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ABSTRACT
Q a '̂Ÿ'Allen, Michael R., M.A., <3tme, 1977 History
Creation of the First American Western Policy, 1783-1787 (307 pp.)
/iDirector: Harry W. Fritz
Following the American Revolution, thousands of pioneers crossed the Appalachian mountains and settled in the trans-montane West. Because of the problems and needs created by this great migration, the American Confederation Congress from 1783 through 1787 had to compose a policy for the trans-Appalachian West. The purpose of this thesis is to survey and discuss the formulation of the land and Indian policies, diplomacy and territorial government ordinances that resulted in the first American western policy. The information contained in the following essays has been drawn from numerous secondary works on the subject, the personal correspondence of individuals who created western policy, the Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress, and the Journals of the Continental Con- gress.
The debate over western policy fit into the sectional division of Confederation political factions. Eastern Nationalists (Northeast- erners who favored strengthening the federal government) were wary of westward expansion, and feared that new western states would lessen their political and economic supremacy. They favored limited migration, a humanitarian Indian policy, revenue-oriented land policy, temporary surrender of American navigation of the Mississippi River, and a colonial form of territorial government. The Southerners were more optimistic about westward expansion, and opposed this Eastern Nationalist view. The South expected political and economic benefits from new western states and therefore favored extensive westward mi­gration, an expansionist Indian policy, liberal land sales provisions, navigation of the Mississippi River, and a democratic form of terri­torial government. From 1783-1784 the South held the upper hand, but with the rise of Nationalism (i.e., the movement to replace the Articles of Confederation with the Federal Constitution) and Southern adoption of the Nationalist program. Congress enacted the Eastern Nationalist western policy. The Land Ordinance of 1785, Indian Ordi­nance of 1786, Jay-Gardoqui Negotiations of 1785-87, and the North­west Ordinance of 1787 are all essentially Eastern Nationalist legis­lation for the West. The rise of Nationalism and adoption of the Constitution were paralleled by adoption of the Eastern Nationalist western policy.
But in the long run, the Eastern Nationalist western policy was a failure. It did not conform to the realities of the frontier, or the desires of the Westerners. As the nation moved west during the nine­teenth century, the Eastern Nationalist western policy was defeated, as were the men who had created it.
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When the states on the eastern shores . . . shall
have become populous, rich, and luxurious, and ready 
to yield their liberties into the hands of a tyrant, 
the gods of the mountains will save us, for they will 
be stronger than the gods of the valleys. Astraea 
will take her flight from the tops of the Allegheny 
when she leaves the New World.
David Howell to Jonathan Arnold, 1784
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/j.
l 'kM êèÉ i"T AMKlUCA.-f/
The emigrants to the frontier lands . . , are the
least worthy subjects in the United States. They are 
little less savage than the Indians; and when possessed 
of the most fertile spots, for want of Industry, live 
miserably.
Timothy Pickering to Rufus King, 1785*
*David Howell in Herbert James Henderson, Party Politics in 
the Continental Congress (New York, 1975), p. 369; Timothy 
Pickering to Rufus King, June 4, 1785, in Charles King, ed. 
The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King (New York, 1894) 
1:106-107.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The old myth that the Confederation Congress was an 
impotent body that did nothing but squabble, and that the 
Confederation era was one of chaos and anarchy resolved by 
the Constitutional Convention, has been effectively chal­
lenged by several historians. Merrill Jensen issued the 
first rebuttal of this "Critical Period" school of Confed­
eration history in the 1930s and *40s.^ More recently 
Herbert James Henderson has argued that "to construe the 
history of the Continental Congress as a kind of confused 
journey toward the Convention of 1787 is anachronistic. . , 
In actuality, the Continental Congress was primarily a
revolutionary legislature, and in this context its record
2was strikingly successful." Indeed, the Confederation
3Congress's list of successes is quite impressive. It
Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation (Madison, 
1940); The New Nation. A History of the United States During 
the Confederation. 1781-1789 (New York, 1950). For the 
"Critical Period" thesis, see John Fiske, The Critical 
Period of American History, 1783-1789 (Boston, 1902), and 
Jensen, New Nation, xii, xiii.
2Henderson, Party Politics, p. 1.
^The American Congress of 1776 to 1787 is usually called 
the "Continental Congress" up until about 1783, and the "Con­
federation Congress" thereafter--although both terms are often
declared American independence, administered the Revolu­
tionary War and Continental Army, framed the alliance with 
France, and, after winning the war, negotiated the Treaty 
of Paris of 1783. The list of domestic achievements follow­
ing the war is also impressive, and is of fundamental impor­
tance in the following essays. For one of the greatest 
achievements of the Confederation Congress was the creation 
of the first American western policy.^
Organization of the West was a major preoccupation of 
Congress during the 1780s. As the Confederation Congress 
attempted to devise a land policy, regulate Indian affairs, 
engage in diplomatic negotiations over the West, and insti­
tute territorial government in the trans-Appalachian region, 
disagreements and differences of opinion arose. These dif­
ferences led to the formation of rudimentary political fac­
tions which held opposing attitudes towards development of 
the West. Although there are exceptions, the following gen­
eralizations are applicable to Congressional factionalism 
over the West in the 1780s. The opposing sides of western 
questions usually coalesced regionally, with the Easterners 
opposing Southerners. At the same time, this sectional 
division contained ideological implications. Most of the 
Easterners who took a stand on the West were Nationalists
interchanged. Since these essays are confined to the 1783-87 
period, "Confederation Congress" will be used.
^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 1-2.
or centralists, while their Southern opposition attracted 
some Southern Nationalists and enjoyed the support of many 
Antifederalists in Congress.^
During the 1783-84 period the Southern coalition held 
the upper hand. This development coincided with an overall 
decline in Nationalist strength in Congress. Thomas Jeffer­
son of Virginia, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, and Anti­
federalist David Howell of Rhode Island joined with others, 
mostly Southern, to formulate a national western policy.
These men looked with hope to the West, and shared what 
Henderson has termed "optimistic expectations of western 
innocence and regeneration." Moreover, they anticipated 
political and economic benefits to accompany admission of 
new western states. Southerners looked forward to economic 
and political allies in the trans-Appalachian frontier, and 
Antifederalists like Howell believed western congressmen
The terms "Easterner," "Southerner," "Nationalist," 
and "Antifederalist" will be discussed throughout these 
essays. For the "Eastern-Southern" dichotomy in the Confed­
eration Congress, see Henderson, Party Politics and footnote 
#7 below. "Easterner" is used here instead of "Northerners" 
because it is the term used by most in the 1780s. The "Na­
tionalists" of the 1780s are defined in Jensen, New Nation, 
xiii, xiv, 425. "Nationalists" were those who favored in- 
creasing the power of the central government at the expense 
of the states. The Nationalists wanted to replace the 
Articles of Confederation and, in 1787, pushed for ratifica­
tion of the Constitution. The terms "centralist" and "Fed­
eralist" are modern-day synonyms for "Nationalist." "Anti­
federalists" is used in these essays to describe those states’ 
righters who opposed a strong national government. Actually 
these men referred to themselves as "Federalists." See 
Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists, Critics of the 
Constitution (New York^ T5blj, vii, xii. But to avoid con­
fusion , I will use the term which has been given to them by 
others.
would help thwart the centralist tenets of the Nationalists. 
After the creation of the National Domain, the Southerners 
drafted the Land Ordinance of 1784, and secured passage of 
Jefferson’s territorial government Ordinance of 1784. Thus 
by the Spring of 1784, it appeared as though the Southern 
coalition had successfully laid the foundations for Ameri­
can western policy. But their ascendency did not last for 
long.
As the centralist impulse increased in the 1780s, a new 
group of men became the architects of American western 
policy. Men such as Rufus King, Nathan Dane, Gouveneur 
Morris, Arthur St. Clair, George Washington, Edward Carring­
ton, Henry Knox, James Duane, John Jay, William Samuel John­
son, and Timothy Pickering were all instrumental in the 
creation of the first American western policy. While not 
solely responsible, these men held the key committee member­
ships and chairmanships, advisory positions, and Confedera­
tion cabinet posts instrumental in formulating policy for 
the trans-Appalachian frontier. These men share common 
characteristics. With the exception of Washington and 
Carrington,^ they were all Northeasterners--residing in the 
Middle and New England states. They all belonged to what
^Washington and Carrington were both Virginia Nationalists, 
and shared much in common with their political allies to the 
North. Washington’s attitudes towards the West provide a 
classic example of a Southerner who advocated the Colonial 
"New England" mode of expansion in the 1780s. See Chapter 5 
below. It is no coincidence that the Federalist Party of the 
17 90s, a political movement with a New England nucleus, had 
a Southerner, George Washington, as its leader.
Henderson calls the "Eastern" party of Confederation poli-
7tics. Ideologically, they were all conservatives and 
Nationalists--they advocated order and stability through a
Ostrong, centralized National government. Every one of 
these men favored the Federal Constitution in 1787, and 
each of them went on to become prominent members of the 
Federalist Party. In the following essays I will refer to 
them as Northerners, Easterners, Northeasterners, New Eng­
landers, and Nationalists--but perhaps the most appropriate 
term comes from combining the findings of Henderson and 
Jensen: these men were Eastern Nationalists.^
7Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 5-6: "What will be re­
ferred to as the 'Eastern bloc* or 'party* can be discerned 
in voting patterns during the entire history of Congress. . , 
Predictably, congressional parties were primarily regional 
. . . Between 1784 and 1787 intersectional alliances were 
less structured at first and then became increasingly 
polarized along a North-South fault that had been implicit 
in the partisan politics of Congress from the outset of the 
Revolution."
OFor the "Nationalists," see footnote #5 above, and 
Jensen, New Nation, xiii-iv, 425.
^I have identified these Eastern Nationalists in Con­
gressional roll-call votes by referring to the extensive 
charts and graphs in Henderson, Party Politics. Perhaps the 
most valuable source was Appendix il, "Federalist Leaders, 
1800-1816" in David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of Ameri­
can Conservatism, The Federal Party in the Era of Jefferson­
ian Democracy (_New York, 1965} , pp. 227-412". Fischer ' s 
appendix contains short biographies of approximately 240 
Federalists, including much valuable information concerning 
their status in the 1780s, and their stand on the Federal 
Constitution of 17 87. Other sources used in identifying 
Nationalists are Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American 
Republic (Chapel Hill, 1969) and Jensen, New Nation.
The Eastern Nationalists shared common attitudes towards 
the West and westward expansion. In the wake of the failure 
of fiscal centralism (Robert Morris’ impost proposal in 1781), 
most Nationalists looked to the West as a viable means of 
national consolidation. They hoped National supervision of 
the West would bring prestige, revenue, and power to the cen­
tral government. But if these motivations made most Eastern 
Nationalists expansionists, they were at the same time very 
reluctant expansionists. Indeed, the Eastern Nationalists 
were not nearly as optimistic about westward migration as 
their Southern opponents. Most Easterners distrusted the 
"lawless Banditti" of the West and feared new western states 
would inevitably decrease the economic and political power of 
the Northeast. Some Easterners were avowed constrictionists, 
and opposed all expansion. Yet most took a more pragmatic 
view. They considered westward migration to be inevitable, 
and planned a carefully controlled and regulated expansion 
that would enhance the power and prestige of the central 
government. The Eastern Nationalists proposed a corporate 
mode of expansion quite similar to the "New England" system 
of colonial settlement. The Easterners advocated a slow, 
well-organized westward advance closely supervised by the 
national government. As the Massachusetts delegates wrote 
Governor Hancock:
It has been a question, with the Eastern Dele­
gates especially, whether peopling those new 
regions with emigrants from the old States, 
may not, in one point of view, be a disadvantage
to them. But it has been found, that these 
new lands are very inviting to settlers, and 
that, if not regularly disposed of and gov­
erned by the Union, they will in a very few 
years, probably be seised upon and settled 
in an irregular manner, and perhaps at no less 
expence to Inhabitants of the old States. Con­
sidering these circumstances, the advantages 
of regular settlements, of lessening, the pub­
lic debt and military expences on the frontier, 
and of keeping, by such settlements, that 
Country more effectually connected with the 
Union, Congress have been induced to adopt 
measures to establish Government, etc., 
there. . .
For the role of the West in Nationalist strategy, see 
Henderson, Party Politics, p. 377: "There were two avenues
toward National consolidation during the mid-eighties. One 
was the regulation of commerce and the other was the regula­
tion of the West." For Eastern antipathy towards the West, 
see ibid., p. 409: The new attitudes toward western govern­
ment were "the afterthought of the optimistic expectations 
of western innocence and regeneration of the Republic earlier 
articulated by Jefferson and Howell. Consequently, there 
developed a movement in Congress to subdue the western threat 
by tightening congressional control over the Northwest and 
by reducing the number of possible states and making their 
admission more difficult." ". . . Not all members of Con­
gress during the succeeding years subscribed to such liberal 
management of the turbulent west (as the Ordinance of 1784) 
however. In addition to the constrictionist tendencies of 
members representing the Atlantic seaboard, manifested in 
both the Northern stance during the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations 
and the Potomac-Chesapeake geo-politics of Virginians such as 
Henry Lee, there was a pervasive fear in the seaboard states 
that migrants to the West were at best castoffs and at worst 
disloyal people from the East. That the frontier should have 
been a scene of violence, litigation, and rumored sedition 
confirmed more than created the fears of the East. It was 
only natural that New Englanders were the most alarmed about 
the West and least sympathetic with the plight of its "law­
less Banditti which forms the Law of those Settlements. . . .* 
Also, ibid., p. 369: "Some Congressmen, particularly New 
Englanders, strongly favored the development of compact 
settlements in order to create communities that could be 
given stability and coherence through early establishment of 
schools and churches. This view, especially when reinforced 
by provisions reserving land in each township for the support 
of education and religion, was opposed by libertarians who
8
Throughout the 1784-87 period the Eastern Nationalists 
worked to implement their western program. They advocated 
a humanitarian Indian policy, and a revenue-oriented land 
sales program. They tried to appease Spain with offers to 
surrender American navigation of the Mississippi for twenty 
to twenty-five years, and they proposed to institute a 
strong colonial territorial government in the trans- 
Appalachian West. Nearly all of their efforts were opposed 
by Howell, and a Southern coalition led by Jefferson, James 
Monroe, William Grayson, Hugh Williamson, and Charles 
P i n c k n e y . A s  time passed, the opposition decreased for
objected to such corporate arrangements. The advocates of 
rapid expansion for revenue often joined forces for different 
reasons. Libertarians who favored a minimum of restraint 
might find common cause with speculators who wanted a free 
hand to exploit the land."
^^One cannot state that the opposition to the North­
easterners was overwhelmingly Antifederalist, but note that 
half the opponents of the Eastern mode of expansion were 
also Antifederalist leaders, i.e., Howell, Grayson, and 
Monroe. While the Antifederalist and "States' rights" posi­
tion seems conducive to a less restrained mode of westward 
migration, there is no consistent Antifederalist position on 
the subject. One problem is that the Antifederalists were 
much more concerned with thwarting the Nationalist movement 
in Congress than with the West. At the same time some Anti­
federalist leaders, such as Elbridge Gerry and Richard Henry 
Lee, thoroughly supported the Nationalist western policy. 
Problems arise when one tries to find a consistent Libertarian 
strain among Antifederalists, especially the leaders. As 
Staughton Lynd and Jackson Turner Main have pointed out, the 
background and motivations of Antifederalist leaders were 
often far different from those of their following among the 
general populace. See Jackson Turner Main, The Antifed­
eralists Critics of the Constitution, pp. x-xi.
several reasons. Most Southerners, especially the Virgin­
ians, were so anxious to see new western states enter the 
Union that they were willing to compromise over western 
policy to secure that end. They bargained in the belief
that any expansion was better than none. The classic exam-
12pie of this Southern "geo-political" strategy was when, 
in 178 5, the Southerners accepted a modified "New England" 
mode of land sales in the Land Ordinance of 1785. But this 
agreement did not last for long. The Jay-Gardoqui negotia­
tions of 1786 again split Congress right down the middle 
over the western question. In the final analysis, it was 
the rise of Southern Nationalism, particularly in Virginia, 
that won acceptance of the Eastern Nationalist western
policy. The controversy over the West was settled in the
13"Compromise of 1787" between Eastern and Southern Nation­
alists meeting concurrently in the Constitutional Convention 
and the Confederation Congress. Thus the victory of the 
Eastern Nationalist western policy is a window through which 
one can view the overall Nationalist victory in 1787. It is 
no coincidence that the Federal Constitution and the North­
west Ordinance were both drafted in the summer of 1787. One 
was directly related to the other. Indeed, the whole western 
question was a catalyst for the rise of Nationalism.
1 2For the Southern "geo-political strategy" see Hender­
son, Party Politics, p. 415.
^^For the "Compromise of 1787," see Chapter 7, below.
10
Before proceeding, something must be said of the use 
of the term ’’conservative" in the following essays. A 
premise of these essays is that the Nationalists, and more 
particularly the Eastern Nationalists, were the "conserva­
tives" of the Confederation era. Many will disagree with 
this analysis, but such disagreements are nothing new.
The leaders of America in the 1780s themselves could not 
agree as to who was "conservative" and who was "radical," 
"liberal," or "Revolutionary." Both Antifederalists and 
Nationalists claimed to be the sole heirs of the American 
radical Revolutionary ideology. The ’proper’ designation 
depended upon how one interpreted that Revolutionary 
ideology--a most debatable subject, to be sure. Thus, it 
is only natural that disagreements continue today, espe­
cially among historians. The interpretation of Antifed­
eralist and Nationalist ideology as either radical or con­
servative is purely subjective.
As stated, the West is a good window through which one
Jensen and Main, for example, contend that the Na­
tionalists were "conservatives" because they tried to tem­
per the liberal-democratic aspects of Revolutionary 
ideology. In promoting the Constitution, they sought 
order, stability, and security--the age-old goals of all 
conservatives. Jensen's view is questioned by Gordon S. 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 
who considers the "Federalists" as the true radicals of 
the 1780s. For the dispute today over the nature of Con­
federation politics in the 1780s, see Richard B. Morris, 
"The Confederation Period and the American Historian," The 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series (1956):139-56.
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can view the Eastern Nationalist social and political philos­
ophy. The Northeasterners feared the West. They disliked 
the lowly sort of people who were settling the trans- 
Appalachian frontier and feared grave political reversals 
should they be granted the vote. They believed westward 
migration would somehow upset their section’s economic 
supremacy. To salve their fears, the Eastern Nationalists 
sought to slow settlement and delay western growth through 
a tightly controlled, forceful national western policy. 
Perhaps ’control’ is a key word here. The conservatives' 
answer to the western problem, as with so many other prob­
lems, was control: centralization of authority in a power­
ful national government. The conservatives who wrote the 
Federal Constitution believed the ends of society could 
best be achieved by a government that exercised greater con­
trol over men’s lives. The unpopularity of Eastern Nation­
alist beliefs became increasingly obvious, and led to the 
extinction of the Federalist party. The decline of the 
Federalists was paralleled by a repudiation of the Eastern 
Nationalist western policy. The centralist impulse, of 
course, did not die with the Federalists. It has been re­
fined over the past two centuries and enjoys more support 
today than ever before. Indeed, the centralist impulse is 
part and parcel of the American political tradition. It 
is debatable, however, whether the centralist impulse is at 
all related to the radical political tradition of the Ameri­
can Revolution.
CHAPTER I I
BEYOND THE ENDLESS MOUNTAINS
Cheer up, brother, as we go 
O ’er the mountains, westward ho 
Where herds of deer and buffalo 
Furnish the fare
Then o'er the hills in legions boys 
Fair freedom’s star 
Points to the sunset region, boys 
Ha, ha, ha-ha!
When we’ve wood and prairie land 
Won by our toil
W e ’ll reign like Kings in fairy-land 
Lords of the soill^
The Scotch-Irish pioneers of western Pennsylvania and 
Virginia called the Allegheny Mountains and the northern 
Appalachians the "Endless Mountains." If there was an end 
to these mountain ranges, very few white men in the mid­
eighteenth century had seen it, or knew what lay beyond.
The unknown land was rich and green. Much of the "Old North­
west" was shaded by oaks and a variety of deciduous trees, 
while near the Great Lakes there lay a great pine wilderness. 
Throughout all of this country was interwoven open spaces of 
deep black soil and rich prairie land. Farther south lay
Quoted in John D. Barnhart, Valley of Democracy, The 
Frontier Versus the Plantation in the Ohio Valley. 1775- 
1818 (Bloomington, 1953), p. 34.
12
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Kentucky, Tennessee, and the frontier of the trans-Appalachian 
Southwest. Kentucky was a lush, rolling country covered by 
forest and meadows, with cane ten to twelve feet high and 
buffalo grass and clover. Wildlife was plentiful. There 
were flocks of turkeys, partridges, and pheasants; squirrels, 
raccoons, opossums, deer, bears, elk, and, until the 1790s, 
herds of buffalo. Through the heart of the trans-Appalachian 
West flowed the "Beautiful River," the Ohio, stretching for 
over a thousand miles until it entered the great Mississippi. 
Indian tribes inhabited the banks of the Ohio or settled in 
the forests and valleys of the West. In the North were tribes 
that spoke the Algonquin tongue--the Wyandots, Delaware, 
Chippewa, and Shawnee nations of the Ohio Valley. The Chero­
kee, Choctaw, Creek, and Crow tribes built their unique so­
cieties in the Old Southwest. For hundreds of years, the 
Indians, northern and southern, had the trans-Appalachian 
West all to themselves. They fished, hunted, and roamed in 
relative solitude. But the middle eighteenth century brought
change. White men from the Eastern seaboard began to pene-
2trate beyond the "Endless Mountains."
The first white men to see the Mississippi Valley were 
early French and Spanish explorers--DeSoto, Marquette, and 
LaSalle. The French and Spanish each built several outposts
2Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American His- 
tory (New York, 1920), pp. 130, 160-62 ; Reginald Horsman,
The Frontier in the Formative Years, 1783-1815 (New York, 
1970) , pp. 2-3, 6.
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in the Valley in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
but their preoccupations were trapping and trading, and 
the Indians were not greatly affected by their presence.
The British entrance, however, radically changed the history 
of the trans-Appalachian West. By mid-century, and espe­
cially after the French and Indian War, stories had begun to 
circulate in the thirteen American colonies about the rich 
lands beyond the mountains. Men like George Washington be­
came involved in land speculation schemes, and the Vandalia, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Wabash land companies were founded in 
the 1760s and 1770s. Daniel Boone himself was a scout for 
the land companies. By the late sixties and seventies, a 
steady stream of actual settlers was crossing the Appalachians 
and settling in the Bluegrass region of Kentucky. The Brit­
ish colonial administrators in America were appalled. The new 
settlements were illegal (since all of the pioneers were 
squatters) and they contradicted the claims of the various 
land companies. Much worse, they antagonized the western 
Indian tribes, whose friendship the British were cultivating. 
Thus the British western policy, starting with the Proclama­
tion of 1763 (which forbade settlement beyond the Appalachians), 
was avowedly constrictionist. The settlers could not have 
cared less. As Lord Dunmore, the Royal Governor of Virginia, 
observed in 1774, British efforts to halt expansion were,
insufficient to restrain the Americans; and 
that they do and will remove as their avidity 
and restlessness incite them. They . . . for 
ever imagine the Lands further off are still
15
better than those upon which they are already 
Settled . . . proclamations have been published 
from time to time to restrain them: But . . .
they do not conceive that Government has any
right to forbid their taking possession of a 
vast tract of country.
Americans continued to migrate, the British notwithstanding.
As I. R. Christie has shown, American opposition to British
western policy was one of the several grievances that led to
3the Declaration of Independence in 1776.
Settlement slowed during the Revolutionary War and then 
resumed, with increased vigor, following the Treaty of Paris 
of 1783. This was the beginning of what became the "Great 
Migration" of the early nineteenth century. Who were the 
settlers who intended to tame the Appalachian wilderness? 
During these early years they were, for the most part, men 
and women of the upland South--North Carolina, Virginia, and 
southwestern Pennsylvania. Many were English, Scotch-Irish, 
and German immigrants who had settled the frontiers of the 
original colonies. To journey farther west seemed a natural 
progression. They migrated for a number of reasons, most of 
which boil down to dissatisfaction with their lives on the 
seaboard. Some left for religious reasons, or to escape the 
law, taxes, and creditors. All of them were restless, bored, 
and wanted to improve their station in life. They wanted 
good land, and the rights and privileges that came with it.
For the West from 1763 to 1776, see Francis S. Phil- 
brick, The Rise of the West, 1754-1850 (New York, 1965), 
pp. 1-52; Lord Dunmore in ibid., p. 353; and I. R. Christie, 
Crisis of Empire: Great Britain and the American Colonies. 
1754-1783 (New York, 1966.
16
And there was plenty of land in the West.^
There were several routes over the Appalachian Moun­
tains. Many of the Scotch-Irish moved south, down the 
"Great Valley" of the Appalachians. They either settled 
in western Virginia or North Carolina, or moved overland 
into Kentucky and Tennessee. The Wilderness Road, blazed 
by Daniel Boone in 1775, led into Kentucky. Settlers 
would start in North Carolina, travel the Holston River 
through the Powell Valley and on to the Cumberland Gap.
From there the Wilderness Trail led them to the Bluegrass 
country. On this road it was "hardly possible for a carriage 
to pass," according to one traveler. And another described 
it as the "longest, blackest, hardest road" in America. One 
other southern route, this one leading to Tennessee, appeared 
with the opening of the Natchez Trace in 1788. But for most 
of the travelers, the goal was the Ohio--or some other navi­
gable river to take them West. Virginians went up the 
Potomac and took the Cumberland Road across southwest Penn­
sylvania. Once at Pittsburgh they could journey down the 
Ohio to Kentucky. The most popular route of all was Forbes 
Road--the old French and Indian War military road that 
went from Philadelphia, over the Alleghenies, to Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. From there one could take the Ohio River to
Turner, Frontier in American History, p. 164; Phil- 
brick, Rise of the West, pp. 98, 319; Horsman, Formative 
Years. p. 21.
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western Virginia and Kentucky,
KENTUCKY 
AND TENNESSEE
Louisville
Harrodsburg,
WILDERNESS_ /
Knoxville* Nashville
50 100A Musciv I Shoals
Horsman, The Frontier in the Formative Years, p. 5„
All of the pioneers of the 1780s needed transportation 
for their families and supplies. Morris Birbeck, an early 
western chronicler, wrote, "a cart and single horse frequently 
afford the means of transfer, sometimes a horse and pack 
saddle. Often the poor pilgrim bears all his effects and his 
wife follows, naked footed, bending under the hopes of the 
family." But wagons were abundant and cheap; by 1790 the d e ­
sign of the "Conestoga" wagon was perfected. Thus there were 
many of these vehicles "so light you might almost carry it, 
yet strong enough to bear a good load of bedding, utensils.
’Philbrick, Rise of the West, pp. 82, 303-306.
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and provisions, and a swarm of young children," heading over 
the mountain passes. Whatever the route or means of over­
land transportation, most were headed for the Ohio, and once 
they reached it the mode of passage changed to one of any 
number of river craft. Birchbark canoes, pirogues or "dug- 
outs," and batteaus (an extra-large and sturdy canoe) were 
common, but the most popular river craft by far were arks, 
keelboats, and "flatboats." A flatboat was a large, bulky 
floating box made out of rough wood. The flatboats had 
enough space for a living quarters, small kitchen, and stor­
age room for household goods and even livestock. They cost 
from fifty to a hundred dollars to build and could be torn 
apart for use at journey's end. May through September was 
"flatboat season" on the Ohio, and in good weather the trip 
from Pittsburgh to Louisville, Kentucky took seven to ten 
days.̂
Most settlement during the 1780s was south of the Ohio-- 
in Kentucky, that "new and beautiful country of canes and 
turkeys." Settlement via the Ohio River and the Wilderness 
Road resulted in a total population of around twenty to 
thirty-five thousand in 1785. Harrodsburgh and Boonesborough, 
both founded in 177 5, were joined in the 178 0s by a number of 
new towns, including Louisville and Lexington. To the south.
Ibid., pp. 306-14. Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of 
the West (New York, 1962), p. 145. Roosevelt’s history is 
perhaps one of the most readable as well as reliable his­
tories of the trans-Appalachian West.
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the Tennessee country experienced considerable growth in the 
eastern river valleys and on the Cumberland River, near 
Nashville. Wautauga, founded by James Robertson in the late 
1760s, was joined in 1783 by the self-proclaimed "state" of 
Franklin. Land speculations by Robertson, William Blount,
John Sevier, and other North Carolineans spurred settlement 
of that region. Georgia boasted a population of 75,000, 
but expansion into Alabama was slowed by the strong Spanish 
presence, as well as Indian opposition. The country was fer­
tile, however, and Americans had already probed as far as
7Natchez, Mississippi.
All of this southern settlement is often contrasted with 
the relatively slow advance in the "Old Northwest" during the 
1780s. Confederation western policy and strong Indian resis­
tance both served to limit settlement north of the Ohio. Yet 
even there the white presence grew. The British occupied 
their northwest posts, and French settlements in the region 
included Detroit, Prarie DuChien, Kaskaskia, and Vincennes. 
American trappers and traders frequented the region (as had 
American militiamen during the Revolution), and the Ohio 
River traffic bordered the Old Northwest. Moreover, squatters 
were daily crossing the Ohio, avoiding federal troops, settl­
ing on lands, and fighting the Indians. And thousands more 
were poised and ready to join them. Thus, the entire trans-
7Horsman, Formative Years, pp. 2-3, 9; Philbrick, Rise 
of the West, pp. 80-91, 316; Roosevelt, Winning of the West, 
p. 144.
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Appalachian West was alive with activity in the 1780s. It 
seemed to many "as if the old states would depopulate, and 
the inhabitants be transplanted in the new." Some indication 
of the extent of the migration is the amount of river traffic. 
Between 1786 and 1788, some 16,000 settlers in over 800 boats 
passed Pittsburgh on their way south. The monthly average of 
people migrating rose from 384 in March of 1787 to 1,053 in 
June of 1788. The 1790 national census showed 73,000 inhabi­
tants in Kentucky and 35,000 in Tennessee. To the north, 
western Pennsylvania numbered 52,000 and the Old Northwest 
contained 5,000 with the number climbing daily. Indeed, 
some 250,000 Americans had made new homes west of the Appala­
chian watershed in the 1780s. As Morris Birbeck observed.
Old America seems to be breaking up, and mov­
ing westward. We are seldom out of sight, 
as we travel on this grand track towards the 
Ohio, of family groups, behind and before 
us. . . . Add to these the numerous stages 
loaded to the utmost, and the innumerable 
travelers on horseback, on foot, and in 
light wagons, and you have before you a 
scene of bustle and business extending over „ 
three hundred miles, which is truly wonderful.
Meanwhile on the eastern seaboard, the Confederation Con­
gress watched these developments with interest and concern. 
Nearly everyone agreed that the national government would have 
to play some kind of role in regulating this great westward
OHorsman, Formative Years, pp. 5, 30-37; Barnhart,
Valiev of Democracy, pp. 38, 40, 44; Philbrick, Rise of the 
West. pp. 81, 90-91; Morris Birbeck in ibid., p. 310. Bir­
beck* s observations were recorded in the early nineteenth 
century while traveling from Philadelphia over Braddock’s Road,
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surge. Congress would have to create a public domain, devise 
a method for surveying and selling public lands, formulate an 
Indian policy, and engage in diplomatic negotiations with the 
Spanish in the Old Southwest. Most important. Congress would 
have to devise some form of territorial government so as to 
establish the rule of law in the trans-Appalachian West.
Nearly everyone in Congress agreed these measures were neces­
sary, but agreement ended there. Great differences of opinion 
over western policy divided the members of the Confederation 
Congress. Many had opposing ideas as to what form the west­
ward movement ought to take. These differences of opinion 
and ideas were frequently debated during the period from 
1783 to 1787, when the Confederation Congress created the 
first American western policy.
CHAPTER I I I
CREATION OF THE NATIONAL DOMAIN: THE VIRGINIA
CESSION AND THE ORDINANCE OF 1784
There are at present many great objects before 
Congress; but none of more importance, or 
which engage my attention more than that of 
the Western country. . . . The Western world 
opens an amazing prospect as a national fund, 
in my opinion; it is equal to our debt. As a 
source of future population and strength, it 
is a guarantee to our independence. As its 
inhabitants will be mostly cultivators of the 
soil, republicanism looks to them as its 
guardian. -,
David Howell of Rhode Island, 1784
The heavy westward migration following the Revolution 
created many new problems for the Confederation Congress. 
But Congress could not act until it gained legal jurisdic­
tion over the trans-montane West--Congress needed legal 
title to a truly National Domain. The major roadblock to 
creation of the National Domain was opposition from some of 
the thirteen states. Several states, the most important of 
which was Virginia, laid claim to portions of the trans- 
Appalachian IVest. They claimed jurisdiction over those 
areas, and refused to cede them until Congress met certain 
conditions. Thus the issue of the state land cessions and
^David Howell to ?, in Edmund Cody Burnett, ed., Letters 
of the Members of the Continental Congress (Washington, D.C., 
1936), VII:451.
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creation of the National Domain is a natural starting point 
in an investigation of American western policy. Congress 
could not sell lands, negotiate with the Indians and Spanish, 
or establish territorial governments in the West until the 
National Domain came into being.
This chapter will focus on two important events in the 
creation of the National Domain and western policy: The
Virginia land cession and the territorial government Ordi­
nance of 1784. Congress discussed these two matters during 
the early 1780s and engaged in partisan debate. "Landed" 
states Opposed "landless" states and agricultural interests 
opposed land speculators. Politically, the debate in Con­
gress was between a Southern-Antifederalist coalition and 
Eastern Nationalists and Maryland land speculators. Men 
like Thomas Jefferson and David Howell believed the National 
Domain should exclude land speculators, and that territorial 
government should be democratic. Eastern Nationalists and 
their allies wanted a policy favorable to land speculators 
and a strong, federally controlled territorial government.
This basic division is indicative of a South vs. East regional 
split over western policy that continued throughout the 1780s 
and the early national period.
1784 was an ebb year for the Eastern Nationalists.
Failure of Morris* impost and fiscal centralism left their 
party in disarray. The weakness of the Nationalists was 
furthered by the western question and land cession debates.
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which split the party into Northeastern and Southern £ac- 
2tions. Thus, when Thomas Jefferson came to serve in Con­
gress in 1784, that body was quite receptive to his liberal 
program for westward expansion. The decline of Nationalist 
strength and the influence of Jefferson combined to dis­
courage land speculators and secure passage of the Virginia 
land cession in 1784. Moreover, Jefferson, Howell, and 
others were able to draft a remarkably democratic form of 
territorial government for the trans-Appalachian West--the 
Ordinance of 1784.
[P]owerful confederated Land Jobbers . . . 
have long had in contemplation immense 
possessions in this ceded country, under 
pretence of Indian purchases, and other 
plausible, but not solid titles . . . .  The 
modes and methods, which these artists 
pursue, are well understood. . . . They pre­
tend great friendship and concern for the 
Independency, the Union, and Confederation 
of America, but by circuitous means, attack 
and destroy those things, that are indis­
pensable to those ends. . . . Now when 
Virginia, has yielded half, and more than 
half of her Charter claim, the argument 
will be applied to the terms as improper.
3Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams, 1784 
The state land cessions, of which the Virginia cession 
of the Old Northwest is the most important, are highly com-
^Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword, The Beginnings of the 
Military Establishment in America (New York, 1975), pp. 53-54; 
Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 141, 338-39.
^Quoted in Merrill Jensen, "The Creation of the National 
Domain, 1781-1784," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVI 
(December 1939): 326.
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plicated affairs that span the entire Revolutionary era.
The purpose here is to make some sense out of the compli­
cated series of events that led to the creation of the 
National Domain on March 1, 1784. The land cession contro­
versy paralleled the Revolutionary War and was a thorn in 
the side of the wartime Congress. The events surrounding 
the cessions can be divided into two chronological periods:
(1) from the outbreak of the Revolution to 1781, when Vir­
ginia’s first cession was rejected by Congress; and (2) from 
Spring of 1781 until March 1, 1784, when Congress finally 
approved the Virginia cession.^ Several themes that run 
throughout the debates are the conflicting claims of Vir­
ginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York to the Ohio 
Valley ; insistence of the ’’landless" states (Maryland, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania) that the Ohio country be ceded for 
the common benefit of all members of the Confederation; ef­
forts of American land-jobbers and speculators (most of them 
from the "landless" states) to influence Congressional policy; 
the counter-efforts of Virginians and other Southerners to
Although Congress accepted Virginia’s cession on March 1, 
1784, the cession was later revised and resubmitted. This 
followed the Monroe committee recommendation that the Old North­
west be divided into "no more than five and no less than three" 
new states. Since this proposed division contradicted the 
original Virginia cession (which called for numerous small 
states in the trans-Appalachian West), it had to be redrafted 
and accepted once again. See Chapter 7 below. The heated 
debates over the Virginia cession, however, occurred during 
the 1776-1783 period.
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secure a liberal western policy; the effect all of this had 
in delaying ratification of the Articles of Confederation 
and formation of a national western policy; the importance 
of the cessions debate in the Northeast-South dichotomy in 
national politics; and the role of the debate over the West 
in the evolution of a Nationalist movement in the Confedera­
tion Congress. Only with all these factors in mind can one 
embark on an investigation of the Virginia cession and the 
creation of the National Domain.^
When the Americans declared themselves independent in 
1776, four of the thirteen new states claimed portions of 
the Old Northwest. Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut 
all claimed overlapping portions of the Ohio country according 
to the terms of their colonial charters, while New York based 
a claim in the same region on a dubious purchase from the 
Iroquois Confederation. These four states are known as the
The best secondary accounts of the land cession contro­
versy are Thomas Perkins Abernethy, Western Lands and the 
American Revolution (New York, 1937); and Merrill Jensen's 
articles, "The Cession of the Old Northwest," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review XXIII (June 1936):27-49, and "Crea­
tion of the National Domain," pp. 323-42.
^North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia all claimed 
portions of the Old Southwest territory, but the main focus 
of this essay (and other essays in this thesis) will be the 
Old Northwest. Because the Southern states refused to cede 
their lands, much of the western legislation was applicable 
only to the Ohio country. South Carolina ceded its western 
claims in 1787, and North Carolina ceded the Tennessee region 
in 17 92. But the entire Southwest did not legally become part 
of the National Domain until Georgia ceded its claims in 1802.
Note that the Indian title to the trans-Appalachian, the 
most solid title of all the claimants, is not discussed in 
this essay. See Chapter 4 below.
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"landed" states of the Revolutionary era, and can be con­
trasted with the "landless" states of New Jersey, Pennsyl­
vania, and Maryland. During the 1776-1783 period a great 
rivalry grew among and between these landed and landless
states as they argued over who should benefit from land
Isales in the trans-Appalachian West. Most Americans, includ­
ing those in the landed states, believed the western lands 
should be ceded to the Confederation and sold to benefit all 
of the thirteen United States. The desired cessions and 
sales might have occurred had not the whole issue been com­
plicated by land speculators and profiteers from Pennsylvania,
7New Jersey, and Maryland. During the 1770s the Indiana, 
Illinois-Wabash, and Vandalia land speculation companies from 
these three landless states negotiated numerous questionable 
land purchases with the Indian tribes in the Ohio Valley.
These companies' "titles" conflicted with and compounded the 
confusion generated by the Virginia, New York, Connecticut, 
and Massachusetts claims to the region. The landed states 
refused to recognize each other's claims, and Virginia re­
fused to cede its lands to Congress so long as there was any 
chance that the speculators' claims might be recognized as
nThere were Southern land speculators, of course, and 
William Blount, the Franklinites, John Sevier, and the Yazoo 
profiteers are just a few of the more infamous. Those who 
invested in Northwest lands, however, were mainly Eastern 
(with the important exception of Maryland) and included 
Hamilton, Morris, Duer, Pickering, and other Nationalists. 
Land speculation was a common occupation among Eastern 
Nationalists.
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STATE LAND CLAIM S AND CESSIONS AFTER 1783
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valid. The Virginians had the most solid claim to the trans-
Omontane region, and resolved to not cede their title until
the land speculators’ purchases were declared null and void.
The Virginia Gazette sounded their battle cry:
Notwithstanding the impudent assertions . . . 
industriously circulated by the lordly claim­
ants of millions of acres of that western 
territory. . . .  We can assure the public 
that the honourable Congress, as a body, has 
taken no step to confirm the claims of these 
politic individuals, who at the expence of 
millions yet unborn, would erect themselves 
into petty Sovereigns, and defeat the good 
purpose for which so many brave men have shed 
their dearest blood."
As the Revolutionary War commenced, so too did the bitter 
struggle over western lands and the determination of a Con­
federation pdlicy for the trans-Appalachian frontier.
Land disputes came immediately to the fore while the 
Articles of Confederation were being written. Nationalists 
and speculators from the landless states insisted the Articles 
of Confederation include a provision giving the Confederation 
Congress complete autonomy over the Ohio Valley. Eastern Na­
tionalists were particularly interested in a measure that
^Most thought the Virginians' claim most valid because: 
(1) their colonial charter (one of the first granted) included 
Ohio lands; (2) their state bounded much of the Ohio country; 
(3) Virginia pioneers inhabited the region; and (4) the Vir­
ginia militia established a semi-permanent military presence 
there during the Revolution.
^Jensen, New Nation, pp. 350-52; Edmund Cody Burnett,
The Continental Congress (New York, 1941), p. 536; Horsman, 
Formative Years, pp. 30-31; Jensen, "Cession of the Old North­
west," pp. 27-28; Julian P. Boyd, ed.. The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson (Princeton, 1953), VI:572. The Virginia Gazette 
quote is in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson. VI : 572.
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would strengthen the power and prestige of the national 
government. They had considerable support in Congress 
since Nationalist delegates Thomas Johnson, Charles Carroll, 
Samuel Chase, James Wilson, Samuel Wharton, and Robert Morris 
all supported enthusiastically a measure which would benefit 
land companies in which they were all major stockholders. In 
opposition to these profiteers stood David Howell of Rhode 
Island, Thomas Jefferson, Arthur Lee, James Madison, and 
many other Southerners. The land issue not only split Con­
gress into Eastern and Southern factions, but eventually 
divided the Nationalist party into Northern and Southern 
c a m p s . T h o s e  states with claims to the West outnumbered 
those without (counting the Southern states with claims to 
the Old Southwest), however, and defeated the proposed amend­
ment to the Articles of Confederation, seven to six. Mary­
land was so angry that it refused to ratify the Articles, 
thus beginning a battle that lasted for eight long years.
Since Congress would not accept its terms, Virginia continued 
to control and administer the trans-Appalachian West. Numer­
ous Virginia pioneers lived in this region and needed protec­
tion from the British-Indian alliance on the frontier. Thomas
For Nationalist efforts to strengthen the national 
government through acquisition of a public domain see Merrill 
Jensen, "The Idea of a National Government during the Ameri­
can Revolution," Political Science Quarterly LVIII (1943): 
356-79.
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 338-39.
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Jefferson, the governor of Virginia from 1776-1780, organized 
a military expedition of Virginia militiamen under Colonel 
George Rogers Clark that scored military victories at 
Kaskaskia and Fort Vincennes in 1779. Besides protecting 
Americans in that region, Jefferson's policy served also to 
cement Virginia's claim to the Old Northwest by virtue of 
military occupation. But the Virginians' good fortunes ended 
when General Cornwallis attacked the Tidewater in 1780. Most 
of the state militia was on the frontier with Clark, and 
Virginia was overrun by Redcoats; Jefferson fled the capitol, 
and Colonel Clark's mission aborted. Thus by 1780, most Vir­
ginians felt the Old Northwest was an administrative, finan­
cial, and military headache that should be relinquished to 
the Confederation Congress as soon as possible. But they 
still insisted that the speculators' purchases "be deemed 
and taken as absolutely void," and the battle in Congress
j 12raged on.
Problems created by Maryland's refusal to ratify the 
Articles of Confederation combined with Congress's financial 
woes and an overall desire to settle the western lands ques­
tion to bring about a new series of negotiations in the Con­
tinental Congress during 1780. New York made the first move, 
and ceded its claims to the trans-montane West on February 19,
12Marc Anthony Lewis, "Thomas Jefferson and Virginia's 
Pioneers," Mississippi Valley Historical Review XXIV (1948): 
555, 563-64, 567, 582-88; Jensen, "Cession of the Old North­
west," pp. 30, 34.
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1780. New York's surrender of its dubious purchases was 
not of much importance, however, nor were the claims of 
Massachusetts and Connecticut.^^ Virginia was the key to 
the cession question because that state possessed the most 
valid title and exercised de facto control over the region.
The Virginians hoped they might at last win out, and 
Theodoric Bland wrote optimistically to his fellow Virginian, 
Arthur Lee, that the "covert manoevers of the Land Jobbing 
Companies are so well known and so fully discovered that 
their abettors will hardly be enough to oppose [a cession] 
in its fullest latitude." On April 28, 1780, the Virginia 
legislature drafted a cession proposal that surrendered all 
of its western claims except Kentucky and a small military 
reserve north of the Ohio. The Virginians called for the 
establishment of independent states in the West and reasserted 
their demand that all speculators' purchases be declared null 
and void. Congress debated the Virginia proposal and on
The New York claim, based on an illegal purchase from 
a handful of Iroquois Indians, was never given much credence 
by Congress. See Chapter 4 below. The importance of New York's 
1780 cession (which was not accepted) is that it was a political 
maneuver to gain Southern support for New York's fight with 
Massachusetts over the Vermont country. Congress did not ac­
cept New York's cession until 1786, well after the Public 
Domain was established.
The Massachusetts and Connecticut claims also did not 
carry much weight except among Easterners seeking to lessen 
Virginia's influence in the land question. Congress accepted 
the Massachusetts cession in 1785, while the Connecticut ces­
sion was accepted in 1786. For more information concerning 
this confusing assortment of cessions see Jensen, "The Cession 
of the Old Northwest;" "Creation of the National Domain;" and 
Abernethy, Western Lands.
34
October 10, 1780 agreed.
That the unappropriated lands that may be 
ceded or relinquished to the United States, 
by any particular state . . . shall be dis­
posed of for the common benefit of the 
United States, and be settled and formed 
into distinct republican states, which shall 
become members of the federal union, and have 
the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and 
independence, as other states.14
This resolution was still too vague to satisfy the Vir­
ginians ; they wanted specific guarantees against land-jobbing. 
But the speculators and Eastern delegates refused to provide 
any such assurance. Finally, on January 2, 1781, the Virginia 
legislature officially ceded all of its claims to the region 
north of the Ohio, but included the controversial stipulation 
"that all purchases and deeds from any Indian or Indians, or 
from any Indian nation or nations, for any lands within any 
part of said territory [shall be] deemed and declared absolutely 
void and of no effect." Maryland subsequently ratified the 
Articles of Confederation, but the land speculation interests 
refused to accept the Virginia cession so long as it contained 
such obnoxious stipulations. Thus the first five years of 
debate over western lands left Congress in much the same state 
of confusion as that in which the debate had begun. Maryland
Jensen, "Cession of the Old Northwest," pp. 42-43; 
Jensen, "Creation of the National Domain," p. 326; Burnett, 
Continental Congress, pp. 495-99; Congress’s resolution in 
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed.. Journals of the Continental Con­
gress (Washington, D.C., 1934], XVI11:915. Nearly half of 
the members of Congress opposed this resolution. Eastern 
Nationalists particularly feared the creation of new western 
states.
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ratified the Articles of Confederation, but the landless 
states insisted on a stipulation-free cession. The Virginians 
were just as determined to hang on to the Old Northwest until 
the plans of the land investors could be thwarted. So, as 
the Revolutionary War dragged on, Americans continued to 
bicker among themselves over the future course of that terri­
tory west of the Appalachian mountains.
It seems ironic that Virginia had tremendous difficulty 
making a gift of such a vast and rich territory as the Old 
Northwest. Yet the terms of the Virginia cession precluded 
Congressional approval. As soon as Maryland ratified the 
Articles of Confederation that state began to reiterate its 
demand for a "conditionless" cession of the Ohio Valley.
Thus the Confederation Congress of 1781-1784 spent a great 
deal of time debating over the Virginia cession. The Nation­
alists and speculators in Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsyl­
vania squared off against the Southerners and their Anti­
federalist allies. Each side had enough votes to prevent 
the other's victory, but not enough to implement its own de­
signs. While the Virginians held to their hard line, the 
land companies waged a two-pronged attack. They urged Con­
gress to either (1) assert its claim to sovereignty over the 
Old Northwest on the legal basis that Great Britain had gov­
erned the territory and that the Congress, not Virginia, was
^^Jensen, "Cession of the Old Northwest," pp. 34, 37,
44-45 ,  47.
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the logical successor to the British; or (2) demand a 
stipulation-free cession from the Virginians. They did not 
follow either tactic consistently over the next three years, 
and both views were espoused as expediency dictated.
In the Fall of 1781 Congress appointed a committee to 
discuss the western land problem and make recommendations. 
According to James Madison, this committee was "systemati­
cally and notoriously opposed" to the Virginia claim; its 
members were all from the landless states of Maryland, New 
Jersey, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, Pre­
dictably, the committee’s November 3, 1781 report supported 
the Indiana Company's purchases in the Old Northwest and 
dismissed Virginia's claims to the region as "invalid." 
Moreover, the committee refused to recognize the land grant 
Governor Thomas Jefferson made to those who had fought at 
Kaskaskia and Vincennes with George Rogers Clark. The East­
erners did not have the votes to have this report approved, 
however, and the situation remained unchanged. In April of 
1782 Arthur Lee of Virginia demanded that all debate over 
the West be halted until each member of Congress declared 
(in a roll-call vote) whether or not he owned stock in any 
of the companies affected by the debates. This "purifying 
declaration" of Lee's "was evaded by three days chicane,"
Ibid., pp. 32-35; Burnett, Continental Congress, 
p. 536; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., "Jefferson, The Ordinance 
of 1784, and the Origins of the United States Territorial 
System," The William and Mary Quarterly XXXIX (April 1972): 
236; Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, VI:572.
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and finally dropped altogether. Yet both sides were growing 
weary from the six years of battle. The Virginia state 
assembly urged settlement of the dispute so they would "not 
again be left in uncertainty on that subject." Moreover, 
the end of the Revolutionary War made Congress daily aware 
of the problems of finance, Indian relations, diplomacy, 
land for Revolutionary veterans, and illegal settlement of 
the trans-Appalachian frontier--none of which could be reme­
died until it approved the Virginia cession. As James 
Madison wrote Edmund Randolph: "Every review I take of the
Western territory produces fresh conviction that it is the
true policy of Virginia as well as the United States to
17bring the dispute to a friendly compromise."
By the Spring of 1783 there was some light at the end of 
the tunnel. The war was over, and Congress's desperate 
financial straits necessitated action. Nearly everyone 
favored western land sales to raise money, especially those 
Antifederalists who opposed Morris and the Nationalists' im­
post proposal and taxation schemes. At the same time, the 
military land bounties could not be granted until Congress 
approved the Virginia cession. George Washington addressed 
this problem in a letter to the Indian Affairs committee in 
October of 1783, and warned of imminent Indian warfare lest 
Congress restrain the trespassing "banditti" of the West.
l^Jensen, "Creation of the National Domain," pp. 328, 331 ; 
Jensen, "Cession of the Old Northwest," p. 48.
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On June 6 a Congressional committee had recognized the va­
lidity of Virginia's claim, and at the same time arrived at 
a formula by which Congress could satisfy Virginia's demands 
without making any specific guarantees. That summer Congress
sent a report to the Virginia legislature outlining the terms
18under which its cession would be accepted.
Congress's acceptance of the Virginia cession on March 1, 
1784 was not a victory of the principles for which that state 
fought for seven years. There was no ironclad provision in 
the cession prohibiting land-jobbing and speculation in the 
Ohio Valley. All the Virginia cession included was a provi­
sion tacitly excluding land companies from the trans- 
Appalachian West. Nothing in the cession invalidated the 
purchases of the Illinois-Wabash, Vandalia, and Indiana land 
companies. Virginian Joseph Jones wrote Madison that the
18Jensen, "Creation of the National Domain," pp. 334,
338 ; Jensen, "Cession of the Old Northwest," p. 48.
19See Journals of the Continental Congress, XXVI:114: 
"That all lands within the territory so ceded to the United 
States and not reserved or apportioned to any of the before 
mentioned purposes [Virginia military reserve, George Rogers 
Clark land bounties, etc.] or disposed of in bounties to the 
officers and soldiers of the American army, shall be consid­
ered as a common fund for the benefit of the United States.
. . and shall be faithfully and bonafide disposed of for that
purpose, and for no other purpose whatsoever." (Emphasis 
mine.) The previous cessions all contained a provision spe­
cifically nullifying purchases made from the Indians. See 
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXV: 5 61-6 3. Virginia's 
political hopes in the West can be seen as a motivation for 
the stipulation in their March 1 cession that the ceded terri­
tory be formed into states "not less than one hundred, nor 
more than one hundred and fifty miles square" to be admitted 
into the union with full rights. See Chapter 7 below.
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proposed cession did not "fully remove the fears of our peo­
ple respecting the Indian purchases and grants to companies." 
Yet others believed the cession was in the spirit of the 
original demands. At any rate, the Virginians were sick and 
tired of haggling. They foresaw future political and eco­
nomic benefits to come with westward expansion, and they 
wanted to expedite the matter with a cession. On December 20, 
1783 their legislature issued a final cession of their claims 
to the territory northwest of the Ohio River:
although the terms do not come fully up to 
the propositions of this Commonwealth, they 
are conceived on the whole, to appear so 
nearly to them, as to induce this state to 
accept thereof, in full confidence that Con­
gress will in justice to the State, for the 
liberal cession she hath made, earnestly 
press upon the other states claiming large 
tracts of waste and uncultivated territory, 
the propriety of making cessions equally 
liberal, for the common benefit and support 
of the Union.
Thomas Jefferson presented the cession to Congress on March 1, 
1784. After New Jersey raised some objections. Congress re­
jected it by one vote! Later the same day Pennsylvania, how­
ever, changed its vote, and at long last Congress accepted
20the Virginia cession and created the National Domain.
2 0For Virginia's political and economic motives, see 
Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 370-71. According to Hender­
son, the Virginians thought they would gain political muscle 
from new western states and economic benefits via commerce 
with the West over the Ohio-Kanawha-Monangahelo river sys­
tems. Other information contained in this paragraph is 
drawn from Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 597; Jensen, 
"Creation of the National Domain," pp. 338-42; Merrill D. 
Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography 
(New York, 1970), p. 279; Dumas Malone, Jefferson the Vir-
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So ended one of the most drawn-out and bitter struggles
21in the history of the early American republic. In the
long run, the Virginians’ struggle proved to be in vain.
The sale of millions of acres of Ohio Valley lands at seven 
to eight cents an acre to John Cleve Symmes, the Scioto 
Associates, and the Ohio Company in 1787 in every way vio­
lated the spirit of the Virginia land cession of 1784. But 
the land speculation interests did not have as much politi­
cal support in the Spring of 1784 as they had later. Their 
spokesmen, the Eastern Nationalists, were no longer strong
in Congress. There was not, according to David Howell, "the
2 2least tincture of their poisonous influence." The vacuum
created by this Nationalist ebb was soon filled, however, by 
a more liberal faction including many Southerners and Anti­
federalists. The 1784 Congress held a more optimistic view 
of westward expansion. Led by Thomas Jefferson and David 
Howell, the Confederation Congress began to draft a radical 
territorial government ordinance for the West: the Ordinance
of 1784.
ginian (Boston, 1948), p. 412 ; Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, 
pp. VI : 571, VI1:4 ; Journals of the Continental Congress. 
XXVI:113.
21See footnote number four above.
2 2Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 53-54; Henderson, Party 
Politics. pp. 338-39.
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But we have an immensity of land courting 
the industry of the husbandmen. Is it best 
then that all our citizens should be em­
ployed in its improvement, or that one half 
should be called off from that to exercise 
manufactures and handicraft arts for the 
other? Those who labor in the earth are 
the chosen people of God if ever he had a 
chosen people, whose breasts he has made 
his peculiar deposit for genuine virtue.
It is the focus in which he keeps alive 
that sacred fire which might otherwise es­
cape from the face of the Earth.
Thomas Jefferson, 1785^^
March 1, 1784 is an important date in the history of 
the trans-Appalachian frontier. On that day. Congress ac­
cepted the Virginia cession and examined the first committee 
draft of the Ordinance of 1784. The Ordinance of 1784, pro­
posing a form of government for the western territories, was 
the product of discussion and debates that had begun in 
colonial times. Franklin's Albany Plan (1754) and the Procla­
mation of 1763 both addressed the problem of territorial 
government, and one of the causes of the American Revolution 
was disagreement over British administration of the West.
After 1776, numerous individuals submitted territorial govern­
ment proposals to the Continental C o n g r e s s , y e t  that body
2 3William Peden, ed., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the 
State of Virginia (New York, 1954), pp. 164-65.
^^Arthur Bestor, "Constitutionalism and the Settlement 
of the West: The Attainment of Consensus, 1754-1784," in 
John Porter Bloom, ed., The American Territorial System 
(Athens, Ohio, 1974), pp. 13-44. For a complete discussion
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could do nothing until the state land cessions were complete 
and Congressional authority over the West firmly established. 
Virginia’s cession combined with other factors to make terri­
torial government a first-priority matter for the Confedera­
tion Congress in March of 1784.
Many American leaders argued in 1783 and 1784 that it 
was necessary to establish immediately some order over unruly 
frontiersmen so as to expedite land sales and prevent an 
Indian war. Most of the Congressional delegates from the 
Northeast were wary of the westward movement. Although they 
wanted land revenues, they were afraid of the economic and 
political consequences of westward expansion, and looked upon 
the "white savages" of the frontier with apprehension. One 
Congressional delegation was alarmed because over 400 Vir­
ginians had illegally crossed the Ohio, and "committed many 
wanton and unprovoked acts of cruelty against the Indians." 
The New York delegates warned that the West was "daily over­
run by lawless men who endanger by their Rashness a new 
Indian war." If Congress was planning to sell lands and 
keep peace with the Indians, these squatters would have to 
be controlled. In September and October of 1783 an Indian
Affairs committee chaired by New York Nationalist James Duane
25discussed many of these problems. David Howell’s protests
of territorial government proposals during the Confederation, 
see Chapter 7 below.
Z^The Duane committee was controlled by the Nationalists. 
For a complete discussion of the importance of this committee
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notwithstanding, the Indian Affairs committee reported that 
to provide for "security against the increase of feeble, 
disorderly, and dispersed settlements in those remote and 
extended territories ; against the depravity of manners
which they have a tendency to produce . . .  or against . . .
frequent and destructive war with the Indians," Congress 
must create a strong territorial government to police the 
western frontier. This Indian Affairs committee report 
led to the appointment of Thomas Jefferson, David Howell, 
and Jeremiah Chase to draft and submit an ordinance for the 
government of the western territory. Thus, Congressional 
desire to clamp down on the westerners led to the appoint­
ment of Jefferson, Howell, and Chase. But if Congress 
wanted to get tough with the Westerners, it certainly picked
the wrong men for the job.^^
When Thomas Jefferson came to serve in the Confederation 
Congress in late Fall of 1783, his reputation as a Revolu­
tionary radical and author of the Declaration of Independence 
served to make him a dominant figure in that body. To say 
that Jefferson was keenly aware of and in favor of western
in the formulation of the American Indian and western policies, 
see the first section of Chapter 4 below.
^^For Congressional attitudes towards the West in 1783- 
84, see Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VII;
289, 290, 300-301; Robert F . Berkhofer, Jr., "The Republican 
Origins of the American Territorial System," in Allan G. Bogue, 
éd.. The West of the American People (Itasca, Illinois, 1970), 
pp. 152-61.
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2 7development is to state the obvious. During the six months 
he served in Congress at Annapolis, Jefferson played instru­
mental roles in the drafting of Indian treaties, land policy, 
and the Ordinance of 1784. There has recently been some 
controversy as to just how great a part Thomas Jefferson 
played in drafting the Ordinance of 1784. Robert F. Berk­
hof er, Jr. argues convincingly that Jefferson was not the 
sole author of that document. Several of the provisions of 
the Ordinance were proposed by others prior to 1784, and com­
mittee member David Howell figured importantly in drafting 
the Ordinance. Although Jefferson's fame has no doubt led to 
an exaggeration of his importance in formulating western 
policy, the fact remains that he did chair the three-man com­
mittee that drafted the Ordinance of 1784, and over half of 
the original ideas of the Ordinance were his. It is no coin­
cidence that the Ordinance of 1784 appeared in Thomas Jeffer­
son's handwriting when submitted to Congress on March 1, 
1784.^®
Congress read the first draft of the Ordinance of 1784 
on March 3. Unlike its successor, the Northwest Ordinance of
7 7For Thomas Jefferson and the West, see Lewis, "Jeffer­
son and Virginia's Pioneer, 1774-1781," pp. 551-588; E. Whit­
ney Griswold, "Jefferson's Agrarian Democracy," in Henry C. 
Denthoff, ed., Thomas Jefferson and American Democracy 
(Lexington, Massachusetts , 1971) , pp . 43, 47 , 51, 57 ; Boyd, 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI;581; and, most importantly, 
Peden, Notes on the State of Virginia, pp. 164-65.
7 R The best articles on the Ordinance of 1784 are by 
Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. See "American Territorial System," 
and "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System," pp. 231-262.
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1787, the Jefferson-Howell Ordinance applied to all of the
trans-Appalachian frontier, not just the Old Northwest.
And unlike its forerunner, the Indian Affairs committee re­
port of 1783, this document emphasized natural rights, and 
was egalitarian and democratic. Basically, the proposed 
Ordinance embodied three aspects : (1) a delineation and
naming of fourteen new states to be created in the trans- 
Appalachian West; (2) general rules for an evolution from 
temporary to permanent governments and statehood for the
westerners; and [3) articles of compact to which the new
29western states would have to subscribe.
The part of the report delineating and naming states
was Jefferson's creation. Fourteen new states were to be
formed in the West, and arranged in a symmetrical pattern
described by committee member David Howell:
It is proposed to divide the country into
fourteen new states in the following man­
ner. There are three tiers of states:
One in the Atlantic [the original thirteen], 
one on the Mississippi, and a middle tier.
The middle tier is to be the smallest and 
form a balance betwixt the two more powerful 
ones.
Because he had little physiographic knowledge of the region, 
Jefferson bounded the new states in a scientifically concise 
manner, using lines of longitude and latitude as borders. 
Each state was to be approximately 2° tall and 3° wide, and
2 QFor the three different versions of the Ordinance of 
1784 as it evolved from a committee report to the final 
Ordinance, see Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, VI:603-1S.
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their arrangement was such as to give the new American repub­
lic a scientific, orderly, and balanced appearance. Fear of 
conflict between small and large states influenced Jefferson, 
as did his conviction (drawn from Montesquieu) that govern­
mental units must be small in order to remain republican.
His proposed names for ten of the states are said to have 
drawn guffaws from contemporaries. Sylvania, Michigania, 
Cherroneseus, Assenesipia, Metropotamia, Illinoia, Washing­
ton, Saratoga, Polypotamia, and Pelisipia all exhibit a 
strange combination of Indian roots. Revolutionary kudos, 
and classical endings. But the predetermination of the loca­
tion and names of the states was done, according to Howell, 
so that "Settlers would know exactly, by name or by number, 
in which little republic they lived, so they could move 
quickly about the business of erecting governments." This 
first part of the proposed Ordinance of 1784 was no less than 
a grand scheme for the trans-Appalachian West based upon 
Thomas Jefferson's notions of geographic balance and repub­
lican theory.
Political motives seem to have played a partial role in 
the first and second aspects of the proposed Ordinance. Most 
members of Congress during the 1780s believed that new 
western states would be allies of the South in the sectional
30Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System," 
pp. 241-49; Berkhofer, "American Territorial System," pp. 
154-55; Peterson, Jefferson and the New Nation, p. 281; Phil- 
brick, Rise of the West, p. 125; Burnett, Continental Congress, 
p. 598.
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politics of the Confederation Congress. Thus, one may inter­
pret the first part of Jefferson’s plan, calling for fourteen 
new western .states, as an attempt to insure future Southern 
political power in Congress. Jefferson’s ally David Howell 
and other Antifederalists in Congress were certainly interested
in lessening the political weight of the Nationalist North-
31east. At the same time the government provisions of the 
proposed Ordinance had great political implications.
This second aspect of the Jefferson-Howell Ordinance 
demonstrates the extent to which the Jefferson committee 
ignored the instructions of its forerunner, the Indian Af­
fairs committee of 1783. Nowhere in this first committee 
draft of the Ordinance of 1784 is there provision for govern­
ment controlled by anyone other than those actual settlers 
who would inhabit the trans-Appalachian West. The committee 
granted white male suffrage even though it was not practiced 
in any of the original thirteen states in 1784. Moreover, 
there was no minimum requirement for the number of people 
necessary to form a "temporary” government, so whenever a 
number of settlers in a proposed state felt inclined, they 
could hold a meeting and form a state government. They had 
to use one of the constitutions of the original states as a 
governmental basis, and elect a state legislature to admin­
istrate governmental affairs. They were also to elect a 
representative to serve in the Confederation Congress who
^^Henderson, Party Politics, p. 373
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would be able to debate, but would have no vote. When the
population reached 20,000, the temporary government stage
ended and the state could write a permanent constitution
and form a permanent government. This second stage ended
when the population of the state reached that of the least
populous of the original thirteen states (Delaware had a
population of 60,000 in 1784). Then the new western state
would be admitted to the Confederacy with the same rights,
privileges, and responsibilities as the original thirteen.
By this plan Jefferson and Howell hoped to provide for swift
admission of new western states into the national political 
32process.
The final thrust of the March 3 report was a "Charter 
of Compact," consisting of principles and precepts to which 
the new western states would be bound. They must always 
remain a part of the United States, and accept responsibility 
for a portion of the Confederation's debt. Their state gov­
ernments were to be republican, and subject to the jurisdic­
tion of the Confederation Congress. The final two Articles 
of Compact were Jefferson's own radical contributions. The 
first of the two forbade citizenship in a western state to 
any person holding an hereditary title. This provision aimed
^^Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System," 
p. 246; Berkhofer, "American Territorial System," p. 155. Pop­
ulation estimates of the original thirteen states were inaccu­
rate during the 1780s, and Jefferson seems to have anticipated 
much more westward migration than actually occurred. This is 
why Monroe and other Southerners favored lowering the popula­
tion requirements for statehood in 1786. See Chapter 7 below.
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at the quasi-aristocratic Society of Cincinnati, to which
many Eastern Nationalist Revolutionary War officers be- 
33longed. But the final and most startling Article of Com­
pact stated, "That after the year 1800 of the Christian era, 
there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in 
any of the said states." Jefferson, a Southern slaveholder, 
could see the tragic consequences of Negro slavery in the 
United States. In this proposed draft of the Ordinance of 
1784, he tried to check the growth of slavery before it was 
too late. Had this final Article of Compact remained, 
slavery would have been illegal in the entire western fron­
tier, north and south, and the course of American history
would have been greatly altered.
After Congress read this first committee draft of the 
Ordinance of 1784 on March 3, the debate began. Although 
several Easterners objected to the liberal governmental 
provisions, the initial debate centered around the proposed
delineation and naming of states. Since North and South
Carolina, and Georgia had yet to cede their western lands 
to Congress, many delegates believed Jefferson’s predeter­
mined arrangement of states to be an example of "counting
3 3For the Society of Cincinnati, see the first section 
of Chapter 5 below.
^^Berkhofer, "American Territorial System," p. 155. 
Jefferson discusses his attitudes towards slavery in Peden, 
Notes on the State of Virginia, pp. 162-63, 292. For more 
information concerning the issue of slavery in the terri­
tories, see Chapter 7 below.
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one’s chickens before they were hatched." Congress voted to
begin the new state boundaries from 45® latitude down rather
than 30° up; thus the Old Northwest could be bounded and
settled while Southwestern claims were being resolved. Some
delegates also objected to the proposed state names. Most
thought Jefferson’s names were too fanciful, and voted to
omit them from the Ordinance. With these objections recorded,
the Jefferson-Howell-Chase committee reconvened on March 17,
rewrote the Ordinance of 1784, and submitted it once again on
March 22. Nearly a month passed before Congress commenced a
more heated debate over the nature of government for the
35western territories.
The most important debates over the Ordinance of 1784 
took place from April 19-23. There was considerable argu­
ment at that time over the provisions pertaining to heredi­
tary titles and slavery. More important, many Eastern delegates 
wanted to strengthen national control over the Westerners.
The article prohibiting hereditary titles was first to go. 
Jefferson wrote that Congress struck the clause, "not from 
an approbation of such honors, but because it was thought 
an improper place to encounter them." There was sharp divi­
sion over the question of slavery in the territories.
Southern delegates (with the exception of Jefferson, Monroe, 
and Hugh Williamson) squared off against the Northeast in a
^^Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System," 
pp. 249, 255; Rav Allen Billington, Westward Expansion (New 
York, 1974) , p. 212.
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heated debate. The anti-slavery article needed seven votes, 
but received only six. Jefferson was keenly disappointed 
over the outcome, as is indicated in a letter to James Madi­
son. "The slavery issue," he wrote,
was lost by an individual vote. Only ten 
states were present. The 4 Eastern states,
N. York, Penn'va, were for the clause.
Jersey would have been for it, but there 
were but two members, one of whom [Beatty] 
was sick in chambers. South Carolina,
Maryland, and iVirginia! voted against it.
North Carolina was divided as would have 
been Virginia had not one of its delegates 
[Monroe] been sick in bed. . . . Thus we 
see the fate of millions yet unborn hanging 
on the tongue of one man, and heaven was 
silent in that awful moment.
Jefferson again expressed his disappointment when the Pennsyl-
vania Packet published, erroneously, the "final" version of
the Ordinance of 1784, failing to omit the hereditary titles
and slavery articles. He wrote sarcastically to a friend
that the Packet * s version was,
certainly no act of Congress's because it 
contained a provision or two not quite 
within their level of politics . . . two 
of which as this forgery pretends were an 
exclusion of hereditary honours, and an 
abolition of slavery. When the true act 
shall be published you will find no such 
petty ideas in it.36
A final series of objections resulted in increased powers 
for the Confederation Congress in controlling Westerners.
^^Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System," 
p. 249; Malone, Jefferson the Virginian, p. 414; Burnett, 
Continental Congress, p. 599; Jefferson to Madison, April 25, 
1784, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VI:499- 
500; Jefferson to Francis Hopkinson, May 3, 1784, in ibid.,
VI:511-12; Peterson, Jefferson and the New Nation, p. 283.
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Many Congressmen, mostly Eastern but including some South­
erners, believed that some checks should be put on the 
turbulent West. Delegates Samuel Chase, John Beatty, and 
Elbridge Gerry spearheaded a drive to add four conservative 
new provisions to the Articles of Compact. The first pro­
hibited local interference "with the primary disposal of 
soil by the United States in Congress assembled, nor with 
the ordinances and regulations which Congress may find neces­
sary for securing the title in such soil to bona fide pur­
chasers." A second amendment prohibited taxation of lands 
belonging to the United States, while a third stipulated 
"the lands of non-resident proprietors shall in no case be 
taxed higher than those residents within any new state."
And the conservatives had one final objection to the com­
mittee version of the Ordinance of 1784. Many in Congress, 
especially the Eastern Nationalists, wanted a stronger fed­
eral presence in the West to counter the lawless tendencies 
of the frontier settlers. These attitudes were the basis 
of Duane’s Indian Affairs report recommending a strong, 
nationally controlled territorial government. The conserva­
tives opposed Jefferson’s recommendations for complete self- 
government in the West, but they were opposed by many South­
erners and Antifederalists who favored local autonomy. As 
a compromise, Elbridge Gerry offered an amendment that 
allowed the Confederation Congress to intervene and restore 
order should any difficulties arise before the temporary
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governments were formed in the West. This motion, opposed
by Howell but not Jefferson, declared,
measures not inconsistent with the prin­
ciples of the Confederation, and necessary 
for the preservation of peace and good 
order among the settlers in any of the 
said new states, until they shall assume 
a temporary government as aforesaid, may 
from time to time be taken by the United 
States in Congress a s s e m b l e d . 37
Thus eight major changes were made to the original com­
mittee version of the Ordinance of 1784: (1) the proposed
state names were dropped; (2) the mode of delineating boun­
daries was changed; (3) Congress deleted the hereditary 
titles and (4) slavery provisions; (5) the states were denied 
the power to tax federal lands and (6) the lands of "non­
resident proprietors;" (7) state interference with Confedera­
tion land sales was prohibited; and (8) Congress took mea­
sures to control lawless pioneers before a temporary govern-
3 8ment was established.
With these major changes incorporated. Congress approved 
the Ordinance of 1784 on April 23, 1784.^^ In its final 
form, the document was not so radical or democratic as the 
first committee draft. Some historians contend that Jeffer­
son himself shares partial responsibility for the conservative
37Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, VI:613-1S.
^^Ibid., VI:603-15; Berkhofer, "American Territorial 
System," p. 156.
39journals of the Continental Congress, XXVI:279. For a 
complete text of the Ordinance of 1784, see the Journals, 
XXVI:275-79. The final vote was ten to one.
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turn of the Ordinance. Indeed, Jefferson seconded Elbridge 
Gerry’s motion to prohibit taxation of lands of non-resident 
proprietors; and he voted in favor of the provision allowing 
Congressional intervention before a temporary government 
could be formed. Yet Jefferson's actions were perhaps only 
manifestations of a necessity to compromise. His ideal plan 
of government for the West was the first draft of the Ordi­
nance submitted on March 1, 1784. Any subsequent changes 
were wrought by the need to incorporate differing points of 
view into the document. Moreover, Jefferson’s actions be­
tween March 1 and April 23 simply do not evidence that much 
of a shift in opinion. He continued to fight for the exclu­
sion of titled aristocracy, and advocated rapid admission of 
fourteen new western states into the union. His vote in 
favor of the Gerry amendment did not compromise his original 
intentions, because that amendment only allowed Congressional 
intervention before formation of a temporary government. One 
must remember that there was no minimum population require­
ment for the formation of temporary governments under the 
Ordinance of 17 84. Temporary governments could have been 
formed as soon as a few hundred settlers had a mind to do so. 
Considering the Westerners' proclivity for forming states and 
writing constitutions during the 1780s, the period of federal 
policing would surely have not lasted for long. Even as
^^Berkhofer, "Origins of the U.S. Territorial System,"
pp. 250-53.
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amended the Ordinance of 1784 was a radical document. It 
granted white male suffrage long before any state in the 
union did so, and it provided for immediate self-government 
for western settlers. Had it remained in effect, the 
Jefferson-Howell Ordinance of 1784 would have been a classic 
example of Revolutionary radicalism in legislative form.
By the summer of 1784, the Confederation Congress had 
created a national domain and adopted an Ordinance for gov­
erning the western territories. Yet the Congress accom­
plished this only after eight years of bitter and divisive 
debate between Eastern Nationalists and Southerners. Accep­
tance of the Virginia cession and the Ordinance of 1784 shows 
that in 1784 the Southerners had won a victory--but it was a 
temporary victory. The Ordinance of 1784 was never put into 
effect. Congress ignored it for three years, largely because 
of conditions on the frontier, and then replaced it with the 
Northwest Ordinance of 178 7. The Northwest Ordinance appears 
neo-colonial when contrasted with its 1784 forerunner. By 
instituting a federally controlled territorial government and 
property qualifications for voting and office-holding. Con­
gress took the heart out of the Jefferson-Howell plan. Pas­
sage of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was a Nationalist 
victory, and is indicative of changing political trends in 
the Confederation Congress. That document could never have 
passed in 17 84, because the Nationalist star had waned in
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that year. Robert Morris was a lame duck, and most of the 
Nationalists had gone home. The final blow was the western 
question itself. The Virginia cession debate split the 
Nationalists right down the middle--North vs. South.
Virginia Nationalists James Madison and Arthur Lee broke 
ranks with their former Eastern allies James Wilson, Charles 
Carroll and Samuel Wharton. The decline of the Nationalists 
was only temporary, to be sure, but in viewing it we can see 
the evolution of Confederation party politics. The Nation­
alists could not strengthen the central government or imple­
ment their western policy until they won a majority once 
again. And they could not win a majority until the nation 
started moving towards centralism, and the split with the 
South was repaired.
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 338-39.
CHAPTER IV
INDIAN POLICY IN THE CONFEDERATION CONGRESS
Although the disposition of the people of 
the States to emigrate into the Indian 
country cannot be effectually prevented, 
it may be restrained by postpoining new 
purchases of Indian territory, and by pro­
hibiting citizens from intruding on Indian 
lands. It may be regulated by forming 
colonies under the direction of the govern­
ment and by posting a body of troops to 
execute their orders. As population shall 
increase and approach the Indian boundaries, 
game will be diminished and new purchases 
may be made for small considerations. This 
has been and probably will be the inevitable 
consequences of cultivation. It is, how­
ever, painful to consider that all the 
Indian tribes, once existing in those states 
now the best cultivated and most populous, 
have become extinct. If the same causes 
continue, the effects will happen and, in 
short period the idea of an Indian this side 
of the Mississippi will be found only in the 
pages of the historian.
Henry Knox, Secretary of War^
White-Indian relations during the Confederation are one 
small segment of a story that began at Jamestown in 1607 and 
has not ended. In colonial times, the British government 
formulated an Indian policy and established Northern and 
Southern Indian departments to treat with the natives. They
^Walter H. Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, 1774-1788 
(Philadelphia, 1933), p. 171.
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came to recognize Indian "right of soil" and established a 
precedent of bona fide purchase of title to Indian lands. 
Although disagreements and wars were frequent, the British 
believed the Indians had a right of occupancy. This is why 
the American colonists most often attempted to secure Indian 
lands by purchase rather than conquest. However, encroach­
ments increased as the colonial population climbed higher, 
and the British efforts to halt migration proved futile. King 
Phillip's War, Bacon's Rebellion, the French and Indian War, 
Pontiac's Conspiracy, and the western theatre of the American 
Revolutionary War created an enmity between white Americans
and native Americans that endured throughout the late eight-
2eenth and nineteenth centuries.
When the American Revolution ended, thousands of pioneers
poured over the Appalachians into the Indian country. In 1784,
George Washington observed,
Men in these times . . . roam over the Country 
on the Indian side of the Ohio, mark out lands,
Survey, and even settle them. This gives 
great discontent to the Indians and will, 
unless measures are taken to prevent it, in­
evitably produce a war with the western tribes.
2For more information concerning colonial Indian rela­
tions, see Bernard Sheehan, "Indian-White Relations in Early 
America: A Review Essay," William and Mary Quarterly XXVI 
(July 1969); Gary B. Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the 
Southern Colonial Mind," ibid., XXIX (April 1972); Nancy 0. 
Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment to European Civilization," 
in James M. Smith, ed., Seventeenth Century America, Essays 
in Colonial History (Chapel Hill, 1959). See also "Colonial 
American Indian Policy," in Francis S. Prucha, American Indian 
Policy in the Formative Years, the Indian Trade and Intercourse 
Acts. 1790-1854 (Lincoln, 1962), pp. 1-40.
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By 1785 there were an estimated 50,000 settlers in western 
Pennsylvania and the Ohio country, and tens of thousands more 
in Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Old Southwest. War appeared 
to be inevitable, but an Indian war would be disastrous to 
the new United States Confederation. Because the Americans 
were bankrupt and without an army, it was essential that Con­
gress devise an Indian policy that would keep the United 
States at peace with the western Indians. The Americans 
wanted land for revenues and westward expansion, but they 
also wanted peace with the Indians. To Congress fell the 
task of obtaining both.
From 1783-1786 the Confederation Congress tried in vain
3to create a workable Indian policy. The debates over Indian 
affairs brought forth sectional disagreements that evidenced 
the Northeast-South split in Confederation politics. While 
the Southerners wanted immediate expansion, and advocated an 
aggressive Indian policy, the Eastern Nationalists favored a 
more cautious stance. Initially the overconfident Congress
The best secondary work dealing with Confederation Indian 
Policy is Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Pol­
icy, 1785-1812 (East Lansing, 1967). See also Prucha, Indian 
Policy; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations. The Indian point of 
view is best documented in Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires 
on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper 
Ohio Valley (Pittsburgh, 1940). The intellectual history of 
white attitudes towards the Indian is best interpreted by 
Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy 
and the American Indian (Chapel Hill, 1973). See also Roy 
Harvey Pearce, Savagism and Civilization. A Study of the Indian 
and the American Mind (Baltimore, 1953). All of the above 
works, particularly Horsman's, form the base upon which this 
essay is built.
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acted belligerently in negotiating with the Northern and 
Southern Indian tribes. They demanded Indian land by "right 
of conquest" (in the Revolutionary War), and arbitrarily dic­
tated treaties to the Indian nations. The Confederation 
failed in its attempt to implement this ill-conceived aggres­
sive policy because it lacked the revenue and power necessary 
for its execution. Some states refused to cede their western 
lands to Congress, and claimed "state sovereignty" in Indian 
affairs. And the greatest impediment to Confederation policy 
was fierce Indian resistance--the Northern and Southern 
tribes refused to acknowledge American claims to their ances­
tral domains. Angered by white encroachments and encouraged 
by Great Britain and Spain, the Indians struck back. The 
commencement of Indian hostilities in 1786-1787 marked the 
collapse of the Confederation Indian policy.
The Indian warfare of 1786-1787 coincided with the re- 
emergence of the Nationalist faction in Confederation politics. 
These conservatives believed the United States needed a power­
ful, centralized national government, and sought to replace 
the Articles of Confederation with a stronger "Constitutional" 
mode of administration. The Nationalists espoused their views 
in the Confederation Congress and implemented them in all 
areas of policy making. Of particular importance to this 
essay is the Eastern Nationalist attempt to reform Confedera­
tion Indian policy. These Northeasterners tried to make Indian 
policy more just, and advocated cash purchase of Indian lands.
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The Eastern Nationalists wanted western lands for revenue and 
expansion, but their philosophy of westward expansion was not 
so aggressive as that of their Southern colleagues. They 
clung to ideals calling for fair treatment of the Indians, 
and most were caught up in the humanitarian movement of the 
period. The Eastern Nationalists wanted Indian lands, but 
they also wanted a clear conscience. The irreconcilable nature 
of their goals became obvious during the early national period.^
There was, of course, one group of Americans that cared 
not a whit for the ideal of just and humane treatment of the 
Indians: The frontier settlers. The pioneers did not serve
in Congress, nor did they ever appear at formal negotiations 
with the Indian tribes. Yet their very existence in the trans- 
Appalachian Indian country made these pioneer yeomen the major 
force in American Indian relations. To be sure. Congress could 
pass laws requiring fair treatment of the Indians--but what 
good were those laws without the support of the frontiersmen?
As hundreds of thousands of pioneers streamed into the trans- 
Appalachian West, the frontier settlers became the de facto
The Eastern Nationalists were not the only Americans 
whose attitudes towards the Indians were based on humanitarian- 
ism. According to Bernard Sheehan, this philanthropic motive 
crossed party lands and included "Men so disparate as Timothy 
Pickering and Thomas Jefferson." See Sheehan, Seeds of Ex­
tinction. p. 6. I believe the Eastern Nationalists were more 
inclined to this position for a number of reasons. See the 
text and notes to section 3 of this essay. The concept that 
many Americans wanted both land and a "good conscience" is 
that of Reginald Horsman. The idea that most of these men 
were Eastern Nationalists is my own.
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architects of American Indian policy. Congress could only 
follow their lead and try to temper their excesses. Ideals 
of justice and humanity did not stop land-hungry pioneers 
from trespassing onto, and stealing Indian lands. And fron­
tier opinions soon became the opinions of a majority of Ameri­
cans. There was no stopping westward expansion--and there 
was no stopping cultural genocide that it entailed.
Every advantage, that could be expected or 
even wished for, would result from such a 
mode of procedure. Our settlements would 
be compact, government well established, 
and our barriers formidable . . . the In­
dians, as has been observed in General 
Schuyler's letter, will ever retreat as 
our settlements advance upon them . . . our 
settlements will as certainly cause the 
savage as the wolf, to retire ; both being 
animals of prey, though they differ in 
shape. r
General George Washington, 1783
The end of the American Revolution marked the beginning 
of a new era in white-Indian relations on the North American 
continent. Although most of the American Indians were allies 
of Great Britain during the Revolutionary War, there was, 
surprisingly, no mention of the Indians in the Treaty of 
Paris of 1783. To make matters more complex. Great Britain 
arbitrarily ceded all of the Indians' land, from the Appala­
chians to the Mississippi, to the new United States of America, 
The Indians could not understand how a treaty signed thousands
^Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 8.
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of miles away could take from them their ancestral domain-- 
particularly since the British and Indians militarily con­
trolled the trans-Appalachian West at the close of the Revolu­
tion. The ambiguity of the Treaty of Paris set the stage for 
an inevitable showdoim between the white man and the red man 
in the Mississippi Valley.^
The clash began immediately after the Revolutionary War, 
when thousands of pioneers moved west into the Indian terri­
tory. The Indians were enraged by this advance onto their 
hunting grounds, and prepared to go to war to defend their 
lands. Although the pioneer squatters were not averse to war, 
the leaders of the United States government definitely were.
A long, expensive Revolutionary War had just ended, and the 
American Confederation needed peace badly. To be sure, the 
Americans claimed all of the trans-montane West by right of 
conquest and the Treaty of Paris. And they looked to the Ohio 
Valley as a valuable source of land revenues, and an area for 
future expansion. But for the time being American expansion 
must be without war. One of the first important jobs of the
Reginald Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," 
William and Mary Quarterly XVIII (1961):38; Horsman, Expansion 
and American Indian Policy, pp. 3-5; Downes, Council Fires, 
p. 279. Downes notes a Wyandot plea to their defeated British
allies: "We don't know how to act 'till we hear from you,
and as we have gone hand in hand together, we hope to continue 
so, and that you'll not allow your poor children to be crushed 
under the weight of their enemies . . . Father depend upon it,
we have great reason to expect [the Americans] shortly--
Father! Should a treaty of Peace be going on we hope your
children will be remembered in that treaty."
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Westward Expansion, p. 192.
Confederation Congress was to create an Indian policy that would 
allow for westward expansion without war. The inability of 
Congress to accomplish this task became increasingly obvious 
over the next four years.
From the very beginning there was confusion and division
over how great a role the Confederation government should play
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in the regulation of Indian Affairs. Article IX of the Articles 
of Confederation stated ambiguously, "The United States in 
Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive 
right of . . . managing all affairs with the Indians, not mem­
bers of any state, provided that the legislative right of any
7State within its own limits be not infringed or violated."
The interpretations of this clause varied, as Nationalists and 
Antifederalists disagreed as to just how much authority the 
central government should have in such matters. Finally, Con­
gress decided the Indian situation necessitated action by the 
national government. They placed regulation of Indian affairs 
under Secretary of War Henry Knox, and instructed him to nego­
tiate treaties with the Northern and Southern tribes. Negotia­
tions of these treaties was imperative; the United States had 
to establish permanent boundaries between themselves and the 
Indian country. But before negotiations could begin, a na­
tional Indian policy had to be formulated. In the Fall of
1783 Congress set out to create the first American Indian 
8policy.
QThe committee on Northern Indians was dominated by Eastern
7Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History 
(New York, 1963), 1:111-15.
OMohr. Federal Indian Relations, p. 176; Harry M. Ward,
The Department of War, 1781-1795 (Pittsburgh, 1962), p. 55. 
Knox's other duties included protecting settlers from Indian 
attacks and evicting squatters from Indian lands. Knox was 
an Eastern Nationalist who favored centralization of Indian 
affairs. See section 3 below.
^The "Northern" tribes included the Six Nations, or
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Nationalists,^^ and the Northeastern perspective is apparent 
in the proceedings of the committee with a few important ex­
ceptions. The committee was greatly influenced by letters 
from Nationalist Generals George Washington and Phillip 
Schuyler of the Continental Army. Washington's attitudes 
towards westward expansion closely resembled those of many 
Eastern Nationalists, and were fully stated in his letter 
of September 7, 1783.^^ Washington had just returned from 
a trip west, and reported that a "parcel of banditti" was 
"skimming and disposing of the cream of the country" and 
trespassing on the Indian lands. General Washington warned 
that if war was to be averted the national government would 
have to assert its authority over the Westerners. He
Iroquois Confederacy, and the Ohio Valley tribes. The Six 
Nations were the Mohawks, Onandogas, Senecas, and Cayugas 
(who allied with the British during the Revolution), and the 
Oneidas and Tuscaroras (American allies). The Ohio Valley 
tribes included the Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa, Ottawa, 
Shawnee, Miami, Wea, Piankashaw, Potowotomi, and Kickapoo 
tribes.
^Slembers of the committee on Northern Indians were 
James Duane (chairman), Richard Peters, Daniel Carroll,
Benjamin Hawkins, and Arthur Lee. Duane, Peters, and Carroll 
were from the Northeast, and all five men belonged to the 
Nationalist coalition.
^^George Washington to James Duane, September 7, 1783, in 
Jared Sparks, ed.. The Writings of George Washington (Boston, 
1838), VIII : 477-484• This important letter contains Washing­
ton's ideas about westward expansion as well as his suggestions 
for Indian policy. The Duane committee did not accept all of 
Washington's recommendations, however. He advocated purchase 
of Indian lands: The "soil they live on can be had by purchase 
at less expence" than war. See Horsman, Expansion and American 
Indian Policy, p. 8. Washington's recommendations were adopted 
in full by Nathan Dane and the Eastern Nationalist coalition in 
1786-87.
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believed American expansion must be gradual and controlled;
settlements should be supervised and compacted. Territorial
government must be strong, and the boundaries between whites
12and Indians clearly defined. General Schuyler felt much 
the same way. He believed the United States could expand 
peacefully westward onto Indian lands, but only if the ex­
pansion was gradual and closely regulated. In his "Thoughts 
Respecting Peace with the Indians" Schuyler spelled out a 
plan for American Indian policy and westward expansion. The 
Indians would be told that since they were on the losing side 
in the Revolution, the United States could rightfully take 
possession of all their land west to the Mississippi. How­
ever, since the United States were "just and benevolent" they 
would take only some of the land, allowing the Indians to 
keep the rest. Schuyler reasoned this same process could be 
repeated over and over again, and the Indians driven farther 
west as their lands were whittled away. Thus the United 
States could gradually expand, eventually acquiring all of 
the Indians' land without the cost of purchase or the tragedy 
and expense of war:
[F]or as our settlements approach their coun­
try, they must, from scarcity of game which 
that approach will induce, retire farther 
back, and dispose of their lands, unless they 
dwindle comparatively to nothing as all sav­
ages have done, who gain their Sustenance by 
the chase, when compelled to live in the
1 2Washington to Duane, September 7, 1783, in Sparks, 
Writings of Washington, VIII : 477-484.
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vicinity of civilized people, and thus 
leave the country without the expence of 
purchase, trifling as that probably will 
be.
Schuyler and Washington's recommendations were typical 
of many Northeasterners' attitudes about westward expansion. 
They wanted to expand, but only gradually, as in the colonial 
"New England" tradition. But the committee on Northern In­
dians took a more aggressive stance, as would the Southern- 
dominated Congress of 1784-85. Contrary to Washington's 
recommendation, the committee dismissed the need to purchase 
title from the Indians. The report of the committee on 
Northern Indians called for a treaty conference to be held 
with the Six Nations and the Ohio Valley tribes. Those 
tribes were to be informed of Great Britain's cession, and 
told the United States claimed all of the trans-Appalachian 
West by right of conquest. Since the Americans preferred 
"clemency to rigor," the Indians would be granted peace, 
and some lands on which to live. The peace would begin with 
an Indian land cession, however. The Indians could not have 
"any reasonable objections" to this, since they had lost the 
Revolutionary War "and they possess no other means to do 
this act of justice than by compliance with the proposed 
boundaries." The report also discussed the specifics of the 
boundary, provided land for the Oneidas and Tuscaroras
1 %Journals of the Continental Congress. XXV:680; Mohr, 
Federal Indian Relations, pp. 97 , 100; Horsman, Expansion 
and American Indian Policy, pp. 5, 7-8.
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(American allies during the Revolution), and outlawed pri­
vate purchases, squatting, and trespassing on Indian lands. 
This committee report on Northern Indians marked the formu­
lation of an American Indian policy. It remained to be seen 
how Congressional logic would fare on the Northern frontier.
The committee on Southern Indians^^ did not submit its 
report until May 28, 1784, and Congress did not accept it 
until March 15, 1785. The report was offered over the objec­
tions of Georgia and North Carolina, both of whom refused to 
cede their western lands to Congress and thereby denied Con­
federation authority to legislate for Indians residing within 
their boundaries. Despite these objections. Congress adopted 
a Southern Indian report quite similar to the October 15 
report on the Northern tribes. The Southern tribes were to 
meet in council with American commissioners to form a treaty.
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXV:680-94.
Horsman. Expansion and American Indian Policy, pp. 10-11 ;
Prucha, Indian Policy, pp. 32-33; Ward, Department of War, 
p. 61. The proposed boundary line would have run up the 
Miami, Mad, and Maumee Rivers to Lake Erie. This line was 
soon abandoned when the Confederation demanded more territory 
one year later. The Oneidas and Tuscaroras were supposed to 
keep all of their lands, but by the early nineteenth century 
both tribes were confined to reservations. Several other pro­
visions provided for an Indian trade committee and called for 
a committee to form a government for the trans-Appalachian 
West. The latter was chaired by Thomas Jefferson, who wrote 
the Ordinance of 1784 the following spring. See Chapter 3 
above.
^^The Southern Indians were the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, 
and Chickasaw tribes in present-day Tennessee, Georgia, Ala­
bama, East Mississippi, and North Florida. See R. S. Cotterill, 
The Southern Indians: The Story of the Civilized Tribes Before 
Removal (Norman, 1954).
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The commissioners were to tell them the United States needed
land for its soldiers, settlers, and for payment of its debts,
Because the Southern tribes had lost the Revolutionary War
they must cede some of their lands to the United States:
The committee are of the opinion that care 
should be taken neither to yield nor require 
too much; to accomodate the Indians as far 
as the public good will admit, and to avoid 
the hazard of war, the expenses of which may 
exceed the value of the acquisition sought 
for; but it is supposed that when they shall 
have been informed of the damages which our 
citizens have sustained from their irruptions 
and those of their British ally, all unrea­
sonable objections will be suppressed.
The March 15 report contained provisions for regulating 
trade, the return of prisoners of war, and guarantees for 
Southern representation at the negotiations. But Georgia’s 
and North Carolina's opposition to the Confederation "inter­
vention" was ominous. No one knew how much force Confedera­
tion Indian policy would have in the South.
Thus by the Spring of 1785 the Confederation Congress 
had created an American Indian policy. Congress ignored 
Washington’s recommendation to purchase title, and the de­
cline of the Nationalist faction after 1783 led to an
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXVII:453-58; 
Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 139; Horsman, Expansion 
and American Indian Policy, pp. 9-11, 13-14. Members of 
the Southern Inaians committee were Richard Beresford, 
Jeremiah Chase, Thomas Jefferson, Richard Spaight, and Jacob 
Read. Georgia and North Carolina’s objections notwithstand­
ing, the committee’s report catered to the more aggressive 
tenets of Southern expansionists. Every member of the com­
mittee was from the South.
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ill-conceived policy that was aggressive and often bellig­
erent. The United States demanded Indian land cessions on 
the basis of right of conquest, but hoped to avoid war by 
allowing the Northern and Southern tribes to keep some of 
their lands. This new Congressional policy completely 
ignored colonial precedents recognizing Indian "right of 
soil." It was based upon right of conquest, but ignored the 
fact that the British and Indians militarily controlled the 
West at the close of the Revolution. And many other impedi­
ments loomed in the future of Confederation Indian rela­
tions; (1) the reluctance of Georgia and North Carolina to 
cede their western lands; (2) the haziness of Article IX, 
and state opposition to Confederation intervention in Indian 
affairs; (3) growing westward migration, and the unjust con­
duct of frontier settlers towards the Indians; (4) the 
financial woes of Congress; (5) the forboding presence of 
both Spain and Great Britain in the heart of Indian country; 
and, most important of all, (6) the resolve of the Northern 
and Southern Indian tribes to fight to retain their lands-- 
all of these forces promised to work against a successful
Indian policy. And all of these factors were evident when
17Congress implemented its Indian policy in the mid-1780s.
1 7 Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," 
p. 38; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy," 
pp. 9-11.
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You are mistaken in supposing that . . . you 
are become a free and independent nation, 
and may take what terms you please. It is 
not so. You are a subdued people. You have 
been overcome in a war, which you entered 
into with us, not only without provocation, 
but in violation of most sacred obligations, 
lv*hen we offer you peace in moderate terms, 
we do it in magnanimity and mercy. If you 
do not accept it now, you are not to expect 
a repetition of such offers. . . .  We shall 
now, therefore, declare to you the condi­
tions, on which you can be received into the 
peace and protection of the United States.
The American Indian Commissioners 
at Fort Stanwix, 1784
At the Fort Stanwix conference your commis­
sioners settled everything as they thought 
would best suit them, and be most conducive 
to their interests. They pointed division 
lines and at once confirmed them without 
waiting to hear our opinion of it and whether 
it would be approved by us or not, holding 
that our country was added to them by the 
King of England. The language confused the 
minds of our chiefs and deterred them from 
making any reply; they kept saying if we did 
not consent to their proposals, that their 
warriors were at our backs and that we should 
receive no protection from the King of Eng­
land. Such has been the language of your 
commissioners at every treaty held with 
us. . . . We are of the same opinion as the 
people of the United States: You call your­
selves free and independent. We, as the 
ancient inhabitants of the country and sov­
ereigns of the soil, say that we are equally 
free as you or any other nation under the sun.
The Northern Tribes to the .
Secretary of War^
The Iroquois Confederacy and the Ohio Valley tribes
^^Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 122; Horsman, 
Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 15.
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readied themselves for their first council with the Ameri­
can Indian commissioners. In a mass meeting at Sandusky 
(on the Ohio) in 1783, the Six Nations and the Northwest 
tribes formed an Indian confederation led by Mohawk chief 
Joseph Brant. Encouraged by several British officers, the 
Indians vowed to not cede any lands to the United States 
without the approval of their entire confederation. They 
set the Ohio River as the boundary beyond which the Ameri­
cans could not pass. When the United States called a 
council at Fort Stanwix (in the Mohawk Valley of New York) 
in October of 1784, all the leaders of this Northern con­
federacy attended. By the time the American commissioners 
arrived, however, winter was approaching, and the Ohio 
Valley tribes had gone home. Thus from Brant's viewpoint 
there could be no valid treaty or land cessions. The Ameri­
cans were determined to get a treaty, however, and threatened 
military reprisal if they did not get their way. Although
only a fraction of the Northern tribes remained, the Treaty
19of Fort Stanwix was negotiated in October of 1784.
After several delays, the five Confederation commis- 
2 0sioners (three Southerners and two Northerners) gathered
Downes, Council Fires, pp. 289-92, The Treaty of 
Fort Stanwix of 1784 is not to be confused with the Treaty 
of Fort Stanwix negotiated between the British and the 
Northern tribes following the French and Indian War.
2 0The five Indian commissioners were George Rogers 
Clark, Oliver Wolcott, Benjamin Lincoln, Richard Butler, 
and Arthur Lee. One of the delays at Stanwix was the problem
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the partial representatives of the Six Nations together 
and informed them of the new American policy. The Six Na­
tions strongly opposed the United States demands. Corn- 
planter, the Seneca chief, protested, "We Indians love our 
lands. We warriors must have a large country to range in, 
as indeed our subsistence must depend on our having much 
hunting ground." The Americans countered that the Indians 
were a "defeated and subdued people". They were being 
offered "moderate terms," thanks to American "magnanimity 
and mercy." According to the American negotiators, the Six 
Nations were not being asked to cede their lands, for they 
had no lands to cede: "We have given the hostile part of
the Six Nations some of the country which we have conquered 
from them." By this stage of the negotiations all pretence 
of parley was cast aside. The Americans talked belligerently 
and threatened war if the Indians did not meet their demands. 
They ended the discussions arbitrarily, stating: "We shall
now, therefore, declare to you the conditions, on which you 
can be received into the peace and protection of the United
of state sovereignty. New York had not yet ceded its western 
lands to Congress, and several New York state Indian commis­
sioners arrived to negotiate a separate treaty with the Six 
Nations. When the New York negotiations finally collapsed, 
the national commissioners took over. New York did not cede 
its western land claims to Congress until 1785. See Chapter 
3 above, as the state land cessions are particularly relevant 
to the issue of sovereignty in Indian affairs. The Southern 
land cessions proved to be the most troublesome in regard to 
Indian relations. See Horsman, Expansion and American Indian 
Policy, p. 16; Downes, Council Fires, p. 295; Mohr. Federal 
Indian Relations, p. 109.
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S t a t e s . "21
In the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, the partial representa­
tives of the Six Nations yielded all their claims to lands
west of the western Pennsylvania border. They received
2 ?peace, and some lands on which to live. “ These terms were 
quite similar to those reached three months later by Ameri­
can commissioners Richard Butler, Arthur Lee, and Samuel 
Holden Parsons at Fort McIntosh (on the upper Ohio, just 
within the Pennsylvania state line). Again, threatening 
language exacted from small segments of the Wyandot, Dela­
ware, Ottawa, and Chippewa tribes a cession which they and 
their confederates immediately disavowed. The one Northern 
commissioner. Nationalist Samuel Holden Parsons of Massachu­
setts, saw the folly of the American position: "It is not
21Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, pp. 16, 
19; Downes, Council Fires, pp. 290, 295; Prucha, Indian Policy, 
p. 34; Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," pp. 38- 
39. For Congressional instructions to the American commis­
sioners at Fort Stanwix, see Monroe to Jefferson, July IS,
1785, in Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed.. The Writings of 
James Monroe (New York, 1898), 1:95. Also, Madison to Jeffer­
son, October 11, 1784, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of 
James Madison (New York, 1901), 11:80: "We found a small por­
tion only of the Six Nations assembled; nor was the number 
much increased when we quitted the business. . . . What the 
upshot of the Treaty will be is uncertain. . . . These ob­
stacles will be rendered much more embarassing by the instruc­
tions to the Commises which I am told leave no space for 
négociation or concession, 5 will consequently oblige them in 
case of refusal in the Indians to yield to the ultimate hopes 
of Congress to break the Treaty. But what will be the conse­
quences of such an emergency?"
2 2The tribes also agreed to return all American prisoners 
of war. For the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, see footnote number 
14, above.
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my province to call in question the propriety of our pro­
ceeds, yet . . .  is it not more expedient to give content 
to the Indians by purchasing such tracts as they will sell 
than to hold out an idea which fires their pride and alarms 
their fears and will probably deluge our frontiers with 
blood?” But Lee and Butler declared, "we claim the country 
by conquest, and are to give, not to receive." Indian ob­
jections were overruled and the Treaty of Fort McIntosh was 
signed on January 21, 1785. This left one final but diffi­
cult task: negotiating a cession from the most powerful of
21the Ohio Valley tribes, the Shawnee.
Commissioners George Rogers Clark, Richard Butler, and 
Samuel Holden Parsons met with some of the Shawnee at Fort 
Finney (at the mouth of the Great Miami in the Ohio country) 
in late January of 1785. After the Americans made their de­
mands, the Shawnee chief Kekewepellethe rebutted, "God gave 
us this country. V»’e do not understand measuring out the 
lands, it is all ours. You say you have goods for our women
"The Treaty of Fort McIntosh," Archer B. Hulbert, ed., 
Ohio in the Time of the Confederation (Marietta, 1918), pp. 
77-80. See Washington to Richard Henry Lee, December 14,
1784, in Sparks, Writings of Washington, IX:76: "These peo­
ple have given, I think, all the United States could reason­
ably have expected of them."; William D. Pattison, Beginnings 
of the American Rectangular Land Survey System. 1784-1800 
(Chicago, 1957), p. 14; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, 
pp. 109-11; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 
pp. 19-20; Downes, Council Fires, p. 292. For a good first­
hand account, see Samuel Holden Parsons to William Samuel 
Johnson, October 27, 1785, in Charles S. Hall, ed.. The Life 
and Letters of Samuel Holden Parsons (New York, 1968), p. 475. 
Parsons was a Revolutionary War officer. Nationalist, surveyor, 
member of the Cincinnati, and a founder of the Ohio Company.
See Chapter 7 below.
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and children; you may keep your goods, and give them to 
other nations. We will have none of them." The American 
commissioners grew angry. They threatened to burn the 
Shawnee villages if they did not sign: "The destruction of
your women and children depends on your present choice.
Peace or war is within your power." These threats and the 
presence of American troops evidently had some impact, as 
Shawnee resistance collapsed. They agreed reluctantly to 
cede all their lands west of the Great Miami River in the 
Treaty of Fort Finney, signed January 31, 1785.^^
On the surface it appeared that by early 1785 the Con­
federation accomplished all of the stated goals of its 
Northern Indians committee report. American Indian commis­
sioners negotiated treaties with Indians at Forts Stanwix, 
McIntosh, and Finney--and the United States gained cessions 
to thirty million acres of the Ohio country. But underneath 
this apparent success lay serious problems. Many of the 
Northern tribes had not attended the treaty councils and did 
not consider themselves bound by the provisions. Congress 
ignored Brant’s confederacy, yet most of the confederacy's 
members still insisted on an Ohio River boundary. The 
Americans' belligerency had created much animosity among the 
Northern tribes. Moreover, the United States had forced its
Clark and Butler were Southerners, Parsons was from 
the Northeast. See Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons: Horsman, 
Expansion and American Indian Policy, pp. 22-23; Mohr, Fed­
eral Indian Relations, p. 115; Downes, Council Fires, pp. 295- 
97 .
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Billington, Westward Expansion, p. 206.
will upon the Indians, but had no military muscle to back it 
up. For the time being, the Northern tribes were somewhat 
mesmerized by the shock of British desertion and the audacity
of the American threats--but they would soon awaken and take
, . 25their vengeance.
The history of Confederation relations with the Southern 
tribes--the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Choctaws--from
1784-1786 is confusing and frustrating. A number of factors 
combined to preclude a successful Indian policy in the South. 
Although Congress was slow and had no money to finance a 
strong southern policy, the major impediments to effective
25.hvard Department of W a r , p. 66; Horsman, Expansion and 
American Tmlian Policy, p .  22; Monroe to Jefferson, May 11, 
1786 , in Hamilton, Writin%s of. M Ç_n_roe , 1:126.
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Indian relations came from the Southerners themselves. Land 
speculators like North Carolina's sometime governor and 
congressman William Blount were feverishly acquiring illegal 
title to millions of acres of Indian land. James Robertson 
and the Franklinites were seizing Cherokee domain in what is 
now Tennessee and North Georgia, Since Georgia and North 
Carolina refused to cede their western lands to Congress, 
they maintained that the Confederation had no legal authority 
to regulate Indian affairs within their state boundaries. In 
direct contradiction of Congress's interpretation of Article 
IX and the national Indian policy, the Southern states nego­
tiated numerous treaties with unrepresentative fragments of 
the Southern Indian tribes. Spanish intrigues in the South­
west and Indian outrage over white settlement combined with
all of this interference to thwart the efforts of the Con-
27federation's Southern Indian commissioners.
Those commissioners were chosen on March 5, 1785, when
Merritt B. Pound, Beniamin Hawkins. Indian Agent (Athens, 
Georgia, 1951), p. 26. Blount's appetite for Indian lands 
was so infamous that among the Southern tribes he was known 
as the "Dirt King" or the "Dirt Captain"!
2 7Cotterill, Southern Indians, p. 65; Pound, Beniamin 
Hawkins. p. 40; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, pp. 141, 166; 
Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 37. Some 
illegal treaties negotiated by Southern states include 
Georgia's treaty with the Cherokees and a few Creeks (May 31, 
1783); Virginia's treaty with the Chickasaws (November 1783); 
the Franklin-Cherokee Treaty of Chota Ford (July 1786); the 
Georgia-Creek treaty of November 3, 1786; and the Treaty of 
Shoulderbone (November 178 6).
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Congress appointed Benjamin Hawkins, Daniel Carroll, William
Perry, Andrew Pickens, and Joseph Martin to treat with the
2 8Southern tribes. Not all of the tribes were interested in 
negotiating, however. The proposed council with the powerful 
Creeks at Galphinton was canceled when only a handful of 
Creeks appeared. The overwhelming majority of Creeks fol­
lowed the lead of their shrewd chieftan, Alexander McGillivray. 
McGillivray, a half-breed and full Colonel in the British 
army during the Revolution, was enraged by Georgia's encroach­
ments on the Creek domain. In 1784 McGillivray put the Creeks 
on a war footing, secured Spanish aid, and laid the foundation 
for a Southern Indian confederation. That confederation issued 
a proclamation denying the validity of the United States claim 
to their country:
2 8Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 628. Originally, 
Congress appointed only three commissioners--two Northerners 
and one Southerner. But the Southern states objected strenu­
ously and Congress added two more commissioners (one each 
from Virginia and North Carolina). Georgia was still unrep­
resented, however, and their Congressman, William Houston, 
wrote: "As we are much connected with the Southern Indians 
I took the liberty to mention that I thought a commissioner 
ought to be appointed from our State, but I was seriously 
replyed to for suggesting that the least countenance ought 
to be given so unworthy a state, and one that had not taken 
a single federal measure." Congress eventually appointed a 
Georgian half-breed (McIntosh) to fill a vacancy on the 
commission.
The most knowledgeable of all the Southern commissioners 
was Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina. Hawkins, a Nationalist 
and delegate to the Constitutional Convention, had a firsthand 
acquaintance with the Indian situation and strove to bring a 
degree of justice into Southern Indian affairs. He violently 
opposed the land speculators and was resultantly loathed by 
most North Carolinean and Georgian politicians. See Pound, 
Benjamin Hawkins.
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We the chiefs and warriors of the Creek or 
Talapuche, Chickasaw, and Cherokee nations do 
most solemnly protest against whatever title, 
pretension or demand the American congress may 
establish for or against our territory, settle­
ments, and hunting grounds, by virtue of said 
Peace treaty between the King of Great Britain 
and the American states, declaring that since 
we are not party to it, thus we are determined 
to pay no attention. . . . His Brittanic 
Majesty has never posessed, either through 
cessions, sale, or conquest, our territory, 
nor that of which said treaty s p e a k s . 2 9
The negotiations with the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chicka­
saw tribes at Hopewell (in South Carolina) in the winter of
1785-86 were much more successful than the Galphinton fiasco. 
Benjamin Hawkins wrote that the Hopewell treaties aimed at 
preserving the rights of the Southern t r i b e s . T h e  three
T *1treaties provided for the return of prisoners of war, trade 
regulation, punishment of trespassers on Indian lands, and a 
liberal boundary settlement between the Indians and the Southern 
states. Unfortunately, the Southerners' opposition to the
2 9Creek Declaration in Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, 
p. 144. See also ibid., pp. 142, 148; Cotterill, Southern 
Indians, p. 63. The Creeks' refusal to parley at Galphinton 
forced the Congressional commissioners to move on, but it did 
not stop the Georgians from immediately negotiating an illegal 
land cession from two malleable Creek chieftans. Fat King and 
Tame King.
Much of McGillivray's opposition to the Americans can be 
attributed to his own extensive land claims in the area.
^^See Hawkins to Jefferson in Pound, Benjamin Hawkins, p. 52,
^^The Americans negotiated three treaties at Hopewell, 
one each with the Cherokees (November 18, 1785); Choctaws 
(January 3, 1786); and Chickasaws (January 10, 1786).
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treaties rendered them virtually unenforceable. Although the 
commission took much of the Indians' land, it was not nearly 
so much as Georgia and North Carolina wanted (North Carolina had 
passed an act in 1783 declaring all the Cherokee claims within 
their bounds null and void). The state legislatures of 
Georgia and North Carolina immediately disavowed the Treaties 
of Hopewell and registered official protests. In Congress, 
William Blount complained that the treaties contained "several 
stipulations that infringe and violate the legislative rights" 
of North Carolina. Hugh Williamson and John Ashe of North 
Carolina proposed a "Resolution, purporting Congress's dis­
avowal of such part of the Hopewell Treaty as ceded certain 
Territory within the limits of the State as hunting grounds, 
and sta[ting] our Claim to same. . . . "  Georgia took up 
where North Carolina left off. One month after Hopewell, the 
Georgia state legislature resolved that all treaties made by 
the Confederation inconsistent with the "sovereign territorial 
and legislative rights and privileges" of Georgia were "hereby 
declared null and void."^^
5 2 Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 29; 
Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, ^  151; Horsman. Formative 
Years. p . 9; John Ashe to Governor Richard Caswell (NC), in 
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:639. See 
also Hugh Williamson to Governor Samuel Johnston (NC), ibid., 
pp. 789-90: Williamson assured the North Carolineans, the
"Treaty of Hopewell will never operate against the Territorial 
Claims of the State whenever she thinks fit to make them." 
Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 147. Note that the politi­
cal ideology of states’ rights and nullification had clearly 
emerged in the South by the 1780s.
84
N O R TH  I 
<v 1Ajf PHICKAhA^
.AUIEE
3j----
Boandary Line 
between the United States 
and
The Southern Indians, 
17S3-1795
(B a s« d  on  C .C .H o y e e , I n d i a n  .  ,Land Cessions in ùis United States) | Lf
Creek B juacary, 17S3
<]^Wngton I 
\ 3  |.i^a3T:3ta j
Arthur P. Whittaker, The Spanish-American Frontier
By 1786, Southern Indian affairs were in much the same 
mess as they had been before Congressional intervention. 
Georgia and North Carolina refused to make land cessions, 
and their adherence to the principle of state sovereignty 
cast much doubt on the authority of Confederation Indian com­
missioners in the South. The bankrupt Confederation Congress 
was no match for aggressive Southern land speculators and 
frontier settlers. And the Southern tribes were growing more 
hostile with each new encroachment. Many of the tribes were 
not represented at Hopewell, and the powerful Creeks refused 
to negotiate at all. James White, the Superintendent of 
Southern Indian affairs, tried to appease the angry tribes, 
but his efforts were in vain. The Southern states were bent 
on total expulsion of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and
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Creek nations from the Old Southwest--even at the cost of war.
There were many causes for the Indian hostilities that 
broke out on the Northern and Southern frontiers after 1784. 
The ominous presence of the Spanish^^ and the British^^ in the
heart of Indian country was certainly a factor. Both nations
33The Spaniards' claims in the Old Southwest caused 
them to view American expansion with great alarm. Spanish 
efforts to close the Mississippi River to American commerce 
combined with an Indian policy aimed at thwarting American 
westward expansion. For Spanish relations with the South­
ern tribes, see Arthur P. Whittaker, The Spanish-American 
Frontier, 1785-1795: The Westward Movement and Spanish Re­
treat in the Mississippi Valley (Boston, 1927), and The 
Mississippi Ouestion, 1795-1803 (New York, 1934); Samuel F. 
Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty (New York, 1926); Laurence Kinnaird, 
ed., Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794, 3 vols., 
American Historical Association Annual Report, 1945, II-IV 
(Washington, 1946-49); Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, p. 142; 
Pound, Beniamin Hawkins; Cotterill, Southern Indians. See 
also Madison to Jefferson, November 1, 1787, in Burnett, 
Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII: "We hear from
Georgia that that state is threatened with dangerous war 
with the Creek Indians. The alarm is of so serious a nature 
that law martial has been proclaimed, and they are proceed­
ing to fortify even the Town of Savannah. The idea there 
is, that the Indians derive their motives as well as their 
means from their Spanish neighbors. Individuals complain 
also that their fugitive Slaves are encouraged by East 
Florida. The policy of this is explained by supposing that 
it is considered as a discouragement to Georgians from 
settlements near the Spanish boundaries."
^^For British-Indian relations, see Andrew C. McLaughlin, 
"The Western Posts and British Debts" in the American Histori­
cal Association Annual Report 1894 (Washington, 1895), pp. 
413-44; A. L. Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and 
British North America (New Haven, 1940); G. S. Graham, "The 
Indian Menace and the Retention of the Western Posts," 
Canadian Historical Review XV (March 1934):46-48; Orpha E. 
Leavitt, "British Policy on the Canadian Frontier, 1782- 
1792: Mediation and an Indian Barrier State," Wisconsin His­
torical Society, Proceedings, 1915 (Madison, 1916), 151-185; 
Clarence W. Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Poli- 
tics (Cleveland, 1917).
The British exercised an even greater influence over the
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had solid claims to territory in the Mississippi Valley; both 
were eager to encourage Indian resistance to the American ad­
vance by providing arms and ammunition, moral support, and 
vague promises of military backing in the event of an all- 
out war. Yet most of the blame for Indian hostilities in 
the mid-1780s can be placed directly on Americans. Indeed, 
the main factor leading to the bloody outbreaks was the bel­
ligerent Confederation Indian Policy of 1783-1786. The 
Northern and Southern tribes refused to accept American claims
Indians of the Ohio country than did the Spanish over the 
Southern tribes. For reasons of diplomacy and commerce (i.e., 
fur trade), Great Britain maintained a powerful military 
presence in the Northwest, in direct violation of the Treaty 
of Paris. The British refused to evacuate seven of their 
military posts in the Ohio Valley (Forts Oswego, Oswegatchie, 
Niagra, Presque Isle (Erie), Sandusky, Detroit, and Michi- 
mackinac) and were thus a constant factor in American relations 
with the Northern tribes.
Although refraining from a direct promise of military 
support. Great Britain diplomatically convinced the Northern 
Indians that they (the British) would somehow help the tribes 
prevent American settlement beyond the Ohio. They supplied 
the tribes with trade goods and encouraged an Indian confed­
eration and military alliance. In this way Great Britain 
kept the Northern tribes on a war footing without overtly 
encouraging hostilities. Throughout the 1780s, the British 
watched the United States-Indian struggle from the vantage 
point of their Northwest posts--and viewed the commencement 
of the warfare for which they shared a partial responsibility. 
Most historians have viewed the British Indian policy criti­
cally. They contend the British policy was based upon sel­
fish commercial and diplomatic motives. A. L. Burt, however, 
credits Great Britain with unselfish motives in their 1780s 
Indian policy. He contends that the fur trade and 'power 
plays' were of secondary importance, and that British 'guilt' 
for the predicament of the Northern tribes was their main 
motivation. Since the American government was weak, and in­
capable of effecting an equitable Indian policy. Great Britain 
decided to stay in the Northwest to provide a balance of power 
and thereby prevent destruction of the Indians.
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to their ancestral domains, disavowed the treaties of 1784- 
1786 (treaties which many of them had not signed), and de­
clared war on the American intruders. The Confederation 
Congress was left to reap the tragic consequences of its 
unrealistic Indian policy.
The Six Nations and Northwest tribes prepared for war 
at a grand council at Britain's Fort Detroit in December of
1786. Under the leadership of Joseph Brant, the tribes sent 
an angry letter to the Confederation Congress. They dis­
avowed the Treaty of Paris, repudiated the treaties of Forts 
Stanwix, McIntosh, and Finney, and demanded that all American 
land surveyors immediately cross back over the Ohio River.
The Northern confederation protested the American policy of 
treating with separate tribes, insisting any Indian land ces­
sion must be approved by the entire Northern Indian confederacy. 
Brant and his allies called for new negotiations and a new 
treaty--a treaty that would prohibit American settlement beyond 
the Ohio. If their demands were not met, the angry Northern 
tribes promised to wage war and drive the Americans out by 
force.
^^Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," p. 40; 
Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 35.
^^Downes, Council Fires, pp. 296, 299; Mohr, Federal 
Indian Relations, p. 123; Horsman, Expansion and American 
Indian Policy, p. 23. Tribes attending the Detroit council 
were the Iroquois Confederacy, i.e., Seneca, Mohawk, Tuscarora, 
Oneida, Cayuga, Onandoga nations, and the Wyandot, Delaware, 
Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Poawatomi, Miami, Cherokee, Wea, 
and Piankashaw of the Ohio country. Several British officers
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Surprisingly, the records of the Confederation Congress 
show no acknowledgment of the Detroit proclamation until seven 
months later. In July of 1787 William Blount wrote that Con­
gress had received a letter from Brant "counched in hostile 
language. . . . ” He also said that reports from Kentucky and 
Georgia indicated trouble, and there was "much Reason to fear 
that Hostilities will shortly commence. . . . ” It was too 
late to appease the enraged Northern and Southern tribes. As 
James Manning of Rhode Island observed.
The Savages have begun their barbarous depre­
dations on our western frontiers, but probably 
not without Provocation from some of the law­
less Banditti which forms the Law of those 
Settlements. Many of the innocent must doubt­
less be involved in ruin in consequences of 
it. The wretched deranged State of finances 
of the federal Government will allow us, if 
disposed, to allow these People but feeble aids.37
American resistance to the Northern Indians' forays was
were also in attendance. The surveyors to which Brant alludes 
were surveying the Seven Ranges of the Ohio Valley to be sold
under the Land Ordinance of 1785. See Chapter 5 below. For
conflicts between surveyors and Indians, see Pattison, Ameri­
can Rectangular Land Survey System.
^^Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, pp. 121-22; Philbrick,
Rise of the West, p. 142; William Blount to John Gray Blount, 
July 19, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. 
VIII:624; James Manning to Hezekiah Smith, June 8, 1786, in 
ibid., 362; James Monroe became quite aware of the foul mood 
of the Northern tribes when he traveled West in 1784. See
Monroe to Jefferson, August 9, 1784, in Hamilton, Writings of
Monroe. 1:39: "It is possible I may lose my scalp from the
temper of the Indians, but if either a little fighting or a
great deal of running will save it I shall escape safe." Two 
months later the Monroe party was "fir'd on by those Indians; 
Mr. Teller § two men Killed, 8 a 4th. wounded." Ibid., 
November 1, 1784.
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unorganized, ineffectual, and most often did more harm than 
good. The Confederation Congress divided. Northeast vs. South
*7 0over whether to aid the besieged settlers. The best the 
bankrupt Department of War could do was send two infantry 
companies to the falls of the Ohio where they maintained a 
purely defensive stance. Virginia, however, organized two 
offensive strikes under General George Rogers Clark and 
Colonel Benjamin Logan in the summer of 1786 and November of
1787. Clark enraged the Shawnee by burning several of their 
villages, but his planned invasion of the Wabash country 
fizzled. Colonel Logan’s attack along the Great Miami aimed 
at punishing warlike Mingos and Cherokees, but all Logan 
managed to do was murder Melonthee, a Shawnee chief who was, 
in fact, an American ally. The net result of the Clark and 
Logan raids was to unite all of the Northern tribes in their 
hatred of the United States--stiffening their determination 
to fight and thwart American expansion.
Meanwhile in the South, marauding bands of Cherokees 
raided the North Carolina and Tennessee settlements, particu-
? OHenderson, Party Politics, p. 385. See also Rufus 
King to Elbridge Gerry, June 8, 1786 in Burnett, Letters of 
the Continental Congress, VIII:624: "The lawless and probably
unjust conduct of the inhabitants of Kentucky towards the 
Indians has lately occasioned the loss of a number of valuable 
lives on the Frontiers of Virginia . . . the Govr: and the 
Delegates of Virginia clamour for war against the Indian 
Towns . . . .  I am decidedly against any such wars, and I at 
present understand the Situation and State of Affairs."
7  Q Ward, Department of War, p. 66; Mohr, Federal Indian 
Relations, p. 126; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian 
Policy, p. 33.
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larly those within Franklin. The Creek Council declared war 
against Georgia on August 2, 1786 and, on order from McGil­
livray, Creek war parties terrorized the Southeastern frontier, 
the Cumberlands, and burned Greensboro, Georgia to the ground. 
The situation was so serious in Georgia that the state legis­
lature declared martial law and ordered all slaves within six­
teen miles of Savannah to fortify the town. Georgians sent 
urgent appeals to Congress, asking for aid, but Congress re­
fused to help. Some delegates charged that had Georgia coop­
erated with the Confederation, "they would have avoided the 
bloody War in which they are now involved in consequence of 
their own violations of the Treaties held by the commissioners 
of the United States with the Indians." Even if Congress had 
wanted to help, it was incapable of acting. Nationalist 
Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire summed up the situation when 
he wrote, gloomily.
How these things will end time must reveal, 
but if we are much longer to be unblessed 
with an efficient National Government, des­
titute of funds and without public Credit, 
either at home or abroad, I fear we shall 
become contemptible even in the eyes of the 
Savages themselves.40
The warfare of 1786-1787 marked the collapse of the first
Cotterill, Southern Indians, pp. 70, 74; Ward, Depart­
ment of War, pp. 70-71; Pound, Beniamin Hawkins, p. 53; Vir­
ginia Delegation to Edmund Randolph, December 11, 1786 in 
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:687-88; 
Nicholas Gilman to John Sullivan, November 7, 1787, in ibid., 
VIII:676. See also Madison to Jefferson, November 1, 1787, 
in ibid., VIII:663.
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Confederation Indian Policy. In the beginning the policy 
seemed a success, but Congress made tragic miscalculations.
In their haste to obtain western lands the American commis­
sioners negotiated belligerently and with only small frag­
ments of the Indian tribes. They claimed all of the West 
even though the Indians controlled the region. The Northern 
and Southern tribes were stunned initially by the audacity 
of the American position, but they soon awakened. Angered 
by Indian commissioners and frontiersmen, and encouraged by 
Britain and Spain, the Northern and Southern tribes retali­
ated violently. The United States found themselves embroiled 
in an Indian war--a war for which the bankrupt Confederation 
Congress was totally unprepared.
The collapse of Confederation Indian policy was just one 
of the problems of the Confederation government. Disunity, 
lack of revenue, the split over state sovereignty--these 
difficulties plagued all aspects of Confederation policy, not 
just Indian affairs. The alleged failure of the government 
under the Articles of Confederation to resolve these problems 
brought about the reemergence of a group of leaders, the 
Nationalists, who attempted to strengthen the coercive powers 
of the national administration. By 1787 the Nationalists 
were advocating the Federal Constitution as the answer to 
America’s woes. In the meantime they tried to strengthen the
^^Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, pp. 15, 
30-31; Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," p. 39.
92
Confederation, centralize administration, and limit state 
sovereignty. Some of them, the Eastern Nationalists, tried 
to change American Indian policy.
The committee conceive that it has long 
been the opinion of the country, supported 
by Justice and humanity, that the Indians 
have just claims to all lands occupied by, 
and not purchased from them.
Nathan Dane, 1787 
Report on Southern Indians
The utmost good faith shall always be ob­
served towards the Indians; their land and 
property shall never be taken away from 
them without their consent; and in their 
property, rights, and liberty, they shall 
never be invaded or disturbed, unless in 
just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; 
but laws founded on justice and humanity shall 
from time to time be made, for preventing 
wrongs done to them, and preserving peace and 
Friendship with them.
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787
The collapse of Confederation Indian policy coincided 
with the reemergence of the conservative or Nationalist faction 
in Confederation politics. The Nationalists, relatively inac­
tive since 1783, renewed their efforts to secure a stronger 
central government. Many of the Nationalists served in Con­
gress during 1785-1787, and their philosophy can be seen in 
the western policy of that period. Eastern Nationalists like
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXIII:485; 
Prucha, Indian Relations, pi TE~.
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John Jay, Henry Knox, Rufus King, Timothy Pickering, and 
Nathan Dane only reluctantly favored westward expansion, and 
some of them were against it altogether. If there was to be 
expansion, these Eastern Nationalists wanted it to be gradual, 
well-organized and onto speculator-owned lands under juris­
diction of a strong territorial government. George Washington 
agreed with these men, and wrote James Duane urging that settle­
ments be "compact" and "government well established." Timothy 
Pickering asked Congress to make sure "the settlement of 
that country may be effected with regularity." To allow the 
West to be overrun with scattered settlers was, according to 
Washington, "inconsistent with the wisdom and policy which 
our true interest dictates.
The Nationalists' attitudes towards the West naturally 
affected their views on American Indian p o l i c y . T h e  Nation­
alists, particularly the Easterners, thought the Indian 
hostilities of 1786-87 were the inevitable result of unre­
strained westward migration. In seeking to control that
George Washington to James Duane, September 7, 1783, in 
Sparks, Writings of Washington, VIII:480; Timothy Pickering to 
Elbridge Gerry, March 1, 1785, in Timothy Pickering, The 
Timothy Pickering Papers (Boston, 1896), reel 5, p. 347; Wash­
ington to Williamson, March 15, 1785, in Sparks, Writings of 
Washington. IX:105. For the Nationlists and the West, see 
Jensen, New Nation, pp. 122-25, and Kohn, Eagle and Sword.
^^See Washington to Duane, September 7, 1783, in Sparks, 
Writings of Washington, VIII:484: "The settlement of the
western country, and making a peace with the Indians are so 
analagous, that there can be no consideration of the one, 
without involving the other."
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expansion they advocated a more just and equitable Indian policy. 
Indeed, the conservative Nationalists held some of the most 
enlightened views toward the American Indian of the early 
national period. There are several reasons for this. The 
relative isolation of New England from the frontier meant that 
many Eastern Nationalist leaders had no serious Indian threat 
within their borders. Their social and religious backgrounds 
certainly made them more receptive to humanitarian notions 
concerning the red man. Eastern Nationalists like Jay, Picker­
ing, King, and Dane formed the nucleus of the anti-slavery 
movement in the United States, and they shared a similar sym­
pathy for the plight of the Indians. Rufus King wrote of the 
"lawless and probably unjust conduct of the inhabitants of 
Kentucky towards the Indians," and John Jay evinced both his 
humanitarianism and his Nationalism when he observed;
The western Indians are uneasy and seem in­
clined to be hostile. It is not to be won­
dered at. Injustice is too often done them, 
and the aggressors escape with impunity; in 
short, our governments, both particular and 
general, are either so impotent or so very 
gently administered as neither to give much 
terror to evil-doers nor much support and 
encouragement to those who do well.45
Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, in King, Correspondence 
of Rufus King, 1:180; John Jay in Henry P. Johnston, ed., The 
Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay (New York, 1890) , 
111:249.
For humanitarianism, see "Humanitarianism and Sentimen­
tality" in Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American 
Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill, 1968), 
pp. 365-72 : "The growth of humanitarianism, one of the most
profound and least explicable develpments of the eighteenth
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century . . . was quietly but effectively equalitarian . . . 
a number of circumstances combined to nurture an especially 
strong humanitarian movement in America. . . . Ironically, 
the presence of two more primitive races tended to stimulate 
humanitarianism." See also Bernard Sheehan, Seeds of Extinc­
tion, p. 4: "The elimination of savagery, many reasoned,
could be accomplished in more refined and humanitarian ways.
The Indian need not be destroyed . . . the white man had a 
moral obligation to see that the tribesmen survived." Shee­
han argues that Federalists and Antifederalists alike were 
caught up in the humanitarian attitudes towards the Indian:
"Men so disparate as Timothy Pickering and Thomas Jefferson 
thought and acted in concert on the question of the Indians." 
Ibid., p. 6.
I would contend that several circumstances combined to 
render the Eastern Nationalists more responsive to a humani­
tarian Indian policy. As mentioned, the isolation of New 
England is important, as was involvement in the anti-slavery 
movement. See Jordan, White Over Black, pp. 365-72. Although 
some Southerners, most notably Jefferson, had some doubts about 
slavery, the Manumission Society of the 1780s was an entirely 
New England affair, with John Jay as its first president. 
Besides Jay, King, Pickering, and Dane, Eastern Nationalist 
anti-slaveryites included Alexander Hamilton, Samuel Hopkins, 
James Pemberton, Benjamin Rush, and Noah Webster. It was 
Eastern Nationalists who revived Jefferson's plan to outlaw 
slavery in the territories and incorporated that provision 
into the Northwest Ordinance. See Chapter 7 below.
But the most convincing proof of Eastern Nationalist 
affinity for a just and equitable Indian policy exists in the 
writings of the time. Most of the documents that evidence any 
compassion or sympathy for the plight of the Indian were 
written by either Easterners or Nationalists. See King to 
Gerry, June 8, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental 
Congress. VIII:624, or footnote number 36; see John Jay to 
John Adams in Johnston, Correspondence of John Jay, 111:215: 
"The newspapers herewith sent will give you information in 
detail of Indian affairs, but they will not tell you what 
however is the fact, that our people have committed several 
unprovoked acts of Violence against them. These acts ought 
to have excited notice of the government and been punished in 
an exemplary manner." Or Alexander Hamilton in Harold Syrett 
et al.. The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1969), 
111:468: "The attempt at the expulsion of so desultory a
people is as chimerical as it would be pernicious. It has 
not a single object for the acquisitions of their lands is 
not to be wished 'till those now vacant are settled." See 
also Theodore Sedgwick, 4th. Congress, Annals of Congress 
(April 1796), p. 900, in the Epilogue to these essays, below.
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An equitable Indian policy fit perfectly into the Eastern 
Nationalists’ overall plan for the development of the West, 
as the Indians were certainly the most effective means of 
controlling westward migration. They formed a formidable 
barrier and discouraged encroachments by frontier settlers.
If the Indians were dispossessed, then there would be nothing 
to restrain the Westerners. "Tho numbers in defiance of the 
authority of the States, cross the Ohio,” observed Timothy 
Pickering, "yet few would be hardy enough to settle on Indian 
ground." But if all the Indians’ lands were taken "to the 
Mississippi, like lawless emigrants will spread over the whole 
of it." And Rufus King queried, "Would not the Indian Claims 
prevent emigration on the Western Side of the Ohio?"^^ The
One of the foremost advocates of a just Indian policy 
was Henry Knox, the Nationalist Secretary of War. Knox was 
zealous in his eviction of squatters from the Indian country 
and in protecting the rights of the Indians. See Mohr, Fed­
eral Indian Relations, p. 171: "It is, however, painful to
consider that all the Indian tribes once existing in those 
states now the best cultivated and most populous, have become 
extinct. If the same causes continue, the effects will hap­
pen and, in short period the idea of an Indian this side of 
the Mississippi will be found only in the pages of the his­
torian." See also Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 41: "The Indians
have constantly had their jealousies and hatred excited by the 
attempts to obtain their lands. I hope in God all such de­
signs are suspended for a long period."
Another Nationalist humanitarian was Indian agent Ben­
jamin Hawkins of North Carolina. See Hawkins to Jefferson, 
1786, in Pound, Beniamin Hawkins, p. 52: "You will see by
the Treaties which I enclose how attentive I have been to the 
rights of these people; and I can assure you there is nothing 
I have more at heart than the preservation of them. It is a 
melancholy reflection that the rulers of America, in rendering 
an account to Heaven of the aborigines thereof, will have lost 
everything but the name. . . ."
46pickering to King, in King, Correspondence of Rufus
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Eastern Nationalists wanted gradual expansion, closely super­
vised by the federal government--expansion that appeased the 
Northern and Southern tribes and prevented an Indian war.
This led them to repudiate the disastrous Indian policy of 
1783-1786. From 1786 through 1787, the Eastern Nationalists 
attempted to change American Indian policy--to make it more 
just and less aggressive. In the Ordinance of 1786, the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and the Southern and Northern 
Indian Affairs Reports of August 1787, they advocated a more 
centralized and equitable Confederation Indian policy. They 
reintroduced the British recognition of Indian right of soil 
and the necessity of bona fide purchase. But the conserva­
tives’ efforts were in vain. No amount of reason could re­
strain the restless pioneers, and these aggressive frontiers­
men made an equitable Indian policy impossible.
The Ordinance of 17 86, "an ordinance for regulating the 
Indian department," reflected the attempt to formulate a 
truly uniform and centralized Indian policy. This Ordinance 
was drafted by Rufus King, and a committee consisting of 
William Samuel Johnson, Charles Pinckney, John Kean, and 
James Monroe. The Ordinance of 1786, accepted by Congress on
King, 1:103; King to Pickering, in ibid., 1:104-5. See also 
Pickering to King, June 4, 1786, in ibid., 1:106-7: "If
such savage emigrants encroach on the Indian territory, or 
commit any outrages, nothing short of a military force will 
be able to bring them to Justice . . .  to prevent [Indian 
wars] resulting from such emigrations I could wish the 
Indians might be expressly authorized by treaty, to break 
up every settlement within their territory."
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August 7, contained two major thrusts: (1) The establishment
of a centralized, national Indian department; and (2) Regula­
tion of trade with the Northern and Southern tribes. Con­
gress created a Department of Indian Affairs under the 
authority of Henry Knox, the Secretary of War. The Indian 
Department consisted of a Northern and a Southern district 
(as in the British colonial system), each with a superinten­
dent responsible only to Knox. The superintendent had to 
take a loyalty oath and post a $6,000.00 bond to guarantee 
good conduct. The Ordinance was quite explicit about trade. 
Only United States citizens could trade with the Indians, 
and they must have a license. The license fee was $50.00, 
plus a $3,000.00 bond. Congress forbade the use of liquor 
in the white-Indian transactions, and finally: "Any trader
or other person employed by a trader, treating an Indian in 
an unjust manner shall on due proof thereof being made be 
deprived of his license or fined.
The Southern states were naturally quite hostile to such 
a measure, since it threatened their sovereignty in Indian 
affairs. Timothy Bloodworth of North Carolina tried to amend 
the Ordinance and reduce national authority in licensing 
traders and conducting negotiations with the Indians. But
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXI:49-53 and 
XXX:37 0; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 33; 
Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 56; Mohr, Federal Indian Relations, 
p. 105. The superintendent's salary was $1,000 per year.
The first appointees were Richard Butler in the North and 
James White in the South.
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only North Carolina, Georgia, and New York voted for the amend-
4 8ment. Representatives William Houston and William Few of 
Georgia moved to omit that portion of the Ordinance of 1786 
pertaining to Indians south of the Ohio, but their measure 
was also defeated. In a final compromise, however, the 
Southerners inserted a provision requiring the Southern Indian 
superintendent to "act in conjunction with the authority of 
[the] state" whenever execution of the Ordinance interfered 
with the "legislative right of a state." This hazy stipulation 
weakened the Ordinance's centralizing effect, but the Indian 
Ordinance of 1786 was nevertheless a step in the direction of 
a strong and equitable national Indian policy.
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provides another good 
example of Eastern Nationalist Indian policy. In drafting a 
plan of government for the Ohio country, the Nationalists in 
Congress showed their desire for gradual, well-ordered expan­
sion into the trans-Appalachian West. The system of govern­
ment they instituted was much like the British colonial system 
and lent itself to political control by Northeasterners and 
landed interests in the Ohio V a l l e y . T h e  Northwest Ordinance 
of 1787 espoused a humane attitude towards the Indians.
4- 8New York desired lands from the Six Nations and often 
allied with Georgia and North Carolina in arguing for state 
sovereignty in Indian affairs. New York did not cede its 
western land claims until 1786. See footnote number 20, 
above.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, XXX:419, and 
XXXI : 4 85, ~4"93".
^^See Chapter 7, below.
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Expansion was still the goal, but the Northeastern plan for 
expansion was less belligerent and more tempered than previous 
Confederation policy. Congress recognized Indian rights of 
prior occupancy and proposed cash purchase. Negotiations and 
bargaining would replace a policy of overt dictation. And 
the Congress pledged, somewhat optimistically, the "utmost 
good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their 
land and property shall never be taken from them without their 
consent. . . .
The warfare on the Southern and Northern frontiers in 
1786 and 1787 produced two committee reports that most accu­
rately reflect the Confederation Congress’s changing attitudes 
towards Indian affairs. Both reports (August 7 and 9, 1787)
were drafted by Nathan Dane, and came from committees domi-
52nated by Easterners and Nationalists. The report on Southern
Journals of the Continental Congress. XXXII:340. The 
provision concerning Indians in the Northwest Ordinance was 
probably written by Rev. Manasseh Cutler, a Massachusetts 
Nationalist and lobbyist for the Ohio Company in Congress.
See Chapter 7, below, and Jay A. Barrett, The Evolution of 
the Ordinance of 1787 (New York, 1891), pp. 69-70, 72. See 
also Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 37; Ward, Department of War, 
p. 68; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, p. 37; 
Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," p. 40.
^^Journals of the Continental Congress. XXXIII:4SS-63, 
477-81. Members of the committee on Southern Indians were 
Dane, Dyre Kearny, Edward Carrington, William Bingham, and 
Melancton Smith. All except Smith were Nationalists--all 
except Carrington Easterners. The Northern Indian Affairs 
committee members were Dane, Benjamin Hawkins, John Kean, 
William Irvine, and Edward Carrington. While Hawkins, Kean, 
and Carrington were from the South, Hawkins and Carrington 
were Nationalists and Kean was an Independent. William Irvine 
was a Pennsylvanian who later joined the Jeffersonians.
Nathan Dane exercised considerable influence in drafting both 
reports.
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Indians was a response to Georgia’s appeal for military aid
to battle the Creeks. The committee rejected this plea,
and blamed the Georgians for the outbreak of hostilities:
Various circumstances shew that the Indians, 
in general, within the United States want 
only to enjoy their lands without interrup­
tion. . . . [But] several tribes complain 
that their land is taken from them . . . their 
is sufficient evidence to show that those 
tribes do not complain altogether without 
cause. An avaricious disposition in some of
our people to acquire large tracts of land
and often by unfair means appears to be the 
principal source of difficulties with the 
Indians.
The committee’s solution to the problem was further centraliza­
tion of Indian affairs. They contended that Article IX called 
for Congressional control of Indian policy. Georgia and North 
Carolina’s claims of state sovereignty had produced nothing 
but "confusion, disputes, and embarassments." The powers for
making war and peace with the Indians, purchasing their lands,
evicting squatters, and fixing boundaries with them "appear to 
the committee to be indivisible," and rightly belonged to the 
Confederation Congress. Georgia and North Carolina’s failure 
to keep peace with the Southern tribes was sufficient proof 
they were incapable of managing their own Indian affairs. The 
committee recommended, in conclusion, that Georgia and North 
Carolina cede their western lands to Congress and accept a 
centralized national Indian policy. As for the requested 
military aid, "Congress can never employ the forces of the 
Union in any cause, of the justice of which they are not
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fully convinced.
On August 9, Nathan Dane's committee on Northern Indian 
affairs issued a report that carried the new policy recommenda­
tions one step further. The report reviewed the dismal state 
of Northern Indian affairs, noting the war posture of the 
angry Northern tribes, Brant's confederacy, and the Indians' 
repudiation of the treaties of Forts Stanwix, McIntosh, and 
Finney. The committee recommended a reappraisal of American 
Indian policy. If total war was to be avoided, the United 
States would have to start all over again. A new treaty 
should be negotiated with all of the Northern tribes, as per 
Brant’s demand. Moreover,
instead of a language of superiority and com­
mand; may it not be politic and Just to treat 
the Indians more on a footing of equality, 
convince them of the Justice and humanity of 
the United States as well as their disposition 
to promote the happiness of the Indians? and 
instead of attempting to give lands to the 
Indians to proceed on the principle of fairly 
purchasing them and taking the usual deeds.54
Thus, for the first time in the new nation's history. 
Congress advocated acquiring Indian lands by bona fide purchase 
of t i t l e . F a c e d  with the collapse of the aggressive 1783-1786
^^Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXIII :455-63.
^^Ibid., pp. 477-81; Horsman, Expansion and American Indian 
Policy, p. 41; Horsman, "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," 
p. 41.
^^This return to the old British policy represents an 
Anglicization of American Indian policy. Washington, of course, 
had advocated purchase four years earlier in his September 7 
letter to Duane. But Congress thought, as did Schuyler, that 
even purchase was unnecessary. Thus Congress finally accepted 
Washington's unheeded advice.
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policy and an Indian war, the Eastern Nationalists transformed 
American Indian policy and attempted to make it more equitable. 
Expansion was still the goal, but the Northeasterners planned 
for the post-1787 expansion to be less ruthless than the un­
restricted flood of migration that followed the Revolution.
Now expansion was to be slow and organized, and into terri­
tories where a solid government was waiting. Of course this 
"new" expansion necessitated Indian land cessions, but they 
were to be obtained from the Northern and Southern tribes by 
fair purchase in honest negotiations. After selling some of 
their lands, the Indians would live on the millions of acres 
to the west of the American settlements. There would be plenty 
of land for all--or so the Eastern Nationalists thought.
No one in 1787, particularly the Eastern Nationalists, had 
any idea of the proportions the westward movement would take. 
Over the next quarter of a century hundreds of thousands of 
American pioneers crossed the Appalachians and settled in the 
Mississippi Valley. The red man's civilization was inevitably 
crushed by this expansion. The Confederation decision to pur­
chase Indian lands in 1787 was a step in the direction of an 
equitable Indian policy, but viewed in the total perspective 
its effects were miniscule. Americans may have salved their 
consciences by introducing purchase money into their trans­
actions with the Indians, but the fact remains that the Indians 
did not want to sell their lands at all. It mattered little to
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the Indians whether the loss of their ancestral domains was 
occasioned by sale, coercion, or outright seizure. The con­
flict between white Americans and native Americans over land 
had no solution. The introduction of purchase money by the 
Americans only tended to shadow that unalterable fact.^^
The 1788-1789 American Indian policy is a good example 
of this phenomenon. To be sure. Congress reintroduced the 
practice of purchasing Indian lands. But they all but ignored 
the other recommendations of the Northwest Ordinance and the 
Dane committees calling for "Justice and humanity" and the 
"utmost good faith" in dealing with the Northern and Southern 
tribes. Resultantly, there was little, if any, change in the 
overall relationship between whites and Indians. In the winter 
of 1788-1789 Ohio territorial governor Arthur St. Clair nego­
tiated two treaties with the Northern tribes at Fort Harmar.
The treaties of Fort Harmar were dictated, and their terms were 
nearly identical to those of Forts Stanwix, McIntosh, and 
Finney. The only difference was the payment of $9,000.00 to
See Jordan, White Over Black, p. 350: "During the post­
war years of governmental drift and economic depression, more­
over, the rhetoric of natural rights became increasingly 
irrelevant to the nation’s problems. Americans found the 
philosophy of natural rights, bedrock of the Revolution, could 
not be made to serve as the cornerstone for effective govern­
ment." See also, Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, p. 11: The
humanitarians of the early national period could "be accused 
of treating the natives more like a precious abstraction than 
a living human being. For the Indian it wanted only the best, 
but that meant ultimately the elimination of the tribal order, 
for which the Jeffersonian age must bear its share of the 
responsibility. Its crime was a willful failure of the in­
tellect but not of the will."
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the Northern Indians, Again, many of the tribes did not 
attend the councils, and those who did were coerced into 
signing. Money was given to salve the Indians’ anger and 
the Americans’ consciences. American Indian policy had not 
changed. The only difference was that the Americans now had 
an excuse not to feel guilty.
In the South the new Confederation policy did little to 
remedy the chaos of the 1780s. North Carolina and Georgia 
continued their aggressive behavior towards the Southern 
tribes and the Confederation Congress was powerless to stop 
them. Secretary of War Knox accused North Carolina of "the 
most unprovoked and direct outrages against the Cherokee In­
dians," concluding that "all other tribes will have good 
grounds not only according to their o\m opinion but according 
to the impartial judgements of the civilized part of the human 
race for waging perpetual warfare against the citizens of the 
United States." The Americans did not secure treaties with 
the Southern tribes until 1792. But these treaties. Northern 
and Southern, were only stop-gap measures. The frontier
breathed a sigh of relief and awaited the policy of the new
c 7federal government.
^^For the Treaty of Fort Harmar (1788-89), see Mohr, 
Federal Indian Relations, pp. 128, 133, 137-38; George Mor­
gan to Sam Adams, 1792: "we attempted to patch the business
at Fort Harmar where but few of the natives attended and 
none were fully represented; here the treaty was negotiated 
and speeches and explanations made to the Indians in the 
French language through a Canadian interpreter who had to 
guess at his meaning for he can neither write nor speak the 
language so as to make himself understood in any matter of
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The policy of the 1790s was much the same as the old.
Although the conservative Federalists would have liked to
5 8limit expansion onto Indian lands, they were powerless to 
stop the dynamic force of the westward movement. With the 
rise of the Jeffersonians, the frontier settlers gained a 
more sympathetic hearing in Congress. And in the long run, 
the frontiersmen were always the ^  facto architects of 
American Indian policy. Full-scale war soon broke out on 
the Northern frontier, climaxing in Anthony Wayne's victory 
at Fallen Timbers in 1795. The Southern Indians’ resistance 
collapsed after Andrew Jackson's victory at Horseshoe Bend 
in 1814. Thus the Eastern Nationalists' plans for an orderly 
and peaceful westward advance came to naught. The number of 
Americans who cared whether or not the United States expan­
sion entailed honor and fair treatment of the Indians dwindled 
to relatively nothing. By the 1830s, treaties, wars, and 
Indian 'removal' had effectively cleared the eastern half of 
the Mississippi Valley of its original inhabitants. The ex­
tirpation of their western breathren was left to a new genera­
tion of Americans.
that importance. It was a misfortune he could find no other 
medium." See also, Downes, Council Fires, pp. 304, 306, 308; 
Cotterill, Southern Indians. p. 86; Horsman, Expansion and 
American Indian Policy, pp. 47-50; Pound, Beniamin Hawkins, 
p. 60; Ward, Department of War, p. 74; Horsman, "Indian Policy 
in the Old Northwest," pp. 41-42; Mohr, Federal Indian Rela­
tions . p. 171.
r o For Federalist Indian policy, see the Epilogue, below.
CHAPTER V
SALES OF THE PUBLIC LANDS
To hit upon a happy medium price for the 
Western lands, for the prevention of mo­
nopoly on one hand, and not discouraging 
useful settlement on the other, will, no 
doubt, require consideration; but ought 
not, in my opinion, to employ too much 
time before the terms are announced. The 
spirit of emigration is great. People 
have got impatient, and, though you can­
not stop the road, it is yet within your 
power to Mark the way; a little while, 
and you will not be able to do either.
George Washington to Richard 
Henry Lee, 1784^
Land has always been of utmost importance in the Ameri­
can experience. It lured millions of emigrants from Europe, 
and sent them westward to populate the continental United 
States. In America, land became the avenue to opportunity-- 
opportunity to achieve prosperity, prestige, and the social 
and political equality that accompanied them. As soon as 
Americans learned the 'art* of acquiring Indian title, they 
began to devise methods for parceling out their vast domain. 
Colonial Americans, particularly those in the Middle and 
Southern colonies, established precedents for cheap or free
^Washington to Lee, December 14, 1784, in Sparks, Writ­
ings of George Washington, IX:81.
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land, and preemption and "squatter's rights." When Great 
Britain, in its quest for colonial revenues, tried to change 
this policy, the colonists objected strenuously. Objections 
to British land policy were one of the many grievances that 
led to the Revolution in 1776.
The National Domain became a reality when the Confedera­
tion Congress acquired the state land cessions and Indian 
title to the Old Northwest in the 1780s. Although the thir­
teen individual states adopted radical land policies in the
1780s, the Confederation Congress followed a different 
2route. The need for revenue resulted in a Congressional 
policy of using public land sales to fund the national debt. 
Congress still had considerable options in land policy, how­
ever. Most of these choices revolved around the "New England" 
vs. "Southern" systems of land disposal. Was settlement to 
advance slowly by compact groups onto 30,000-acre "townships," 
as in New England? Or would settlement be in a less organized 
manner onto smaller individual lots, as in the South? These 
were the opposing views around which the land policy debate 
revolved. The members of the two sides varied, but basic
2There are numerous works which discuss Confederation 
land policy, but many are superficial and repetitive. The 
books used for this essay are Payson J. Treat, The National 
Land System. 1785-1820 (New York, 1910); Pattison, American 
Rectangular Land Survey System. See also Henry Tatter,
"State andpederal Land Policy During the Confederation," 
Agricultural History IX (October 1935); Amelia Clewley Ford, 
Colonial Precedents of our National Land System as It Existed 
in 1800 (Madison, 1910). The latter is a doctoral disserta­
tion done under Frederick Jackson Turner.
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patterns emerged. The debate was between Northeasterners
and Southerners; land speculators and western settlers;
conservatives and liberals; Eastern Nationalists and a
%Southern-Antifederalist alliance.
Thomas Jefferson and Hugh Williamson wrote a Southern- 
oriented Land Ordinance of 1784, but Congress never accepted 
it. Many Eastern Nationalists opposed this Southern plan, 
and demanded a land system more akin to the New England mode 
of land disposal. As the two factions debated in 1785, their 
differing philosophies toward westward expansion became ob­
vious. While the South advocated rapid, and loosely organized 
expansion, the Easterners insisted on a very slow, gradual 
westward advance--closely regulated by a strong national
For the basic dichotomy over land legislation, see Roy 
M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1956 
(Lincoln, 1962), p. 9: "The fact is that much of the history
of the national land system centers around the struggle be­
tween these two forces of squatterism and speculation, between 
the poor man and the man of wealth . . . the opening of vacant 
lands to the westward always stimulated a peculiar democratic 
levelling influence . . . but the forces of order, on the 
other hand, contended that free land would destroy the politi­
cal and economic values upon which the government was founded." 
See also Turner, Frontier in American History, pp. 25-26: 
"Efforts to make this domain a source of revenue, and to 
withold it from migrants in order that settlement might be 
compact were in vain. The jealousy and fears of the East were 
powerless in the face of the demands of the frontiersmen. . . . 
The reason is obvious; a system of administration was not what 
the West demanded; it wanted land." Also Tatter, "Land Policy 
During the Confederation." Tatter calls the Confederation Con­
gress’s policy "rank imperialism." This Progressive interpre­
tation of East vs. South and West; Rich vs. Poor; Privilege 
vs. Democracy, etc. is, of course, oversimplified. But when 
it is refined and the exceptions pointed out, however, its 
basic premises still hold true. This writer considers himself 
to be a "tempered" Turnerian.
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government. Whereas the South looked forward to new western 
states entering the Union, the Northeast feared this would 
result in a decrease in their economic and political suprem­
acy. Both sides wanted revenues from public land sales, but 
for opposite reasons. The Eastern Nationalists believed 
land sales would provide an independent revenue, thus strength­
ening the national government. Southerners and Antifederalists 
favored land sales in order to avoid the impost and taxation 
schemes of Morris and the Nationalists.^ The opposing sides 
did finally compromise, however, and passed the Land Ordinance 
of 1785. This revenue measure was a victory for the New Eng­
land system of land development. Yet the issue was far from 
settled. Widespread squatting and illegal settlement during 
the 1780s and ’90s lead to a collapse of the Confederation 
land policy. It soon became obvious that ’’New England town­
ship planting" would not work in the trans-Appalachian West.
Is it consistent with good policy or free 
government to establish a perpetual revenue?
For the political implications of the land question, 
see Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 368-77. According to 
Henderson the New England system ’’was opposed by libertarians 
who objected to such corporate arrangements. The advocates 
of corporate development did not necessarily oppose expansion, 
but their policy coincided with that of the constrictionists. 
By the same token, democrats and advocates of rapid expansion 
often joined forces for different reasons. Libertarians who 
favored minimum restrain might find common cause with specu­
lators who wanted a free hand to exploit the land. . . . "
I l l
. . . the idea of Congress selling out 
the unlocated lands has sometimes been 
dropped, but we have always met the hint 
[with such] determined opposition that I 
believe it will never be proposed. I am 
against selling the lands at all. The 
people who migrate West . . . will be sub­
ject to their proportion of the Continental 
debt until paid. They ought not to be 
subject to more. They will be a people 
little able to pay taxes. There is no 
equity in fixing upon them the burden 
of this war, or any other proportion than 
we bear ourselves. By selling the lands 
to them, you will disgust them, and cause 
an avulsion of them from the common Union.
They will settle the lands in spite of 
everybody. _
Thomas Jefferson, 1776
The thirteen American colonial governments faced the 
problem of land sales, distribution, and settlement in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The challenges of 
creating a land policy were met in various ways, but basic 
patterns emerged. The Royal and Proprietary colonial 
governors sought to gain substantial revenues from their 
vast domains. This is particularly true of the proprietors, 
like Penn and Lord Baltimore, who entertained ideas of re­
establishing some sort of feudal or manorial system wherein 
they could "quitrent" lands to "vassals” in the American 
wilderness. But efforts to collect quitrents and sell lands 
usually proved futile. There was considerable trespassing 
and squatting on Crown lands, and colonial governors found 
it impossible to police their vast frontiers. By the
^Tatter, "Land Policy During the Confederation," p. 184,
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eighteenth century, "preemption” (first choice when the lands 
were put on sale) for squatters, the "headright" system, and 
land grants to those who provided an Indian buffer all came 
to be. Thus, much land in colonial America was either cheap, 
or given away for free. As colonial American society evolved, 
cheap or free land became one of its marked characteristics. 
But irregardless of price, the colonial governments needed 
surveys, boards of land policy, and land offices to manage 
their domains. They needed some sort of administrative 
apparatus for locating and parceling out lands to settlers 
and buyers. Two diverse systems were adopted by the Northern 
and Southern colonies, and each system catered to the exi­
gencies of its particular section. The two modes of land 
administration became known, respectively, as the "New Eng­
land" and "Southern" systems.^
The "New England" land system was well suited to the 
prudent society of the Puritan Northeast. It centered around 
the concept of settlement in groups; individual migration and 
squatting was strictly forbidden. If a number of people
For colonial land policy, see Ford, Colonial Precedents; 
Malcolm J. Rohrbough, The Land Office Business (New York, 
1968), pp. 3-25; Philbrick, Rise of the West, p. 106; Everett 
Dick, The Lure of the Land: A Social History of the Public 
Lands from the Articles of Confederation to the New Deal 
(Lincoln, 1962), pp. 3-11; Payson J. Treat, "Origins of the 
National Land System Under the Confederation," in Vernon 
Carstensen, ed.. The Public Lands (Madison, 1963), p. 9; 
Benjamin Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies (New 
York, 1924), p. 347; Marion Clawson, Uncle Sam's Acres (New 
York, 1951), introduction.
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desired to leave their town, they were required to incorporate 
and apply to the colonial legislature for a tract of land, or 
"township," usually near or adjacent to their present residence. 
These townships were previously surveyed rectangles, often six 
miles square (thirty-six square miles), with individual lots 
one mile square within. A group of settlers could remove to a 
township if they agreed to make improvements, build schools, 
and establish a church. The New England system thus provided 
for compact settlements, orderly migration, protection against 
Indians, and mutual help during the severe Northern winters.
It was perfectly suited for the New Englanders--a people who 
in the seventeenth century tended towards community life be-
7cause of their lifestyle and the exigencies of their situation.
An entirely different land system evolved in the society 
of the American South. In the Southern colonies, the less 
hostile Indians, mild climate, and plantation type of agricul­
ture favored scattered settlements and development of country 
over town. People did not settle in groups, but rather as 
individual farmers. They located lands and claimed them in­
discriminately instead of in contiguous parcels. Since there 
was no prior survey, settlers simply obtained a warrant (known 
also as certificates, caveats, and grants) for a specified 
amount of land from the colonial government. After so doing.
7Treat, National Land System, p. 23; Treat, "Land System 
Under the Confederation," p. 9; Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, 
p. 7; Hibbard, Public Land Policies, introduction.
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the settler could pick and choose the land he desired from 
any that was unsettled, and stake a claim--usually by marking 
several trees with a tomahawk; hence "tomahawk rights."
After describing his bounds on the warrant, the settler 
registered the purchase and took possession of the land.
This style of "indiscriminate location" was well suited to 
the individual settler, and was adopted by the backcountry 
yeoman as well as the planters of the Southern colonial 
frontier.^
Both Northern and Southern systems had their advantages 
and disadvantages. While the New England system provided 
for secure title and orderly settlement, the Southern mode 
encouraged initiative and resourcefulness, and put no re­
straints on liberty. While the former encouraged community 
life, the latter led to individual plantations and an inde­
pendent backcountry yeomanry. One possible disadvantage of 
the Northern system was that it restrained the freedom of 
those who wished to set out on their own. On the other hand.
OTreat, National Land System, p. 24; Treat, "Land System 
Under the Confederation," p. 10; Hibbard, Public Land Poli­
cies . pp. 36-37; Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, p. 7. The 
Middle Colonies also practiced the Southern mode of distribu­
tion. See David Howell to Jonathan Arnold, February 21, 1784, 
in Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System, p. 39. 
Howell favored this system because, "In this way the good land 
is looked out and seized upon first, and the land of little 
value and of all shapes and sizes, left in the hands of the 
public. But this, I am told, soon rises in value, and is 
bought by the owners of the adjacent good lands, in their own 
defence." Perhaps the greatest advantage of the Southern mode 
is that it catered, realistically, to the inclination of the 
pioneers to settle along the rich creek beds, leaving less fer' 
tile lands vacant.
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the loosely structured Southern system led to improper sur­
veying and inaccurate records. This caused a multitude of 
conflicting claims and legal disputes as well as monopoliza­
tion and fraud. Both the New England and Southern modes of 
land distribution contained positive and negative elements, 
and each was the product of the culture from which it evolved. 
Perhaps the only similarity between the toivnship system of 
the Northeast and the indiscriminate location system of the 
South was that they both provided their respective westward 
settlers with the opportunity to settle on good lands, usually 
at a low price if not for free.^
The availability of cheap lands ended temporarily prior 
to the American Revolution, when the British Lords of Trade 
turned to land sales in their quest for colonial revenue.
The Proclamation of 1763, Orders - in-Council, and the Quebec 
Act (1774) all contained provisions aimed at prohibiting 
settlement beyond the Appalachians so as to promote the sale 
of Crown lands to the East. The British set exorbitant 
rates (for example, five pounds sterling per acre in New Hamp­
shire) to insure high proceeds from these sales. But the 
colonists were outraged, and refused to obey. They continued 
to settle illegally on Crown lands, and many removed to the 
trans-Appalachian West. English land policy was not only a 
financial failure, it was one of the grievances enumerated in
^Treat, National Land System, pp. 24-26; Robbins, Our 
Landed Heritage", p~̂ 71
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the Declaration of Independence.^^
Throughout the Revolutionary and Confederation period, 
the thirteen United States adopted their own radical land 
codes. The Virginia assembly declared in 1776, "that all 
persons who are actually settled on any unlocated or unappro­
priated lands in Virginia shall have the preemption or the 
preference in the grant of such lands." Thomas Jefferson 
announced the same year that he was "against selling the 
lands at all." One year later the Virginians granted all 
squatters the right of preemption at two and one-half cents 
an acre. This liberal policy was similar to those in most 
of the other states throughout the late 1770s and 1780s.
North Carolina granted settlers up to 640 acres (with an addi­
tional 100 acres for a wife and each child) at forty schillings 
an acre, and Pennsylvania sold its western lands at thirty- 
four cents an acre. New York was selling its upstate land at 
twenty cents to one dollar an acre, with credit, while Massa­
chusetts reduced its Maine lands to fifty cents an acre. 
Maryland joined in granting preemption rights, and nearly all 
of the other states' policies favored cheap lands and easy
Ford, Colonial Precedents, p. 84; Robbins, Our Landed 
Heritage. p. 1; Rohrbough, Land Office Business, p. 6; Hib­
bard, Public Land Policies, p. 144; Tatter, "Land Policy 
During the Confederation," pp. 177-78. Tatter contends that 
Confederation land policy was modeled after the policy which 
Great Britain tried to institute prior to the Revolution--a 
policy that contradicted colonial precedents and the policies 
of the thirteen states during the Confederation era.
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credit. While these radical land codes were partly a mani­
festation of Revolutionary ideology, they were not without 
precedent. As noted, cheap or free land was a common fea­
ture of many of the colonial land systems. Indeed, one 
historian contends that no principle in the history of the 
public lands in America is older or of more general applica­
tion than that of giving away the public domain.
While the thirteen states created radical land sales 
programs during the late 1770s and 1780s, the Confederation 
Congress adopted a far different policy. Before 1784, the 
Congress had no land policy at all, as there was no National 
Domain. Not until Congress acquired the various state land 
cessions and Indian title (1783-1785) did the National Domain 
come into being. Prior to the creation of the National Do­
main, however, several proposals emerged concerning public 
lands policy. These plans were indicative of the course that 
Confederation land policy would follow. The Confederation 
Congress was destitute of funds, numerous "banditti" were 
settling the West, and the officers of the Continental Army
Shaw Livermore, Early American Land Companies (New York, 
1939), p. 132; Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, p. 10; Tatter, 
"Land Policy During the Confederation," pp. 180-81. Massa­
chusetts legalized squatting in Maine, but mostly because the 
Maine lands belonged to the Tories. In Vermont, the settlers 
used "squatter's rights" as their legal basis in declaring 
themselves independent from New York, New Hampshire, and 
Massachusetts. The Republic of Vermont's land policy was 
radical. See also. Ford, Colonial Precedents, pp. 83, 89,
95; Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, p. 9. Virginia's Kentucky 
lands were often given away, as was the case in North Carolina 
and Georgia, The "cheap land" thesis is that of Amelia Clewley 
Ford.
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were clamoring for their land bounties and back pay. These 
conditions figured importantly in three separate land policy 
proposals made to Congress between 1781 and 1783. By 
examining the Peletiah Webster Plan, the "Financier's Plan," 
and the "Army Plan," one can view the origins of the first 
Confederation land policy.
One of the first proposals for a national land system 
was in a pamphlet published in 1781 by Peletiah Webster, a 
Philadelphia essayist and political thinker. Webster decried 
proposals by some Eastern constrictionists to sell or mortgage 
the trans-Appalachian West to Britain or Spain, saying, "It 
would be like killing the goose that laid an egg every day 
in order to tear out at once all that was in her belly." 
Instead he viewed the public domain as a valuable source of 
revenue, and proposed land sales and settlement via a mode 
that closely resembled the colonial New England system of 
land administration. Webster's plan called for prior survey 
into townships, sale at auction to the highest bidder (one 
Spanish dollar per acre minimum), gradual settlement of one 
tier of townships at a time, salt and mineral reserves for 
the federal government, and mandatory improvements by each 
purchaser. Webster aimed at discouraging squatting and pre­
emption, "For I esteem this very wrong and injurious to the 
public, which rather deserves punishment than reward." 
Peletiah Webster's desire to use the National Domain for 
revenue purposes was echoed by Theodoric Bland and Alexander
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Hamilton on July 5, 1783. They introduced a resolution in 
Congress, the "Financier’s Plan," which proposed that land 
revenues be used to finance the Confederation government.
Like Webster, the advocates of the Financier’s Plan called 
for the New England township system, prior survey, and sales 
by auction. And they proposed specifically that additional 
land bounties be paid to all army officers in lieu of the 
"half pay and arrears" owed them. The resolution proposed 
awarding $30.00 worth of land for every dollar owed by Con­
gress. Thus both the "Webster Plan" and the "Financier’s
Plan” advocated a revenue-oriented land policy based on the
12New England system of land administration.
One of the most influential groups in determining Con­
federation land policy was the officer corps of the Conti­
nental Army. Because of the military land bounties awarded 
during the Revolutionary War, these men had a great stake in 
the distribution of the National Domain. The ancient policy 
of awarding land for military service was practiced exten­
sively during the Revolution, when both Congress and the 
state governments awarded lands to their respective soldiers 
and officers. Virginia was one of the most generous, allotting
"Peletiah Webster on Our Western Unlocated Lands (1781)," 
in Hulbert, Ohio in the Confederation, pp. 17-29; Ford, Colo­
nial Precedents, p~̂ 55 ; Tatter, "Land Policy During the Con­
federation"; Treat, National Land System, p. 16; Marshall 
Harris, "Origins of the Land Tenure System in the United States 
(Ames, 1953), pp. 387-88; "Financier’s Plan," in Hulbert, Ohio 
in the Confederation, p. 35; Pattison, American Rectangular 
Land Survey System, p. 20; Treat, National Land Policy, p. 19; 
Harris, Land Tenure System, p. 388.
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200 acres to privates, 400 to non-commissioned officers,
1 ̂5,000 to Colonels, and 1,500 acres to general officers.
Other states were nearly, if not more liberal. Pennsyl­
vania's officers received 2,000 acres while in North Caro­
lina they received 12,000. The national government was not 
to be outdone, however, and in September of 1776 the Conti­
nental Congress attempted to encourage enlistments in the 
Continental Line by offering land bounties to volunteers. 
Privates received certificates for 100 acres. Colonels got 
500 acres, and Major-Generals, 1,100. The fact that at this 
time there was no public domain from which these lands could 
be drawn does not appear to have restrained the Continental 
Congress's generosity. Neither did the fact that the Indians 
controlled all of the trans-Appalachian West. Congress as­
sumed that when the time came, the states would donate the 
necessary land and the Indian title would be extinguished.^^
13Virginia stipulated that its soldiers could collect on 
their bounties in the "Virginia Military Reserve," to be com­
posed of lands included within Virginia's claims by her colo­
nial charter. Many of the claims were satisfied with lands in 
Kentucky, but Virginia's intention that all of the lands 
granted to soldiers be "good" lands (i.e., river bottom land) 
caused complications for the Virginia cession of 1784. Vir­
ginia refused to cede her claims to the area NW of the Ohio 
unless Congress promised to reserve "good" lands in the Ohio 
country for Virginia’s soldiers who were unable to locate 
"good" lands within the boundaries of that state. Congress 
finally accepted this provision, and the Virginia Military 
District in Ohio became a reality on the Land Ordinance of 1785.
^^Rudolph Freund, "Military Bounty Lands and the Origins 
of the Public Domain," in Carstensen, The Public Lands, p. 19; 
Hibbard, Public Land Policy, p. 32; Treat, National Land Sys­
tem . pp. 230-35.
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As the war drew to a close, many of New England’s Con­
tinental Army officers banded together to plan the most 
effective use of their military land bounties. Many of the 
officers were impoverished by the war and wary of the impend­
ing return to civilian life. Some believed the nation was 
ungrateful for their services, and looked to the West and 
western lands for a "fresh start." Yet the officers’ dis- 
gruntlement had political ramifications that reached far 
beyond the issue of public lands. Their experiences in the 
Continental Line left them little respect for the weak Con­
federation government. The Continental Army officers were, 
almost to a man. Nationalists who favored a strong centralized 
government. During the 1780s, ex-officers like Washington,
The connection of the Continental Army with the Na­
tionalist faction in Congress was first suggested by Jensen 
in The New Nation. The best treatment of the subject is in 
Kohn, Eagle and Sword. Kohn contends that the Continental 
Army officers' corps formed the nucleus for the Nationalist 
effort and went on to join the Federalist party during the 
1790s. Although the main concern of his book is the army’s 
efforts to create a strong military establishment (i.e., 
standing army) in America, he alludes to several matters 
which concern western lands. Some Continental Army officers 
who were important Nationalists were General George Washing­
ton, Henry Knox, Rufus King, Timothy Pickering, John Marshall, 
Jonathan Dayton, Arthur St. Clair, Benjamin Lincoln, Rufus 
Putnam, Henry Knox, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, William Duer, 
Alexander Hamilton, James McHenry, and David Humphreys.
These officers undoubtedly favored a strong national gov­
ernment. This is largely because of the many administrative 
problems encountered by the army because of the alleged im- 
potency of the Confederation. Lack of pay, supplies, recruits, 
etc. caused many problems, and most of those problems were 
blamed on the Congress. Knox said, "Americans will have fought 
and bled to little purpose if the powers of government shall 
be insufficient to preserve the peace." See Kohn, Eagle and 
Sword. p. 11. To argue for a peacetime army in 1783 was to 
favor giving the national government added authority, a symbol
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Arthur St. Clair, Timothy Pickering, Rufus King, Samuel 
Holden Parsons, Rufus Putnam, Alexander Hamilton, and Henry 
Knox retained their military friendships and comaraderie.
They formed the Society of Cincinnati, a fraternal organiza­
tion of officers aimed at maintaining these bonds of friend­
ship while at the same time speaking out on political issues 
of the day. The Cincinnati, as it was called, was denounced 
by Sam Adams, Jefferson, and others as a political pressure 
group and "military aristocracy" (membership in the Cin­
cinnati was passed down to the eldest son in each family). 
Because of the Society of Cincinnati's great interest in the 
West, Jefferson attempted unsuccessfully to insert a provision 
into the Ordinance of 1784 prohibiting citizenship in the West 
to any person holding an hereditary title. The Society of 
Cincinnati grew, however, and in the 1780s was a major force 
behind the "Army Plan" of land policy submitted to Congress 
in the Newburgh Petition of 1783.^^
of ultimate sovereignty--the power of the sword. Militias, 
on the other hand, were creations of the states and were op­
posed by the Nationalists. It is no coincidence that studies 
of Pennsylvania and New York debates over the ratification of 
the Constitution show a distinct dichotomy between Continental 
Army and militia veterans.
If one accepts the Jensen-Kohn thesis, the importance of 
the army in creating the national Western policy (Washington's 
influence, as well as that of King, Pickering, Knox, Schuyler, 
the Newburgh Petitioners, and the Ohio Company) is an impor­
tant factor in the overall Nationalist tone of that policy as 
it stood by 1787.
^^Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 13: "By maintaining the
associations of the war, the Cincinnati proved an institutional 
and emotional bond between the Continental Army and the [Na­
tionalist] faction." Jefferson wrote Washington in 1784 that
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The officers' first try at influencing Congressional
land policy took place at the army cantonment of Newburgh,
on the Hudson, in December of 1782. One historian has called
the Newburgh Convention a "conspiracy." He contends the
"Newburgh conspiracy was the closest an American army has
17ever come to revolt or coup d'etat." This is debatable.
he opposed the Cincinnati because the order's philosophy ran 
counter to the idea of the "equality of man . . .  § particu­
larly the denial of preeminence by birth." The nation's 
foremost civilian Revolutionary also maintained that the 
society created "a distinction between the civil and the 
military." See Ford, Writings of Jefferson, 111:464-70.
San Adams' views on the Cincinnati can be found in two let­
ters to Elbridge Gerry in April of 1784 in Henry Alonzo 
Cushing, ed.. The Writings of Samuel Adams (New York, 1908), 
IV:298: "I look upon it to be as rapid a Stride toward an 
hereditary Nobility as was ever made in so short a Time. . . . 
"It appears wonderful that they could imagine a People who 
had freely spent their Blood § Treasure in Support of their 
equal rights § Liberties could so soon be reconciled to the 
odious hereditary distinctions of Families. This Country 
must be humiliated and debased to a great Degree, before they 
will patiently bear to see Individuals stalking about with 
their assumed Honorary Badges 8 proudly boasting "These are 
the Distinctions of our Blood." Adams applauded Jefferson's 
attempt to exclude the Cincinnati from citizenship in the 
West: "I hope Congress will not fail to make this an indis­
pensable condition" of the Ordinance of 1784. According to 
Freund ("Military Bounty Lands," p. 27), Jefferson was well 
aware of the political implications of the "Army Plan" and 
the role of the Society of Cincinnati in those plans. This 
was the rationale behind his efforts to prevent the rise of 
a military "aristocracy" in the West. See also Kohn, Eagle 
and Sword, p. 12: For "most Federalists . . . the attraction 
and fascination with armies went much deeper. Federalists 
viewed society as an integrated, stable organization in which 
individuals deferred to their superiors . . . they emphasized 
order, tradition, natural distinction among men. . . . Strik­
ingly these same values personified the eighteenth century 
military officer."
17Kohn Eagle and Sword, p. 17. For a discussion of the 
Newburgh "conspiracy," see Jensen, New Nation, pp. 72, 76-77. 
The longest treatment is in Kohn, Eagle and Sword, Chapter I.
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The Newburgh petitioners were certainly very vocal in their 
demands for back pay, a stronger central government, and a 
permanent standing army. Of importance to this essay, how­
ever, is the Newburgh officers' demand, in a petition to 
Congress, for federal lands in the West. General Rufus 
Putnam and Colonel Timothy Pickering drafted this so-called 
"Army Plan" of Newburgh calling for "A New State Westward of 
the Ohio." They proposed to people the Ohio country with 
loyal army veterans who would defend the territory against 
Indians and "banish forever the idea of our Western territory 
falling under the domination of European powers." The Army 
Plan called for a tract of about 17,500,000 acres, to be 
managed in the New England style of land development. It 
would be surveyed prior to settlement and divided into town­
ships six miles square, with reserves for the ministry and 
schools. Two hundred eighty-five officers signed the New­
burgh Petition (no enlisted men or non-commissioned officers 
signed). None were Southern, 235 were from New England, and 
90 percent belonged to the Society of Cincinnati. Congress
Kohn calls the affair "one of the most bizarre and little 
understood events in American history," "At the very moment 
of victory, the officers' corps responded to an anonymous 
appeal from one of its members and met to consider mutiny 
against constituted civilian authority. . . . "  The "anony­
mous" appeal was probably written by Captain John Armstrong. 
It summarized the various grievances of the army in strong 
terms, and concluded: "IVe have borne all that men can
bear--our property is expended--our private sources are at 
an end, and our friends are wearied out and disgusted with 
our incessant applications. . . . Any further experiments 
on [the army's] patience may have fatal effects."
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received the petition on June 16, 1783 with an attached letter
of endorsement from George Washington:
I am induced to give my sentiments thus freely 
on the advantages to be expected from this 
plan of colonization, because it would con­
nect our government with the frontiers, extend 
our settlements progressively, and plant a 
brave, a hardy, and respectable race of people 
as our advanced post, who would be ready and 
willing (in case of hostility) to combat the 
savages and check their incursions.18
Despite this pressure from the army. Congress did not 
convey bona fide title for military bounty lands until 1796.
By this time some of the veterans were dead, others had sold 
their counties to speculators, and the idea of settling the 
Northwest with Revolutionary veterans had lost its original 
enthusiastic support. Nearly all of the Revolutionary land 
bounties found their way into the hands of speculators and 
profiteers. The main reason the army is linked with early 
settlement of the Ohio Valley is that many of those land 
speculators were former Revolutionary officers. Some of the 
Newburgh leaders--Rufus Putnam, Arthur St. Clair, Samuel 
Holden Parsons, Timothy Pickering, Benjamin Tupper, and Winthrop
18The Newburgh Petition appears in several forms. The 
final document sent to Congress is "Rufus Putnam's Plan for a 
Western State (1783)," in Hulbert, Ohio in the Confederation, 
p. 56. Washington's endorsement is in ibid., p . 64. Picker- 
ing's notes were doubtless used in the formulation of this 
proposal. See his "Proposition for Settling a New State by 
Such Officers and Soldiers as Shall Associate for that Purpose" 
in Pickering, Papers of Timothy Pickering, Reel 53, #134.
Also, ibid., #148 ; Freund, "Military Bounty Lands," p. 21;
Ford, Colonial Precedents, p. 56; Archer B. Hulbert, The Rec- 
ords and Original Proceedings of the Ohio Company (Marietta, 
Ohio, 1917), pp. xxiv, xli; Treat, National Land System, p. 21.
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Sargent--formed the nucleus of the Ohio Company, a settlement- 
speculation firm discussed below. The Ohio Company and land- 
jobber John Cleve Symmes were the only parties able to obtain 
lands in exchange for military bounties during the 1780s.
Notwithstanding the Peletiah Webster plan, the Financier's 
Plan, and the Army Plan, Congress could not begin to formulate 
a land policy until the state land cessions and Indian treaties 
led to the creation of the National Domain. This occurred dur­
ing 1783-1785. With the Virginia cession and the Indian 
treaties at Forts Stanwix, McIntosh, and Finney, Congress at 
last had a public domain in the Old Northwest for which it 
could legislate. But how would that domain be administered?
Treat, National Land System, pp. 237, 238-39, 244-45.
In 1788 the bounties were rendered transferable. After that, 
nearly all of the bounties fell into hands other than those 
of their original holders. When Congress created the na­
tional military reserve during the 1790s, it remained largely 
empty. Rudolph Freund's "Military Bounty Lands and the Origin 
of the Public Domain" is the best treatment of the subject. 
While acknowledging that hardly any actual veterans settled 
the West using their Revolutionary bounties, Freund insists 
that the policy was a success. The speculators who ended up 
with the land, he maintains, were instrumental in the settle­
ment of that region and should be given credit for same. See 
Freund, "Military Bounty Lands," pp. 15, 17, 29, 31.
2 0The Virginia cession contained an important clause as 
far as land policy was concerned. It declared that all lands 
ceded "shall be considered as a common fund for the use and 
benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall 
become members of the Confederation . . . and shall be faith­
fully and bonafide disposed of for that purpose, and for no 
other use or purpose whatsoever." Jefferson (in the land 
Ordinance of 1784) changed the stipulation a little to require 
the land revenues be used for the extinguishment of the public 
debt and "for no other purpose whatsoever."
The role of the Old Southwest in the public domain was 
confused until the Georgia and North Carolina cessions were 
obtained. Although North Carolina ceded in 1787, it was not
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Would the land be sold in large chunks to speculators, or 
would sales benefit the small farmer? In the long run, the 
Confederation's financial distress was the main determinant 
of the course followed. Robert Morris, Alexander Hamilton, 
and other Nationalists viewed the National Domain as a valu­
able source of revenue for funding the national debt. They 
believed that the central government would be strengthened 
if it could acquire an independent income from land sales. 
They were opposed by Antifederalists and Southerners like 
David Howell, William Grayson, and Jefferson, who favored 
cheap or free land for actual settlers and feared growing 
centralization of the national government. By 1783, however, 
even Jefferson and Howell had come to view the public domain 
as a "precious resource" for extinguishing the national debt. 
The reasons for this reversal were political as well as eco­
nomic. In the first place, most Southerners eagerly awaited 
new western states, which they believed would add to their 
strength in Congress. They were willing to compromise over 
land sales in order to expedite settlement and statehood.
At the same time, Antifederalists believed that substantial 
land revenues would weaken Morris' Nationalist argument for 
the necessity of a tariff, or impost. The Nationalists' 
opponents hoped that lucrative land sales would mean the
until 1802 that Georgia made its cession. For this reason 
much of Confederation land policy, and the entire western 
policy for that matter, pertains only to the area Northwest 
of the Ohio River.
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national debt, contrary to Hamilton and Morris' plan, could
be extinguished, not funded. As David Howell wrote in 1784,
But the price of the land is the chief ques­
tion, after all. If the liberties of this 
country are preserved, it will, in my humble 
opinion, be done by paying, and not by fund­
ing, the national debt. I am, therefore, of 
opinion with those who are for making the 
most of what we have to carry to market.21
The quest for revenue, then, led the Confederation Con­
gress away from colonial precedents of cheap or free land. 
Contrary to colonial practices and practices adopted in all 
of the thirteen states' individual land policies, the Con­
federation Congress decided to sell public lands as a source 
of revenue. Ironically, the policy Congress chose to follow 
was similar to that of the British Lords of Trade during the 
pre-Revolutionary period. The Confederation Congress, like 
Great Britain, needed money badly; the public lands seemed 
to be the answer to its problem. But the desire for revenue
21 Treat, National Land System, pp. 1-7; Tatter, "Land 
Policy During the Confederation," p. 184; Kohn, Eagle and 
Sword. p. 55; Howell to Arnold, February 21, 1784, in Hul­
bert, Ohio in the Confederation, p. 73. For another Anti­
federalist's view, see Richard Henry Lee to Sam Adams, May 20 
.1785, in Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 11:359: "I 
hope we shall shortly finish our plan for disposing of the 
western lands to discharge the oppressive debt created by 
the war § I think if this source of income be rightly managed, 
that these republics may soon be discharged from the state of 
oppression and distress that an indebted people must invari­
ably feel."
The political motivations of the Nationalist faction in 
Congress are discussed in Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 369- 
77: "As the land was sold. Congress would receive an inde­
pendent revenue--that critical element of sovereignty so 
clearly grasped by the Nationalists who failed to secure that 
object through fiscal centralism."
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was about the only facet of the land question over which 
there was any agreement. Great differences of opinion re­
mained over the mode of distribution. How would the lands 
be surveyed? Would there be a minimum purchase requirement? 
What about the place of sale, the price per acre, and the 
availability of credit? Would the lands be sold indiscrimi­
nately or progressively in contiguous parcels? Inherent in 
all of these questions was the overriding debate between the 
New England and Southern systems of land disposal. Congress 
had to decide whether westward expansion was to proceed in a 
corporate fashion, under close supervision of the national 
government, or be allowed to run its own course. This great
question faced Congress as it began, in 1784, to create the
22first national land policy.
Some gentlemen looked upon it as a matter 
of revenue only, and that it was true policy 
to get the money without parting with the 
inhabitants to populate the country and 
thereby preventing the lands in the original 
states from depreciating. Others (I think) 
were afraid of interference with the lands 
now at market in the individual states.
Part of the Eastern gentlemen wish to have 
the land sold in such a manner as to suit 
their own people. . . . But others are 
apprehensive of the consequences which may 
result from the new States taking their 
position in the Confederacy. They, perhaps.
^^Tatter, "Land Policy During the Confederation," p. 183,
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wish this event may be delayed as long as 
possible.
William Grayson to George.- 
Washington, 1785
The Confederation Congress began work on a national land 
policy in the Spring of 17 84. Financial distress, pressure 
from the army officers, fear of British and Spanish encroach­
ments, and increasing westward migration all combined to con­
vince Congress of the need for a national land policy, as 
well as an overall strategy for American expansion westward. 
They realized the need for an inexpensive mode of selling 
lands in the West; packaging them up into parcels to satisfy 
the veterans, pioneers, and land speculators while increasing 
federal revenues. The task of creating a national land sys­
tem fell originally to Thomas Jefferson and Hugh Williamson. 
Jefferson was quite interested in development of the West, 
and had figured importantly in drafting the territorial gov­
ernment Ordinance of 17 84. On March 2, 1784, the day follow­
ing acceptance of the Virginia cession. Congress appointed 
Jefferson, Williamson, David Howell, Elbridge Gerry, and Jacob 
Read to a committee "to devise and report the most eligible 
means of disposing of such part of the Western lands as may 
be obtained from the Indians by the proposed treaty of peace 
and for opening a land office.
7 %Grayson to Washington, April 15, 1785, Treat, National 
Land System, pp. 32-33.
^^Hibbard, Public Land Policies, pp. 32-33; Daniel Boor- 
stin, "Packaging a Continent," in The Americans, The National 
Experience (New York, 1965), pp. 241-48: "Our land system is
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"An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Locating and 
Disposing of Lands in the Western Territory" was first read 
before Congress on May 7, 1784. This report is usually re­
ferred to as the Jefferson-Williamson Land Ordinance of 1784,
as both Thomas Jefferson and Hugh Williamson were instru-
2 5mental in its creation. In essence, the Jefferson-Williamson 
plan was a 'reformed* Southern system of land distribution. 
However, there was one important "New England" addition to 
the report: prior rectangular survey. Jefferson and William­
son made this reform to prevent overlapping claims, and to 
provide for security of title within the context of a Southern 
mode of land sales and distribution. At the same time, the 
Land Ordinance of 1784 called for low minimum purchase price
a relic of the young nation's need to make a commodity of its 
land, and hastily map and sell it, even before it was explored 
or surveyed. It is one of the first examples of the peculiar 
importance of packaging in America." Jefferson's interest in 
the West is discussed in Chapter 3 above. For his attitudes 
towards land speculation, see Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, VII: 
504: "I never was nor am now interested in one foot of land
on earth, off the waters of the James River." See also, ibid., 
p. 147.
2 5The original report of the committee is in Journals of 
the Continental Congress, XXVI:356. Also in Boyd, Papers of 
Jefferson, VIII:140-48. Only recently has Hugh Williamson 
received any credit for his role in the Land Ordinance of 
1784. Williamson's role is discussed in Pattison, American 
Rectangular Land Survey System, p. 37. Williamson was a 
scientist and a mathematics professor, and his travels in 
Europe gave him added perspective in land surveying techniques. 
See Williamson to Governor Martin, July 5, 1785, in Burnett, 
Letters of the Continental Congress. VTI:563-64. Williamson 
supported the proposed Land Ordinance of 1784: "However as I
happen to have suggested the plan to the committee it is more 
than probable that I may have parental prejudices in its 
favor. . . ."
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and the use of warrants (certificates, caveats, etc.] for 
individuals to locate their own claims. This was a modified 
form of indiscriminate (as opposed to contiguous) location. 
Jefferson and Williamson succeeded in inserting New England's 
prior survey mode into the administrative framework of the 
Southern colonial land system. And Jefferson wrote, "The 
method of sale heretofore practiced by several [Southern] 
states and now practiced by Congress has never been defeated 
and cannot be defeated.
Although rectangular survey had considerable precedent 
in the Northeast, the Jefferson-Williamson grid was unique. 
Their plan called for the use of "hundreds" and "geographical 
miles" whereas the traditional New England grid was usually 
divided into six mile square townships using statute miles.
The Ordinance stated that land "shall be divided into Hun­
dreds of ten geographical miles square, with each mile con­
taining 6086 feet and four tenths of a foot. . . . These 
hundreds shall be divided into lots one mile squre each, or 
850 acres and four tenths of an acre. . . ." The introduction 
of hundreds as the basic unit of land distribution, although 
soon abandoned in favor of the New England ’township,' was 
one part of Jefferson's grand scheme to introduce the decimal
Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System, pp. 
43, 230; Treat, "Land System During the Confederation," p. 11. 
Much of the technical aspect of the rectangular survey system 
has been explained to me (patiently) by my friend, Chris 
Huck of the University of Montana Department of Forestry.
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system into American usage. The idea of rectangular units
did remain, and formed the base upon which the national land
27system was built.
27Boorstin, "Packaging a Continent," p. 244. The intro­
duction of rectangular survey "explains why the 20th. cen­
tury United States startles the air traveler by the rectangu­
lar symmetry of its fences and roads. . . . The American 
land . . . has thus remained one of the largest monuments to 
a priorism in all human history. And in a country which is 
a byword for adaptability and empiricism I" See Pattison, 
American Rectangular Land Survey System, pp. 37, 43. Patti­
son’ s book (a doctoral dissertation from the University of 
Chicago) is the definitive work on the origins of the survey 
system. It interprets technical as well as political aspects 
of the problem.
Jefferson was quite interested in the 'hundreds’ unit 
of measurement, as well as all decimal units. The hundred 
was originally the subordinate division of the shire or county 
in England. Jefferson attempted, without success, to intro­
duce the ’hundred’ into America throughout his life. See 
Ford, Colonial Precedents, p. 65. Jefferson’s attraction to 
decimal units is evidenced by an ordinance he conceived in 
1784 in "Notes on the Establishment of a Money Unit and of a 
Coinage for the United States." Much of our contemporary 
decimally oriented coinage, with its 100 cents, quarter dol­
lars, and tenths of dollars, etc., is based on Jefferson’s 
proposals. It is only natural that he turned to decimal 
arithmetic in devising a land mode. See Jefferson to Hopkin- 
son. May 3, 1784, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Con­
gress , VII:512. Jefferson observed: "In the scheme for dis­
posing of the soil an happy opportunity offers of introducing 
into general use the geometrical mile, in such a manner as 
that it can not possibly fail of forcing its way on the people. 
However, this bearing some relation to astronomy and to science 
in general, which certainly have nothing to do with legislation, 
I doubt whether it can be carried through . . . but I hope it 
will be forseen that should we introduce so heterodox a facil­
ity as the decimal arithmetic, we should all of us soon forget 
how to cypher. I have hopes that the same care to preserve an 
athletic strength of calculation will not [allow us] . . .  to 
banish all this cunning learning, to adopt the dollar for our 
unit. . . . This is surely an age of innovation, America the 
focus of it! . . ." In administration, the 1784 report is 
drawn almost verbatim from the Virginia legislature’s 1779 
land law. See also Treat, National Land System, p. 26; Boyd, 
Letters of Jefferson, VII:148.
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Another provision of the Jefferson-Williamson Land Ordi^ 
nance of 1784 stated that all surveyed regions would be 
admitted ultimately into the Confederation as sovereign 
states. The law called for appointment of surveyors by Con­
gress and listed technical directions for the mode of survey­
ing. Surveys were not to be progressive, but rather by the 
"hundreds most in demand." Finally, a system of purchase 
allowed prospective buyers to purchase a warrant for a hun­
dred or lot (one square mile) and then go out and indiscrimi­
nately locate their land. The price of land appears to have 
been a source of controversy as the Land Ordinance of 1784 
does not specify any figures. The only evidence of Jeffer­
son's sentiments is found in a letter which suggests "the 
third of a dollar an acre" as a fair price. The emphatic 
stipulation that revenues from land sales should be applied 
to the "NATIONAL DEBT . . . AND TO NO OTHER PURPOSE WHATSOEVER" 
seems to indicate a certain discomfort with the idea of selling 
the land at all.^^
2 8Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 600; Ford, Colo­
nial Precedents, p. 70: "The system of rectangular surveys
was therefore a gradual evolution under conditions peculiar 
to Colonial life, modified in regard to boundary lines by 
the reforming doctrinaire mind of Jefferson." Freund, "Mili­
tary Bounty Lands," p. 29; Pattison, American Rectangular 
Land Survey System, pp. 40, 42, 66. This plan to permit 
the direct sale of lots meant, according to Rufus King, giv­
ing up "the Plan of Townships." Also, Treat, National Land 
System. p. 27.
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The Jefferson-Williamson land units, from William D. Patti­
son, The American Rectangular Land Survey System.
Congress never adopted the Jefferson-Williamson Land 
Ordinance of 1784. When it took a vote on May 28, only one 
state (North Carolina) supported the plan. Many in Congress 
were waiting until the Indian treaties were finalized before 
they would take a stand on land policy. More important, many 
Northeasterners disliked the Southern nature of the Jefferson- 
Williamson Land Ordinance. Jefferson's departure for Europe 
that year thwarted whatever momentum the report may have had. 
The main contribution of the 1784 plan is its establishment 
of prior rectangular survey as a tenet of national land policy,
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The Jefferson-Williamson Ordinance furnished a rough base 
upon which was built the 178 5 national land system, but with 
important differences. The Land Ordinance of 1784 was much 
more Southern than any future Confederation law would be.
Its warrant system threw open all western lands to direct 
claim by individual lots, whereas the New England system re­
quired that lots be assigned only through the agency of pro­
prietors and speculators, in whom title to an entire township 
was invested. Moreover, this 'first come, first serve' mode 
of 1784 accorded no preferential treatment to large investors 
or those holding military bounties. Congress would never 
adopt such a measure, especially when revenue was the aim of 
national land policy. The Jefferson-Williamson Land Ordi­
nance of 1784 may have been a 'reformed' Southern system,
but it was not 'reformed' enough to meet the approbation of
29the Confederation Congress.
Almost a year passed before Congress once again addressed 
the question of the public domain. The immediate catalyst 
was the cessions from the Northwest tribes in the treaties of 
Forts Stanwix, McIntosh, and Finney. Yet the encroachments 
of squatters, the demands of the Revolutionary officers, and
2 QPattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System, pp. 
83-84. David Howell wrote in February 1784, "We wait with 
impatience for the result of the négociations with the Indians, 
It is expected that Congress, before they rise, will be en­
abled to open their land office." See also, Burnett, Conti­
nental Congress, p. 625; Rohrbough, Land Office Business, pp. 
7-8; Lee to Livingston, April 30, 1785, in Ballagh, Letters 
of Richard Henry Lee. II.
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financial distress all served to stress the need for a na­
tional land system. It is no coincidence that the financial 
crisis was particularly acute during the period in which the 
Confederation Congress devised a mode for sales of the pub­
lic domain. The annual state requisitions were due, and the 
scarcity of funds led most to agree the public lands were a 
"fine fund for extinguishing the public debt." But as before, 
this was about all they agreed on. During the ensuing debates, 
David Howell wrote, "The Land Ordinance . . . proves to be the 
most complicated and embarassing Subject before Congress 
since peace has taken place." The debates were heated, and 
"as much has been said and wrote about it as would fill forty 
volumes." Indeed, William Grayson later commented that "If 
the importunities of the public creditors, and the reluctance 
to pay them by taxation either direct or implied had not been 
so great I am satisfied that no land Ordinance could have 
been procured.
On March 16, 1786, Congress read the Jefferson-Williamson 
Land Ordinance again, probably as a starting point for discus­
sion, and referred the land question to a grand committee 
composed of one member from each state. This committee in­
cluded Hugh Williamson and David Howell (both of whom had 
assisted in drafting the Land Ordinance of 1784), but was
Treat, National Land System, p. 27; Pattison, Land 
Survey System, pp. 83-84; Burnett, Continental Congress, 
p. 625; Rohrbough, Land Office Business, pp. 7-8.
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31dominated by Easterners and Nationalists. The two most 
influential members of the committee were Nationalist Rufus 
King of New York and Antifederalist William Grayson of Vir­
ginia. King led the effort to replace the Jefferson- 
Williamson Ordinance with a pure New England plan. Grayson, 
the chairman of the committee, proved to be the great expedi­
ter. He pushed for compromise in the face of great differ­
ences of opinion, and secured passage of a land bill even
thought it contained what he considered to be "exceptional 
32measures."
Perhaps the most influential person in the creation of 
the Land Ordinance of 178 5 was not even serving in Congress 
at the time. This was Colonel Timothy Pickering of Massa­
chusetts. Pickering had long been interested in western lands
33as a speculator and proponent of the "Army Plan" of 1783.
Journals of the Continental Congress. XXVIII:114. 
Members of the committee were Pierse Long (New Hampshire), 
Rufus King (Massachusetts), David Howell (Rhode Island), 
William Samuel Johnson (Connecticut), Robert R. Livingston 
(New York), Archibald Stewart (New Jersey), Joseph Gardener 
(Pennsylvania), John Henry (Maryland), William Grayson (Vir­
ginia) , Hugh Williamson (North Carolina), John Bull (South 
Carolina), and William Houston (Georgia).
32pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System, 
pp. 82, 85.
3 3Pickering, Timothy Pickering Papers, introduction; 
Jensen, New Nation, p. 336. Prior to 1785, bad luck in his 
land investments tended to lessen Pickering's esteem for the 
frontier populace. He purchased 10,000 acres in the Wyoming 
Valley of Pennsylvania and moved there to administrate his 
lands and serve as justice of the peace and administrator of 
deeds. The local squatters did not care for Pickering, how­
ever, and assaulted him and kept him prisoner for several 
weeks. After losing all his investment, Pickering left the
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On March 1, 178 5 he wrote Elbridge Gerry an urgent letter
requesting information about the land policy debates in
Congress. In this letter to Gerry, Pickering spoke of their
land speculation interests, and suggested the kind of policy
he wished Congress to adopt:
As you have expressed your wishes to be con­
cerned in the purchase of lands on the other 
side of the Allegheny Mountains thro* our 
agency, we think it very material to your 
interests as well as our own that we be in­
formed, if possible, what plan Congress will 
probably adopt in disposing of those lands 
which lie West of the Ohio. If they mean to 
permit the adventurers to make a scramble for 
them (as has been the case in this State 
[Pennsylvania] 8 Virginia) it will behoove 
us to engage seasonably with some enterpris­
ing, but confidential character, to explore 
the country and make locations. But I would 
rather suppose Congress would fall on a more 
regular plan--as that of surveying a district 
or districts for a State or States, dividing 
the same into counties 8 townships --and then 
selling the townships at public auction. . . 34
Pickering, of course, was advocating a New England system 
of prior survey and sale by townships at auction. This system 
would suit more adequately the needs of Eastern land jobbers 
like himself, who wanted to speculate in western lands without 
necessarily residing in the West. The New England system was 
also productive of the corporate and regulated settlement that 
most New Englanders and Eastern Nationalists desired. Pickering
country and resolved to do his future land dealing in absentia.
^^Pickering to Gerry, March 1, 1785, in Pickering, Timothy 
Pickering Papers. Reel V, #347; Also in King, Correspondence 
of Rufus King. 1:72.
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advocated survey and sales of one state at a time:
In this way the settlement of the Country may 
be effected with regularity--with much more 
safety than in the desulatory way practised 
in the two States [Pennsylvania and Virginia] 
before mentioned--and with much greater ad­
vantage to the United States. . . . But if 
Adventurers shall be permitted to ramble 
over that extensive Country, and take up all 
of the most valuable tracts, the best lands 
will be in a manner given away, and the 
settlers thus dispersed, it will be impossible 
to govern; they will soon excite an Indian 
war; to the destruction of multitudes of the 
settlers and to the injury of the public. . . .
But if there must be a scramble, we have an 
equal right with others and therefore the 
information desired in the beginning of this 
letter may be of essential importance. Your 
answer to this letter will much oblige your 
Sincere friends, who wish to advance your in­
terests to their o w n . 35
Gerry answered Pickering immediately and told him to 
write land committee member Rufus King. Pickering wrote 
King a lengthy letter on March 8, expressing ideas similar 
to those above. He advocated a New England system, gradual 
settlement, sale by auction with a minimum purchase and price, 
natural resource reserves for the federal government, and 
land reserves for the Army, education, and religion. He 
proposed some changes in the technical aspects of surveying 
and asked that surveyors be required to record information 
on the quality of lands so as to aid "purchasers in the more 
distant states." King answered Pickering on April 13 and 
thanked him for his "ingenious communications." He enclosed 
the first draft of the Land Ordinance of 1785: "You will see
^^Ibid.
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thereby that your views have had weight with the committee 
who reported the ordinance, and I have only to add that I 
shall hold myself particularly obliged to you for these 
communications on the subject. . . . "  Pickering replied 
on April 36 that the land ordinance met with his "approba­
tion- -if for no other reason because the principles of it 
coincide with the ideas I had previously conceived and 
communicated to you."^^
As the Pickering-King correspondence indicates, the 
first draft of the Land Ordinance of 1785 was nearly a pure 
New England system of land administration. The grand com­
mittee’s report, "An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of 
Disposing of Lands in the Western Territory" (April 14, 1785) 
was, in fact, identical to the colonial New England system 
except it did not include requirements for settlement and 
improvements. The law called for prior survey of seven mile 
square townships, the minimum area of purchase. After survey, 
the land was to be auctioned off in the respective states at 
a minimum price of $1.00 per acre, with no credit. Other pro­
visions included the appointment of surveyors and stipulation
Gerry to Pickering, in King, Correspondence of Rufus 
King. 1:43; Pickering to King, March 8, 1785 in Pickering, 
Timothy Pickering Papers. Reel V, #351-A. With Jefferson’s 
system, investors would have to pay "adventurers who under­
took to explore the County § make locations for them" and 
charged "monstrous deductions;" sometimes 1/2 the original 
price of the land. See King to Pickering, April 15, 1785, 
in Correspondence of Rufus King. 1:46. See also, Pickering 
to King, April 30, 1785, in ibid., p. 91.
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of surveying techniques, mineral reserves for Congress, and 
land reserves for Congress, the Army, schools and churches.
As Monroe wrote Jefferson, the new land Ordinance "deviates 
I believe essentially from the one at Annapolis" (the Land 
Ordinance ©f 1784). Congress retained the Jefferson- 
Williamson rectangular grid but deleted its hundreds, geo­
graphical miles, and decimal divisions. The committee 
stripped the Jefferson-Williamson survey proposal of its 
original function as a control over the Southern land system. 
It abandoned the modified Southern system of indiscriminate 
location and replaced it with prior survey, and progressive 
seating. "The present plan," Grayson wrote Washington in
April of 178 5, "excludes all the formalities of warrants,
37entries, returns, and caveats."
After the grand committee read its report on April 14, 
Congress debated the proposed land law for over a month.
One reason for the length of the discussion was lagging 
attendance--Grayson wrote there were "never above ten States 
on the floor and of these nine were necessary to concur in 
one sentiment." Congress had to ’shut down’ several times 
during the debate because it could not reach a quorum of
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXVIII:251-57. 
The report appeared in Grayson’s handwriting. Treat, "Land 
System During the Confederation," p. 11. One-seventh of 
the surveyed lands was to be held in reserve for the military 
bounties. Hibbard, Public Land Policy, pp. 38-39. Note that 
townships were seven miles square instead of the usual six. 
This was soon amended. Monroe to Jefferson, April 12, 1785, 
in Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, 11:71; Pattison, Land 
Survey System, pp. 86, 88, 92.
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nine states. But the main reason for delay was "warm and 
unexpected" disagreements that arose over the proposed land 
law. Serious debates arose over the township system, method 
of sales, and the minimum price. "We have been this fort­
night about a land ordinance," King wrote Elbridge Gerry on 
April 26, 1785. "Virginia makes many difficulties--the 
eastern States are for actual Surveys and sale by Townships,
the Southern States for indiscriminate Locations, etc. What
3 8will pass, if anything does, is wholly uncertain."
The division of the debate reflected the age-old differ­
ences between the New England and Southern land systems.
Many Virginians and other Southerners were willing to accept 
prior rectangular survey (ala Jefferson-Williamson), but 
were opposed to predetermined location, "Township planting," 
compact settlements, and gradual migration. They tried to 
make it possible for settlers to purchase small amounts of 
land wherever they desired. David Howell, seconded by
3 A For the debates over the Land Ordinance of 1785, see 
Journals of the Continental Congress. XXVIII: 234-47, 251-56, 
264, 268n, 284-85, 290-91, 292-96, 298-303, 309-10, 316-17, 
323, 326-29, 335-40, 342-43, 370-73, 378-81. A chronology 
of the debates is in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Con­
gress . VIII:ix. Congress read the Jefferson report on March 
4 and March 16, and the Grayson committee report a first 
time on April 14; April 29 saw Congress at a standstill with 
no quorum. On May 5 and 6, Congress read the Ordinance a 
second and third time; there was a lapse in representation 
until May 18 when debate was resumed. The Land Ordinance of 
1785 was passed on May 20, 1785. The best records of the 
debate are found in the letters of committee chairman William 
Grayson in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress.
See also Treat, National Land System, p. 34; Burnett, Conti­
nental Congress, pp. 624-25.
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Williamson, moved the entire territory be opened to sale by 
one mile square sections. But this amendment, along with 
Grayson's proposal to reduce the size of sections by one- 
half, failed to muster enough support. Several amendments 
to lower the price to fifty cents or two-thirds of a dollar 
also failed to win the votes of nine states. Virginia's 
argument that the necessary $23,040.00 (the minimum amount 
with which any land could be purchased), would preclude 
sales to actual settlers failed to convince the Northeast- 
erners who sought large sales to land investors. On May 1 
Grayson wrote Madison and accused the "Eastern people" of 
"being amazingly attached to their own customs, and unrea­
sonably anxious to have everything regulated according to
39their oim. pleasure."
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXVIII, see 
footnote #38. Treat, National Land System, p. 35; Treat, 
"Land System During the Confederation," p. 11; Pattison, 
Land Survey System, p. 93; Treat, National Land System, p. 
37; Grayson to Washington, May 8, 178 5 in Burnett, Letters 
of the Continental Congress, VIII:119: "The price is fix’d
at a dollar the acre liquidated certificates, that is the 
land is not to be sold under that; The reason for establish­
ing this sum was that a part of the house were for a half a 
dollar and another part for two dollars and others for 
intermediate sums between the two extremes, so that ulti­
mately this was agreed upon as a central ground. If it is 
too high (which I am afraid is the case) , it may be here­
after corrected by a resolution." King to Gerry, April 26, 
1785, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII; 
104. Grayson to Madison, May 1, 1785 in ibid., VIII : 109. 
Grayson to Madison, May 28, 1785, in ibid., VIII : 129 : "The
Eastern people who before the revolution never had an idea 
of any quantity of Earth above a hundred acres, were for 
selling in large tracts of 30,000 acres while the Southern 
people who formerly could scarce bring their imaginations 
down so low as to comprehend the meaning of a hundred acres 
of ground were for selling the whole territory in lots of a
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The Easterners, according to Rufus King, had good cause 
in defending the New England system and the proposed Ordi­
nance. Sale by townships, he argued, would not injure the 
poorer classes and encourage land-jobbing, for this was not 
a problem in the ’’Eastern States,” where the lands ’’were 
generally settled in that manner.” Poor settlers could 
simply ’’band together” and buy a township. The Eastern Na­
tionalists argued that the Southern system ’’would have a ten­
dency to destroy all those inducements to emigration which 
are derived from friendship, religion, and relative connec­
tions,” and that ’’the same consequences would result from 
sales in small quantities under the present plan.” Auction 
sales in the East would prevent those settlers near the lands 
from gaining an unfair advantage, and monopoly would ’’cure 
itself,” because speculators would be forced to sell to actual 
settlers before too long. But ”if they should make money by 
ingrossing, the great design of the land office is answered, 
which is revenue- -. ” Abandonment of ’’fractional” surveys 
and the warrant system would save the Confederation consider­
able time and money, while precluding the possibility of over­
lapping claims and disputes. Finally, ”if the plan should be 
found by experience to be wrong, it can be easily altered by 
reducing the quantities and multiplying the surveys.
mile square. In this situation we remained for eight days 
with great obstinancy on both sides. . . .”
'^^The New England argument in defense of the proposed 
Ordinance is paraphrased from the debate by William Grayson
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Aside from the immediate reasons for Eastern support of 
corporate expansion via the New England system, one can find 
several important underlying factors. Of economic importance 
is the fact that many Eastern states had their own lands for 
sale, and were reluctant to diminish their value by throwing 
open vast parcels of cheap government land. At the same 
time, those Easterners who wanted to speculate in Ohio lands, 
like Pickering and the Army speculators, wanted only gradual 
expansion. If there were no controls, then highly priced 
"mid" western lands would be worthless; the pioneers would 
simply squat on lands farther West. Another economic motive 
was the belief that cheap western lands would draw off the 
Eastern labor pool, raise wages, and lower prices. But there 
were political motivations too. Besides their push for an 
independent national income through land sales, the Eastern 
Nationalists had good reason to act as they did. They feared 
the political consequences of new states entering the Confed­
eracy, and sought to delay that possibility through a restric­
tive land policy. All of these considerations combined to 
move the Easterners and Nationalists toward a more conservative 
western policy. If westward migration was inevitable, then it 
should be gradual, orderly and closely supervised. George
in Treat, National Land System, p. 31; and Grayson to Washing­
ton, April 15, 1785, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental 
Congress. VIII:95. The above quotations are from Grayson, 
not the New Englanders, as there are no other firsthand ac­
counts of the debate available.
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Washington, a Virginia Nationalist who subscribed to the
Northeastern view, argued.
Compact and progressive seating will give 
strength to the Union, admit law and good 
government, and federal aids at an early 
period. Sparse settlements in several 
new States, or a large territory for one 
will have the direct contrary effects. . .
To suffer a wide-extended Country to be 
overrun with . . . scattered settlers, is 
in my opinion, inconsistent with that 
wisdom and policy, which our true interest
dictates, or which an enlightened people
ought to adopt.41
So after several weeks of debate Congress found itself 
in an extremely awkward position. It needed money, yet there 
was no agreement on a mode for selling the public lands. As 
both sides clung to their opposing views, it became obvious 
that a compromise was in order. Although they favored the 
Southern system, the Virginia delegates initiated a compro­
mise because they believed it would benefit them in the long 
run. Any land sales at all (even sales under a New England 
system) would lead to eventual settlement of the West. And, 
as Herbert James Henderson has shown, the Virginians' "geo­
political" strategy of the 1780s was based largely upon
anticipated political and economic benefits that would result
For the Easterners' motivations, see Henderson, Party 
Politics. p. 370; Grayson to Washington, May 8, 1785, in 
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:117; 
Washington to Williamson, March 15, 1785, in Sparks, Writ­
ings of Washington. IX:105; Washington to Duane, September 7, 
1783, in ibid., VIII:477. Also, Pickering to King, June 4, 
1785, in King, Correspondence of Rufus King, 1:106-107.
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from admission of new western states. Thus, the Virginians 
were willing to compromise over land policy, so long as some 
new western states (i.e., Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee) 
would enter the Confederation in the not too distant future.
Grayson initiated the bargain in a motion that "would 
accomodate both the Eastern and the Southern States." Since 
no one could agree whether to sell by townships or sections, 
Grayson proposed to sell half the land one way and half the 
other. One-half of the alternating townships would be sold 
intact; the other half would be sold in sections of 640 
acres--but only consecutively, and no second township was to 
be offered in sections until every section in the preceding 
one had been sold. This great stumbling block hurdled, the 
rest of the Ordinance began to fall into place. Congress 
deleted the land reserve for c h u r c h e s , a n d  reduced the size 
of townships from seven to six miles square. The proposed 
Ordinance was read for a second and third time on May 5 and 6, 
but further objections and a lapse in representation post­
poned acceptance. Debate resumed on May 18, and the Land
^^For the Southerners' motivations, see Henderson,
Party Politics, p. 377.
^^The religious clause was particularly obnoxious to 
Madison. See Madison to Monroe, in Burnett, Letters of the 
Continental Congress . VIII; 624: "How a regulation so unjust
in itself, so foreign to the Authority of Congress, so hurt­
ful to the sale of public land, and smelling so strongly of 
an antiquated Bigotry, could have received the countenance 
of a Committee is truly a matter of astonishment."
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Ordinance of 1785 finally passed on May 20--after five weeks 
of debates and haggling. Rufus King wrote Elbridge Gerry 
about the Ordinance just before its passage, and expressed 
his approbation: ”I am pleased great benefits will result
from it. You will find it bears strong features of an 
eastern system. When I tell you the History of this ordi­
nance you shall acknowledge that I have some merit in the
. . ,,44business."
The final version of the Land Ordinance of 1785 is here 
recapitulated: Thirteen surveyors (one from each state)
were to survey the Ohio country lands ceded by the Indians 
(the first "seven ranges"). The lands were to be divided 
into six mile square townships and one mile square sections 
or lots. The land was to be sold by townships and sections, 
alternately, at auctions in each of the thirteen states.
The minimum price was $1.00 per acre, payable in specie or 
certificates. Congress granted Virginia a military reserve 
north of the Ohio, and one-seventh of all of the land was 
reserved for Revolutionary land bounty holders. One-third of 
all gold, silver, copper, and lead as well as four sections
Grayson to Pickering, April 25, 1785, in Pickering, 
Timothy Pickering Papers. Reel 18, #234; Treat, Land Policy 
During the Confederation." p. 11; Hibbard, Public Land Poli­
cies , p. 39; Lee to Washington, May 7, 1785, in Ballagh, 
Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II: "I have now the honor to 
enclose you the Ordinance above alluded to, which meets the 
assent of nine States § every member of these Nine States 
except one Man, who keeps the Ordinance from passing by joint 
causes, as he alleges, of indisposition 5 dislike. . . ."
The "one Man" was Rufus King. Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, 
May 8, 1785, in King, Correspondence of Rufus King, I.
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^ ( G eographer's  Line
Bose L ine
Base Line
Proposed Survey o f First 
S e/en Ranges Under 
Ordinance of 1785
36 30 24 18 12 6
35 29 23 17 11 5
34 23 22 16 10 4
33 27 21 15 9 3
32 26 20 14 8 2
31 25 19 13 7 1
Six Miles
A Township os Numbered 
Under Ordinance of 1785
T h e  Ordinance of 1785
1st Range East
Connecticut Reserve
PENNSYLVANIAO H I O
1st -----------
Principal
Meridian
T he Seven Ranges
A n  O rd inance o f 1785 p ro v id in g  fo r  the n a tio n a l surveying system 
established the base line , or geographer’s line , due west fro m  the point 
at w h ich  the O h io  R ive r intersects the western boundary  o f Penns>I- 
vania. T h e  first p r in c ip a l m erid ian  la te r became the boundary between 
O h io  and Ind iana . T o  accommodate settlers who were stream ing into 
the area, the seven ranges were m arked o ff in  an exception to ilw  
no rm a l surveying procedures.
William Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System
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of each township was reserved for Congress, while one sec­
tion went for schools and education. The act reserved six 
townships for Canadian and Nova Scotian Revolutionary refugees, 
and for Christianized Indians. Congress prescribed the form 
of deeds and the method of obtaining bounty lands. The re­
mainder of the Ordinance dealt with technical aspects of sur­
veying and dividing the public lands. James Monroe provided
perhaps the best summary of. the Land Ordinance of 178 5 in a 
letter to Madison that summer:
[The territory] is to be survey'd in townships 
containing abt. 26,000 acres each, each town­
ship marked on the plat into plots of one 
mile square; and 1/2 the country sold only in 
townships and the other in lots. 13 surveyors 
are to be appointed for the purpose to act 
under control of the Geographer, beginning 
with the first range of townships upon the 
Ohio and, running North to the Lakes, from 
[a point due north of] termination of the 
line which forms the Southern boundary of the 
State of Pena., and so on westward with each
range. As soon as [7] ranges shall be survey'd,
the return will be made to the Bd. of Treasury, 
who are instructed to draw them in the name of 
each State in the proportion of the requisition 
on each, and transmit its portion to the loan 
officers in each for sale at public provided 
it is, nor any part, sold for less than one 
dollar specie or certificates the Ac r e .45
Thus, out of conflicting interests came compromise and 
the drafting of the first American land policy. The national 
land system was not the creation of one man or section, but
The best summary of the final version of the Land Ordi­
nance of 1785 is in Treat, National Land System, pp. 36-37.
See also Harris, Land Tenure System, p. 390; Monroe to Madison, 
in Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System, p. 85.
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rather several. If credit be given to individuals, then it 
must go to Jefferson, Williamson, Grayson, Pickering, and 
King. In weighing the attributes of the New England and 
Southern land systems, the Confederation Congress opted for 
a modified New England form. This system had advantages as 
well as disadvantages. The implementation of rectangular 
survey brought order to the huge task of allotting western 
lands. It provided for security of title and simplicity of 
conveyance. But on the other hand, the new land law seemed 
unrelated to the realities of westward expansion taking place 
at that very moment. Because it was a revenue measure, the 
Land Ordinance of 1785 made no provision for squatting or 
preemption. The law aimed at sales to speculators and land- 
jobbers; there were no credit or low minimum purchase stipula­
tions. It was highly unlikely that any ordinary settler 
would have the $640.00 cash with which to purchase a section, 
nor would he want to buy from land investors who would be 
charging considerably more than the $1.00 per acre they had 
to pay. The requirement for sales of contiguous sections was 
completely foreign to those settlers who always sought the 
best lands along the river bottoms and streams. The Eastern 
Nationalists were sincere in their loyalty to "township plant­
ing," for it had worked well during the colonial period of 
their section's history. But the Southerners better grasped 
the nature of American westward expansion. In insisting on 
sales of small tracts, the Southerners were prophetic of the
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eventual course of national land policy. It remained to be 
seen how well the Land Ordinance of 178 5 would fare in the 
realities of the trans-Appalachian West in the 1780s.
In my opinion, it will never answer the End 
proposed, for before this formal and hitherto 
unheard of plan can be carried into Execution, 
the lands will be possessed by persons, who 
have already and are daily crossing the Ohio, 
in great numbers, so as to put the United 
States to more expense to dispossess them, 
than the soil will afterwards sell for.
Richard Dobbs Spaight to 
Governor Caswell, 1785
For my part I must acknowledge my faith of 
paying the Domestic Debt by regular sails 
of the Western Land was never very great.
There is land eno' and that which is excel­
lent. . . . But to me the Idea of running 
this out, and by the neat proceeds of its 
sails discharging any considerable part of 
the Debt is almost as chimerical as to count
Treat, National Land System, pp. 36-37, 39, 179; Jef­
ferson to Monroe, June 17, 1785, in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, 
pp. 8, 229. Jefferson originally disapproved of the Ordinance 
which superseded his own recommendations. "I am very differ­
ently affected towards the new plan of opening our land 
office. . . .” "To sell them at vendue [in auction] is to 
give them to the bidder of the day, be they many or few. It 
is ripping up the hen which lays the golden eggs. If sold in 
lots at a fixed price, as first proposed, the best lots will 
be sold first. As these become occupied it gives a value to 
the interjacent ones, and raises them, tho* of inferior quality, 
to the price of the first." However, after studying the final 
document, Jefferson seems to have changed his mind. In a 
letter to Monroe that summer he declared, "I am much pleased 
with your ordinance, and think it improved from the first in 
the most material circumstances." See Pattison, American Rec­
tangular Land Survey System, p. 103.
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upon the number of cod-fish and Whales in 
the ocean for that purpose.
George Thatcher to._
Pierse Long, 1788^'
Congress anticipated large revenues from sales under the 
Land Ordinance of 1785, and immediately made arrangements for 
surveying the Ohio Valley lands. The Confederation appointed 
thirteen surveyors to serve under United States Geographer 
Thomas Hutchins. They began their work in September of 178 5, 
but Indian hostilities, hard winters, and the tedious mode of 
rectangular survey prolonged the process for several years.
As early as 1786 Charles Petit wrote that Congress was grow­
ing impatient, and that "Some are for adhering to the ordi­
nance of last year in the mode of laying out and selling the 
land. Others think it impractical and wish it to be radi­
cally changed." Although further efforts by Southerners to 
institute indiscriminate survey failed, several other amend­
ments were made to the Land Ordinance of 1785. In order to 
expedite sales. Congress relaxed the survey stipulations, 
granted three months credit, and cancelled the thirteen 
separate state auctions, replacing them with one auction in 
New York City. As soon as the first four ranges were sur­
veyed, the government opened up the region for sale to the 
highest bidders. But the results greatly disappointed the 
over-optimistic Congress. The auction yielded little more
Richard Dobbs Spaight to Governor Caswell (North Caro 
lina), June 5, 178 5, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental 
Congress. VIII:ix; George Thatcher to Pierse Long, April 23, 
1788, in ibid., VIII:725.
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THE SEVEN RANGES
E n d  o f  surveyLnê.  
G E O G R A P H E R S
'  0--' 
i U S C A R A W / V
■o:
Me M A H O m 'i MQUll
*  W h e r e  t r o o p s  h e l d  m  r e s e r '
William Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System
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than one hundred thousand dollars^-far from sufficient for
4 8even one year's payment on the public debt.
This failure led Congress, over the next few years, to 
ignore the sales provisions of the Ordinance of 1785 alto­
gether. In its quest for land revenues, the Confederation 
Congress turned to huge sales of cheap land to investors and 
speculators. From 1787-1788 the Ohio Company, James Flint, 
and Royal Parker, John Cleve Symmes, and William Duer and the 
secret Scioto Associates purchased over 6,000,000 acres of 
government land at pennies an acre. These sales also resulted 
in failure, however, as most of the companies either defaulted 
on their payments or went bankrupt. In the meantime, squatters 
and trespassers continued to pour onto the public domain. As 
it became clear that these actual settlers could not and would 
not pay large sums of money for land. Congress began to
48The "seven ranges" are directly West of the Ohio River. 
For the survey and surveyors of the seven ranges, see Treat, 
National Land System, p. 41; and Pattison, American Rectangular 
Land Survey System, p. 97. Pattison provides an excellent 
account of these early white explorers of the Ohio country 
wilderness. The interest in Ohio Valley lands by investors 
tended to influence the choice of surveyors from each state. 
Most of the surveyors chosen were well established gentlemen, 
who were quite interested in land speculation. They were 
knowledgeable, cultured, and looking to increase their for­
tunes. It is no wonder that they were referred to as the 
"Gentlemen Surveyors" by contemporaries. No less than five 
members of the surveying group were members of the Ohio Com­
pany. See William D. Pattison, "The Survey of the Seven 
Ranges," Ohio Historical Quarterly LXVIII (April 1959); Treat, 
National Land Svstem. p. 43; Charles Petit to Jeremiah Wads­
worth in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII: 
361; Treat, National Land System, pp. 44-48; Harris, Land 
Tenure System, pp. 392-93; Rohrbough, Land Office Business, 
pp. 10-11; Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey System, 
p. 155.
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acknowledge the failure of a revenue-oriented land policy.
The failure of the Land Ordinance of 1785 rendered Con­
gress receptive to offers from speculators and land-jobbers. 
During the raid-1780s several land investraent corapanies 
approached Congress, all eager to speculate in Ohio country 
lands. A list of their shareholders reads like the social 
and political register of New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachu­
setts, and New York. The Ohio Corapany was certainly the raost 
prominent and firmly established of these groups. The Ohio 
Associates' origins went back to the Society of Cincinnati, 
the "Array Plan," and the Newburgh Petition of 1783. Although 
the corapany represented a minority of Northern army officers, 
it was the only group of veterans organized to collect on the 
Revolutionary military bounties. Their loyal services during 
the war, and their announced intent to settle the West, gave 
the Ohio Company a certain legitimacy not enjoyed by the 
other land speculation companies. The Newburgh Petition lay 
in abeyance from 1783-1787, but its proponents continued to 
correspond and confer. Benjamin Tupper, Rufus Putnam, Winthrop 
Sargent, and Samuel Holden Parsons formed the nucleus of this
Treat, National Land System, p. 47; Kohn, Eagle and 
Sword, p. 100; Jensen, New Nation, p. 355. The land companies 
of the late 1780s had few if any ties to the pre-Revolutionary 
and Revolutionary Corapanies discussed in Chapter 3 above.
These firms of the 1760s and 1770s-1783 period include the 
Susquehannah Company; Ohio Company (another one); Transylvania 
Company; Mississippi Company; Illinois Company; Illinois- 
Wabash Company; Vandalia Company; and the Muscle Schoals 
Company. The best treatment of this early speculation is 
Abernethy, Western Lands. See also Rohrbough, Land Office 
Business, p. 12,
158
group, and each retained an enthusiastic interest in western 
lands. Tupper, Sargent, and Putnam, all surveyors, surveyed 
lands in Massachusetts, Maine, and the Ohio country (Seven 
Ranges), and agreed that the Ohio lands would best suit 
their purposes. The group continued to speculate in military 
land bounties and public securities, and in January of 1786 
called a meeting at the Bunch of Grapes Tavern in Boston 
where the Ohio Company of Associates was formed. They drew 
up articles of association, elected officers, opened up 
$1,000,000 worth of stock for sale at $1,000 a share, and 
selected Samuel Holden Parsons to negotiate a land purchase 
from Congress. Parsons was convinced "that public securities, 
if Congress a little alter their system, is [our] best estate." 
If he could only secure some government post in the West, "I 
will make the fortune of your family and my own till time 
shall be no more."^^
Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 100; Hibbard, Public Land 
Policies, p. 41; Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Company, pp. 
xxxvii, xli; Pattison, "Survey of the Seven Ranges," pp. 137- 
38; Shaw Livermore, Early American Land Companies, pp. 134, 
135, 309. Most of the members of the Ohio Company were also 
members of the Cincinnati, the Masons, and the American Union 
Lodge. The group originally assumed it would have to pay 
$1.00 per acre, as per the Ordinance of '85, but instructed 
Parsons to try and secure a more "advantageous" deal. See 
Jensen, New Nation, p. 355. The war service of the Ohio Com­
pany members, gave them more leverage in negotiating than 
other interests. This is evidenced in the tone of their 
appeal, which appears in the Journals of the Continental Con­
gress . XXXIII:428-29: "If these terms are admitted we shall 
be ready to conclude the contract. If not we shall have to 
regret, for a Numerous Class of our Associates, that the 
Certificates they received as Specie, at the risque of their 
lives and fortunes, in support of the Common Cause, must for 
a considerable time longer wait the tedious and precarious
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The Ohio Company submitted its proposal to Congress in 
the Spring of 17 87. Under ordinary circumstances Congress 
probably would have refused the offer, as it entailed a com­
plete disregard of the Land Ordinance of 1785. But these 
were no ordinary times. Shay's Rebellion, the Jay-Gardoqui 
controversy, the Constitutional Convention, financial dis­
tress, lagging attendance, and the failure of the Ordinance 
of 1785 all combined to render the Confederation Congress 
confused and insecure. Under these circumstances, the offer 
of a million dollars for western lands seemed attractive.
Yet there was still much opposition. As General Parsons was 
unable to make much headway, the Ohio Associates sent a 
shrewd Revolutionary chaplain. Rev. Manasseh Cutler of Ipswich, 
Massachusetts, in his stead. Cutler immediately launched an 
intense lobbying campaign, and offered Congress $250,000.00 
down on 1,000,000 acres of land at about two-thirds of a 
dollar per acre. But Cutler found "a number in Congress de­
cidedly opposed to my terms of negotiation, and some to any 
contract." There were many, he explained in a letter to a 
friend, who feared that land-jobbers would gain from so large 
a grant, at the expense of actual settlers. When Congress 
balked. Cutler tried a bluff. On July 17, 1787, he told the
issue of public events . . . and that the United States may
lose an opportunity of securing in the most effectual manner, 
as well as improving the value of western lands, whilst they 
establish a powerful barrier, against the irruptions of the 
Indians, or any attempts of the British power, to interrupt 
the security of the adjoining States."
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delegates he would bypass Congress and buy state lands in­
stead. This threat upset many in Congress who favored the 
sale, but the Ohio Company offer was not tempting enough 
to change its opponents* minds. Thus negotiations were at 
a standstill in mid-July when William Duer, the infamous 
Secretary of the Board of Treasury, entered the scene.
William Duer was an American entrepreneur extraordi­
naire. He was the son of an English aristocrat, a former 
naval and army officer, close friend of Alexander Hamilton, 
member of the Continental Congress, an ardent Nationalist, 
and a member of the Cincinnati. Duer's business dealings 
were varied, but included war profiteering, and speculation 
in stocks, specie certificates, and military land bounties.
In 1786 Congress appointed Duer Secretary to the Board of 
Treasury, the very center of the public business of the Con­
federation government. Although he was very secretive, there 
is enough evidence of Duer's dealings with Cutler and the 
Ohio Associates to make the "Scioto" land deal one of the 
better documented abuses of government power during the early
Treat, National Land System, pp. 48-49. For Parsons* 
role in the negotiations, see Hall, Letters of Samuel Holden 
Parsons, pp. 495-514. Cutler replaced Parsons before the 
July 14, 1787 proposal was made. It is important to remember 
when considering the terms of purchase that even though we 
speak in terms of two-thirds of a dollar, etc. the inflated 
value of Continental securities, with which most of the land 
was being purchased, bring the actual price of lands down to 
around ten cents an acre. Joseph Stancliffe Davis, "William 
Duer, Entrepreneur, 17 47-99," in Essays in the Earlier His­
tories of American Corporation (Cambridge, 1917), p. 132.
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days of the Republic. The Scioto project has been called a 
"kind of illegitimate half-brother to the new Ohio Company." 
Duer offered secretly to assist the Ohio Associates in mak­
ing Congress a proposition that was too tempting to refuse. 
Instead of 1,000,000, Cutler would offer to buy 5,000,000 
acres of land from Congress. One and one-half million would 
belong to the Ohio Company, while the remaining three and 
one-half million acres would belong secretly to the Scioto 
Group, a company made up of Duer and some of the "principal 
characters of America." But Duer warned Cutler that it was 
"necessary or at least prudent" to keep the "separate pur­
chases out of sight." In other words, Duer wanted to use 
the Ohio Company as a legitimate front to purchase land for 
one of his speculation schemes. In return for Cutler's 
coupling the Scioto and Ohio Company enterprises, Duer agreed 
to loan the Ohio Associates $143,000 and use his influence 
as Secretary to the Board of Treasury to secure a favorable 
contract. The deal was struck on July 20 after an "elegant" 
oyster dinner in Brooklyn. Cutler promised to keep the deal 
a "profound secret." The next day he, Winthrop Sargent, and
their powerful new ally, Duer, began an intense lobbying cam-
52paign to "bring over my opposers in Congress."
Archer B. Hulbert, "The Methods and Operations of the 
Scioto Group of Speculators," The Mississippi Valley His­
torical Review, I § 11:506-16, 56-7 3 ; James Woodress, A 
Yankee's Odyssev: The Life of Joel Barlow (Philadelphia, 
1958), p. 91; Davis, "William Duer, Entrepreneur," pp. 111- 
12, 123, 130-31, 132, 124, 133; Livermore, Land Companies, 
p. 138. A study of the Scioto affair is difficult as many
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Cutler found Congress much more receptive to a plan 
that offered over $5,000,000 in revenue. With "the assis­
tance of Colonel Duer," he and Winthrop Sargent lobbied 
for passage of a plan which was "warmly debated" on July 23. 
One tactic of the Ohio Company was its announced support 
of Pennsylvanian Arthur St. Clair, the Nationalist president 
of Congress, for territorial governor of the Ohio country. 
Finally, a committee consisting of Rufus King, Nathan Dane, 
Egbert Benson, Edward Carrington, and James Madison gave 
the Board of Treasury the power to reach a final agreement 
with Cutler. This was exactly what Duer wanted. After the 
body for which he was secretary took over the negotiations, 
the affair went quite smoothly. Two separate contracts were 
signed in October of 1787. The first was between the Ohio 
Associates and Congress for one and one-half million acres. 
Two payments of 5500,000 were to be made; the first due 
immediately and the second after the surveying was com­
plete. At this time full title to its one and one-half 
million acres would be granted the Ohio Company. The 
second contract for three and one-half million acres was 
signed by Cutler, Winthrop Sargent, "and associates;" it
of the transactions were secretive. One has to depend on 
indirect evidence, letters written by uninitiated corres­
pondents, or letters written in distress. According to 
Davis, Duer was "a cautious man whose right hand often was 
not suffered to know what his left hand did." Hulbert adds 
that Duer often used secret codes, initials, nome du plume, 
shorthand, etc. to conceal his communications. In view of 
his government positions, Duer's business transactions were 
certainly a conflict of interests. Indeed, he was grimly 
prophetic when he expressed to John Jay, in 1777, the fear 
"that we shall not increase in virtue, as we may in years."
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was supplemented by a secret contract signed with Duer a
few days later. Six equal payments were due on this land,
but not until the Ohio Company's original one and one-half
million acres was bought and paid for. By signing two
separate contracts, the liabilities of each company were
greatly minimized. The Ohio Associates could carry out
their original plan, allowing the Scioto Group additional
time to sell its option and raise the installments. Most
important, the failure of the Scioto Group would not affect
the Ohio Company's title whatsoever. The land was to be
paid for in specie, public securities, and military bounties.
Considering the inflation rate on securities, the military
bounties and allowances for bad land, etc., the Ohio and
Scioto Companies received 5,000,000 acres of the Ohio Valley
for about eight to nine cents an acre. As Cutler wrote in
his diary in the Fall of 1787:
By this ordinance we obtained a grant of 
near 5,000,000 acres of land, amounting 
to . . . one million and a half acres for 
the Ohio Company and the remainder for a 
private speculation, in which many of the 
principal characters in America are con­
cerned. Without connecting this specula­
tion, similar terms and advantages could 
not have been obtained for the Ohio Com­
pany.
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXIII:399, 429- 
30. Since Congress had to approve the final plan, intense 
lobbying was necessary. See Davis, "William Duer, Entre­
preneur," pp. 155-34, 137, 139. Cutler wrote, "My friends 
made every exertion in private conversation to bring over my 
opposers in Congress. In order to get at some of them, so 
as to work powerfully on their minds, we were obliged to
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No comment need be made about the ethics involved in 
such a business deal. No mention of Duer appears in any of 
the letters of the members of Congress, nor in the Journals 
of that body. It seems that the members of the committee 
which expedited the sale (King, Dane, Carrington, Benson, 
and Madison) were well aware of the nature of the transac­
tion, yet went ahead with it a n y w a y . T h e  reasons for
engage three or four persons before we could get at them. In 
some instances we engaged one person, who engaged a second, 
and he a third, and so on to a fourth, before we could effect 
our purpose. In these maneuvers I am much beholden to the 
assistance of Colonel Duer and Major Sargent. . . . The Mat­
ter was taken up this morning in Congress and warmly debated 
until 3 o ’clock, when another ordinance was obtained. This 
was not to the minds of my friends, who were now consider­
ably increased in Congress, but they conceived it better than 
the former; and they obtained ah additional clause empowering 
the Board of Treasury to take Order upon the Ordinance, and 
complete a contract on the general principles contained in it, 
which still left room for negotiations." For the terms of the 
contract, see Davis, "William Duer, Entrepreneur," or Hulbert, 
"Scioto Group of Speculators," p. 505. Also, Treat, National 
Land System, pp. 50-51; Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Company, 
p. Ixx; Hibbard, Public Land Policy, p. 48. Some historians 
have intimated that Duer "bribed" Congressmen with offers 
of shares in the speculation, etc., but there is no evidence 
to substantiate this charge. As for Cutler and Sargent's 
legal relationship with the Scioto Group, there is also dis­
agreement. Some say they were equal partners, and that Cutler 
and Sargent hoped to make some money off the Scioto deal.
But Hulbert contends that they were involved in the deal in 
"name only." Whatever, when the Scioto venture went bankrupt 
the Ohio Company lost $80,000. The Ohio Company’s main busi­
ness with Scioto appears to have been only in the West--for 
instance, when the Galliapolis emigres arrived. If they were 
legally bound to Duer, no one pressed the issue--or Cutler 
and Sargent would have also gone bankrupt in the 1790s.
^^Every member of the committee was a Nationalist. See 
Hulbert, "The Scioto Group of Speculators," p. 73; Hulbert, 
Records of the Ohio Company, p. Ixxii, Ixxiii. Hulbert says, 
"To doubt the committee knew this is to misread everything 
that is written between the lines of the documents that are
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approval of the Ohio Company sale are varied. Congress was 
in an extremely tenuous position in 1787. Domestic turmoil, 
instability, and a feeling of imminent disbandment all ren­
dered Congress more remiss than it might have been in a less 
tumultuous period. The Confederation always needed money, 
and Cutler and Duer’s scheme was quite tempting. Edmund 
Cody Burnett astutely summed up the situation:
Congress had long been dreaming dreams of the 
money to be obtained from these lands; now 
it was suddenly awakened to find the dreams 
come true. Real money and lots of it was 
actually dangling before their eyes; besides 
there was a fair promise that more, much 
more, was coming from like sources. . . .
Those who predicted in 1783 that the National Domain would 
one day become a great source of revenue thought their pre­
dictions had at last come true. The Ohio Company’s $5,000,000.00 
offered security to an insecure Congress.
left to us of the transaction.” But Congress felt that by 
’’linking the democracy and willingness of performance of the 
Ohio Company of Associates with the financial strength of 
Duer’s group of promoters, a very honorable and successful 
negotiation could be concluded. . . .”
^^Hibbard, Public Land Policy, p. 47; Hulbert, Records 
of the Ohio Company, p. Ixx. See Antifederalist Richard 
Henry Lee to Washington, July 15, 1787, in Ballagh, Letters 
of Richard Henry Lee, 11:425: ’’Our next object is to con­
sider a proposition made for the purchase of 5 or 6 millions 
of Acres, in order to lessen the domestic debt. An object 
of great consequences this, since the extinguishment of this 
part of the public debt would not only relieve from a very 
heavy burden, but by demolishing the Ocean of public Securi­
ties, we should stop that mischievous deluge of speculation 
that now hurts our morals and extremely intrigues the public 
affairs.” Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII 
xlii; Treat, National Land System, pp. 57-58. Treat argues 
the Congress is to be commended for extinguishing half a 
million of the public debt.
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Moreover, the colonization plans of the Ohio Associates 
seemed prudent to Congress. The company intended "an actual, 
a large and immediate settlement of the most robust and in­
dustrious people in America"; men "who had no intention 
other than the Federal Government." This plan of orderly 
westward expansion was in the New England tradition, and 
enjoyed the approval of Easterners and Nationalists controlling 
C o n g r e s s . E d w a r d  Carrington, a Virginia Nationalist, voiced 
his approval of the sale in an August, 1787 letter to James 
Monroe:
I hold a great bargain for the U.S. as the 
Land goes good and bad together, and it will 
be a means of introducing into the Country, 
in the first instance, a description of Men 
who will fix the character and politics 
throughout the whole territory, and which 
will probably endure to the latest period 
of time. . . .
This Nationalist and Northeastern influence on western policy 
is also seen in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, passed con­
currently with the Ohio Company purchase- Manasseh Cutler and 
the Ohio Associates played a role in shaping the document.
The Northwest Ordinance created a strong territorial government 
to insure the Ohio Company's political sovereignty and property
Hibbard, Public Land Policy, p. 47; Jensen, New Na­
tion, p. 355. Jensen contends that the rise of the National­
ists in the Constitutional Convention was also manifest in 
the Confederation Congress. "The ultimate success of the 
Ohio Company was due in part to the fact that once more the 
balance of power in Congress was shifting, a shift no better 
expressed than in the election of General Arthur St. Clair 
as president." As mentioned, the five committee members that 
determined the outcome of the Ohio Company's negotiations were 
all Nationalists, three of them Easterners.
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57rights from encroachments by frontiersmen and squatters.
Several other land speculation entrepreneurs approached 
Congress during the late 1780s. Royal Flint and James Parker 
(both members of the Scioto Group) proposed to purchase one 
million acres on the Wabash and Mississippi Rivers, and George 
Morgan and Associates wanted a million acres on the Missis­
sippi. But neither of these deals materialized. The only 
other big land contract negotiated by the Confederation Con­
gress was with John Cleve Symmes, a Nationalist Congressman 
from New Jersey and newly appointed judge in the Northwest 
Territory. Symmes was enthusiastic about the fertility of 
the Ohio country, and foresaw a fortune for "the lucky specu­
lator who should buy lands from Congress for five Schillings 
an acre and sell it to immigrants at twenty." Symmes con­
tracted for one million acres between the Great and Little 
Miami Rivers, on the Ohio. The contract was for two-thirds 
of a dollar per acre, but use of inflated securities, mili­
tary land bounties, and allowances for bad land brought his
c 7Carrington to Monroe, August 7, 1787 in Burnett, Let­
ters of the Continental Congress. VIII:631. See Manasseh 
Cutler, Description of Ohio (Boston, 1896): "It is a happy 
coincidence that the Ohio Company are about to commence the 
settlement of this country in so judicious a manner. It 
will serve as a wise model for the future settlement of all 
the federal lands; at the same time that by beginning so 
near the western limit of Pennsylvania, it will be a con­
tinuation of the old settlements, leaving no vacant lands 
to be seized by such lawless banditti as usually infest the 
frontiers of countries as distant from the seat of govern­
ment." For the Northwest Ordinance, see Chapter 7 below.
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actual purchase price down to that of the Ohio Company--about
5 8eight to nine cents an acre.
Thus by 1788, the Confederation Congress had, by amend­
ing the Land Ordinance of 1785, sold over 6,000,000 acres of 
the public domain to three land investment companies at a 
promised return of over $5,000,000.00 in specie and securi­
ties. Congress hoped there would be more big purchases, and 
announced the availability of lands in the Old Northwest to 
any purchaser willing to buy "not less than One Million of 
Acres in One body." An era of large scale private coloniza­
tion seemed to be at hand. On paper the sales looked promis­
ing. In reality they proved to be negligible, for the attempt 
of the federal government to sell western lands through land 
speculators was a dismal failure. All three of the large 
purchasers of the 1780s failed to meet their payments to Con­
gress, and two of them went bankrupt. Part of their problem 
was caused by the rise in the value of public securities after 
ratification of the Constitution. All the speculators planned 
to pay for most of their lands with securities they received 
for those lands. With the rise of these securities, however, 
the cost of lands went up, further applications ceased, and
S^Treat, National Land System, pp. 52-53; Hibbard, Public 
Land Policy, p. 50; Pattison, American Rectangular Land Survey 
System, p. 170; Hibbard, Public Land Policy, p. 43; Treat, 
National Land System, pp. 53, 64. One other sale that should 
be mentioned here was to the state of Pennsylvania. That 
state bought a 2 00,000 acre triangle of land between Lake Erie, 
New York, and Pennsylvania at 75 cents an acre. This pur­
chase gave Pennsylvania additional frontage on Lake Erie. See 
Treat, National Land System, p. 63, for a graph summarizing 
all of the Confederation land sales to speculation companies.
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the existing contractors were unable to make payments. The 
first company to go under was the Scioto Group. Duer had 
never planned on colonization; he wanted only to act as a 
middleman and sell his option on the lands to someone else 
at a profit. But Duer could find no buyers. His agent in 
Europe, Joel Barlow, compounded the problem by selling in­
dividual lots to French emigres. Six hundred of these French­
men arrived in the United States in 1790 to found the colony 
of Galliapolis--only to discover there was no title for the 
lands they had purchased. This ineptitude, the rise in the 
price of securities, and Duer's inaction all culminated when
Duer and two of his associates were swept down in the New
cqYork financial panic of 1792.
5 9Robbins, Our Landed Heritage, p. 11. For the securities 
question, see Treat, National Land System, p. 55, and Davis, 
"William Duer, Entrepreneur," p. 143. The confidence that 
accompanied the ratification of the Constitution increased 
the value of securities because everyone thought, correctly, 
that the new federal government would pay off in specie. Af­
ter 1789 no one wanted to waste their securities on land when 
they could get silver and gold for them. See Thatcher to 
Long, April 23, 1788 in Burnett, Letters of the Continental 
Congress, VIII:7 26: "Not a great many purchasers have offered
themselves, and few that have could give evidence of their 
ability, and of those that could, still a small number have, 
and probably ever will, comply with their contracts. Conti­
nental Securities have been for several years very low, perhaps 
lower than they will ever be hereafter should the proposed Con­
stitution, or any other with the energy to discharge the Inter­
est be adopted. Hence if purchasers found it difficult to dis­
charge their contracts while public Securities have been sold 
from 6/ to 3/ on the pound, what probability is there of 
their being enabled after the adoption of the Constitution 
that shall secure their Redemption, and make them equal to 
Silver and Gold." Duer, the Ohio Associates, and Symmes all 
asked for retroactive reductions in the price of their pur­
chases with these developments. As Davis commented in "Wil­
liam Duer, Entrepreneur," p. 224: "One cannot but comment in
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The Ohio Company did partially colonize its tract, and 
founded the to^m of Marietta in 1788. However, the original 
plan of the Newburgh petitioners to settle en masse was never 
realized. By the 1790s the company was more or less a specu­
lation firm, run by ex-army officers, selling Ohio Valley 
lands to newly arrived pioneers. Less than one-third of the 
817 Ohio Company shareholders ever moved out West. Many 
difficulties eventually led to the Company's demise. The 
secret Scioto deal angered many members of the company, and 
disputes arose between immigrant and speculator stockholders. 
The Ohio Associates were hard-pressed to sell shares, and 
several original subscribers defaulted. Lack of business 
"know-how," the rise in the price of securities, the rela­
tively poor quality of land, lack of immigration, and the 
Indian wars of the 1780s and '90s all drained the Company's 
energy. When its second payment of $500,000 came due in 17 92, 
the Ohio Associates were unable to pay. Rather than forfeit
passing, upon the ingenuity of the land purchasers who would 
urge the appreciation of the public securities as one reason 
for making a land grant for which those securities should be 
received in payment, and then when the appreciation had 
taken place would urge a reduction in price of lands corres­
ponding to or exceeding the extent of that appreciation." (!) 
For Duer's bankruptcy, see Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Com­
pany , p. Ixxxv; and Davis, "William Duer, Entrepreneur," 
pp. 144, 213, 249; Woodress, Life of Joel Barlow, p. 93; 
Treat, National Land System, p. 59. To relieve the French 
immigrants duped by the Scioto Associates, the Congress 
passed a relief act granting 24,000 acres to the French 
settlers at Galliapolis^ See Hulbert, Records of the Ohio 
Company. p. Ixxxix. One of Duer's last business deals before 
he landed in debtor's prison was a land speculation scheme 
with Henry Knox. Knox, Duer, and others bought Maine lands at 
ten cents an acre.
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everything, they asked the Federal Congress for help, and 
Congress passed a Relief Act which lowered the price of the 
original purchase. The company received 7 50,000 acres for 
its original $500,000 in securities. In addition, the 
Federalist-controlled Congress granted the Ohio Associates 
214,285 acres for military bounty warrants. Finally, it 
awarded them a donation tract of 100,000 acres for services 
rendered in settling the area and in fighting Indians. By 
1795 the Ohio Company had begun to liquidate its holdings.
It sold all company property, completed the surveys (as per 
its contract), and divided up its assets. Although the 
final dividends were small, the Ohio Company was spared 
bankruptcy by the federal government.
John Cleve Symmes did not fare as well as the Ohio 
Associates, largely because of his own dishonesty. Symmes 
started off well enough, founding the town of Cincinnati in 
1787. But in his zeal to make money, he continually sold 
lands that were not within the bounds of his purchase. Con­
gress was initially cooperative, and agreed to grant Symmes 
the lands he had sold. It also passed a relief measure for
Philbrick, Rise of the West, pp. 124-25; Davis, "Wil­
liam Duer, Entrepreneur," p. 142; Livermore, Land Companies, 
p. 136. Proxy voting was the rule, with eight or ten men 
holding all the proxies. Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Company, 
p. cxii; Treat, National Land System, p. 55; Hibbard, Public 
Land Policies, pp. 8, 49; Livermore, Land Companies, p. 140; 
Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Company, p. Ixvi. For a summary 
of the Ohio Company dealings, see Treat, National Land System, 
p. 57.
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the judge similar to that afforded the Ohio Company. But 
Symmes continued to sell lands that did not belong to him.
In 1802, Judge Symmes was arrested on three counts of fraud 
and soon went bankrupt.
Thus Congress's grandiose plans to sell western lands 
to fund the national government did not work. The original 
sales under the Land Ordinance of 1785 were negligible, 
drawing little more than $100,000 in revenue, and Congress's 
subsequent deals with the land speculators fared little 
better. Confederation land policy was undoubtedly a failure-- 
but why? The answer lies in Congress's basic assumptions.
That body was' quite correct in predicting that westward ex­
pansion would increase, producing widespread demand for 
western lands. But it made a great mistake in assuming the 
settlers would feel obligated to pay for those lands! Where 
land was cheap, as in the individual states, pioneers would 
settle and make purchases. (Indeed, much of the settlement 
prior to 1820 was within the frontiers of the thirteen states, 
not the trans-Appalachian West.) But where lands were expen­
sive, as in the public domain in the Ohio country, most of
Philbrick, Rise of the West, p. 125; Treat, National 
Land System, p. 60. Symmes also received a tract for educa­
tional purposes. Congress granted him the land he had been 
selling and took away his original grant. But Symmes wanted 
both. See ibid., p. 61. Congress had to finally grant pre­
emption rights to those who had been frauded by Symmes--but 
the preemption went at $2.00 an acre. See Hibbard, Public 
Land Policies, p. 51.
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those who migrated would simply squat and trespass. The 
frontier settlers would, in Jefferson's words, "settle the 
lands in spite of everybody." There is no better example 
of this than in the American tradition of squatting as 
manifested in the 1780s and '90s in the trans-Appalachian 
West. Tens of thousands of pioneers squatted and built 
homesteads on lands to which they had no legal title whatso­
ever. The futile efforts of federal troops to evict them
f i  ?were eventually abandoned.
^^For squatting and trespassing in the trans-Appalachian 
West, see Barnhart, Valley of Democracy, pp. 127-30; "Peti­
tion to Settle Ohio Lands (1784)," in Hulbert, Ohio in the 
Confederation, p. 95; "Petition of Kentuckians for Lands 
North of the' Ohio River," in ibid., pp. 137-40; "Ensign 
Armstrong's Report to Col. Harmar, April 12, 178 5," in ibid., 
p. 103. While the Land Ordinance of 1785 was under debate, 
700 troops were dispatched to erect Fort Harmar in the Ohio 
wilderness. One of their main duties was the eviction of 
squatters from federal lands. In the spring of 1785, General 
Harmar ordered Ensign John Armstrong and twenty-six men to 
forcibly evict trespassers Armstrong described as "banditti 
whose actions are a disgrace to human nature." Ensign Arm­
strong ousted numerous families and burned their cabins and 
sheds. He arrested one Joseph Ross who was "determined to 
hold possession, and if I destroyed his house (said) he 
would build six more." When confronted by an armed group of 
seventy-five frontiersmen, Armstrong threatened to "fire 
upon them if they did not disperse." • There was no bloodshed, 
but on April 11 the group petitioned Congress, stating, 
we were Visited by a command of men Sent by the 
Commandant at Fort McEntosh; with orders from 
Government on purpose to Disposess us and Destroy 
our Dwellings.. . . by which order it now Appears 
our Conduct in Settling here is Considered by the 
Legislature to be prejudicial to the Common good; 
of which we had not the Least Conception till now; 
we are greatly Distressed in our present Circum­
stance; and we humbly pray if you in your Wisdom 
think proper to grant us Liberty; to Rest where 
we are and grant us the preference to our Actual 
Settlements when the Land is to be settled by 
order of Government. . . .
175
As time passed, it became obvious that New England 
"township planting" was not going to work in the trans- 
Appalachian West. This is not to say, however, that the 
Confederation land policy was a total failure. Some legal 
settlement did take place under the policy, and the Ohio Com­
pany and Symmes settlements formed the nucleus from which 
much of southern Ohio grew. More important, prior rectangular 
survey, a provision of the Land Ordinance of 1785, brought 
order and security of title to the national land system and 
has remained in that system until the present day. It was 
the purchase and location provisions of the 1785 Ordinance 
that were ill-suited to the frontier situation. With expan­
sion and admission of new western states into the Union, 
these conservative stipulations were amended or defeated.
By the early 18 00s, the national government had begun to 
change its land policy to meet the needs of the Westerners. 
Preemption was first granted by the Federal Congress in 
1799, and the Land Ordinances of 1803 and 1820 marked an 
evolution that culminated in the Homestead Act of 1862. Prior
Several other missions followed the Armstrong foray of 
1785. Ebeneezer Denny (fall of ’85) and Captain John Ham- 
tramck (summers of 1786 and '87) were also sent to evict 
squatters, yet were unable to keep up with the continuing 
encroachment. In 1787, Secretary of War Knox warned Con­
gress, prophetically, that "All future attempts to remove 
squatters may be abortive" because "their numbers may be 
so great as to defy the power of the United States." Indeed, 
by the 17 90s the federal government had all but given up its 
efforts to evict squatters and trespassers from the trans- 
Appalachian West.
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rectangular survey provided a solid foundation upon which 
these liberal land policies could be built, but the Eastern 
Nationalists' fear of the West, and their efforts to con­
trol westward expansion through a "New England" corporate 
style of settlement proved to be anachronistic. George Wash­
ington, a Nationalist himself, gave a prophetic assessment of 
the western situation in 1785:
A penetrating eye, on close observation, will 
discover thro' various disguises a disinclina­
tion to add new States to the Confederation, 
westward of us; which must be the inevitable 
consequence of emigration to, and population 
of that territory. . . . [But] as to the re­
straining of the citizens of the Atlantic 
States from transplanting themselves to that 
soil, when prompted by interest or inclination-- 
you might as well attempt (while our Governin'ts 
are free) to prevent the reflux of the tides, 
when you had got them within your r i v e r s . ^3
Washington to Grayson, May 8, 1785, in Burnett, Letters 
of the Continental Congress, VIII:118. For a general assess­
ment of Confederation land policy, see Tatter, "Land Policy 
During the Confederation," pp. 185-86; Treat, "Land System 
Under the Confederation," p. 13; and Treat, National Land 
System, pp. 370-91. Treat believes the Confederation did a 
good job considering the circumstances. The frontiersman who 
could not afford government land simply ignored the policy, 
and "moved on again in advance of the civilization he could 
not endure."
CHAPTER VI 
THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER DEBATE
However singular the opinion may be, I cannot 
divest myself of it, that the navigation of 
the Mississippi, at this time, ought to be no 
object with us. On the contrary, until we 
have a little time allowed to open and make 
easy the ways between the Atlantic States and 
the Western territory, the obstructions had 
better remain. There is nothing which binds 
one country or one State to another but inter­
est. Without this cement the western inhabi­
tants, who more than probably will be composed 
in a great degree of foreigners, can have no 
predilection for us, and a commercial connexion 
is the only tie we can have upon them.
George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, 1785
The object in the occlusion of the Mississippi 
on the part of these people so far as it is 
extended to the interest of their States . . . 
is to break up so far as this will do it, the 
settlements on the western waters, prevent any 
in the future, and thereby keep the States 
southward as they now are--or if settlements 
will take place, that they shall be on such 
principles as to make it the interest of the 
people to separate from the Confederacy, so as 
effectively to exclude any new State from it:
To throw the weight of the population eastward 
and keep it there, to appreciate the vacant 
lands of New York and Massachusetts. In short, 
it is a system of policy which has for its ob­
ject the keeping the weight of government and 
population in [the East] and is prepared by a 
set of men so flagitious, unprincipled, and 
determined in their pursuits as to satisfy me 
beyond a doubt they have extended their views 
to the dismemberment of the government.
James Monroe to Patrick Henry, 1786^
1George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, August 22, 1785,
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Following the American Revolution, the Spaniards in the 
Old Southwest watched the great migration of American pioneers 
over the Appalachian Mountains with growing alarm. "There is 
not time to be lost," wrote Martin Navarro, a Spanish official 
in New Orleans: "Mexico is on the other side of the Missis­
sippi in the vicinity of the already formidable establishments 
of the Americans." This fear of American encroachment was 
manifested in a Spanish western policy bent on strangling 
United States settlements in the Mississippi Valley. In June 
of 1784, the Spanish government in New Orleans issued a procla­
mation closing the Mississippi River to all American citizens. 
The King of Spain sent Don Diego de Gardoqui to the United 
States to negotiate a treaty that would insure Spanish sover­
eignty in the Old Southwest.
The American reaction was far from unanimous. Southerners 
and Westerners angrily condemned the Spanish closure, insisting 
on America's right to navigate the Mississippi by virtue of 
the colonial charters and the Treaty of Paris of 1783. Gardoqui 
soon learned, however, that many Americans, especially the 
Nationalists in the Northeastern states, were not so enthusias­
tic in defending American rights to the Mississippi. They dis­
trusted the squatters and "insolvent emigrants” who were cros­
sing the Appalachians, and feared the growth of the West would
in Sparks, Writings of Washington. IX:119; James Monroe to 
Patrick Henry, August 12, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the 
Continental Congress , VIII:424-25.
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result in a loss of the economic and political dominance of
the Northeastern states. Many of the Eastern Nationalists,
including Gardoqui's American counterpart. Secretary of
Foreign Affairs John Jay, were willing to surrender American
use of the Mississippi for a number of years in return for a
favorable trade treaty and military alliance. The Jay-Gardoqui
negotiations and the Mississippi River Debate thus led to an
inevitable conflict between the expansionist Southern party
and the Northeastern anti-expansionists in the Confederation
Congress. As a result, the Congress met a political impasse
that had to be resolved by the Constitutional Convention of
1787. The Confederation Congress's political crisis could not
be,resolved and the Federal Constitution could not be written
until there was a resolution of the East-South split over
western policy. By viewing the Jay-Gardoqui controversy and
the Mississippi River Debate one can view a crucial issue in
the evolution of early American politics and in the creation
2of the first American western policy.
Spain is proud and extremely jealous of our 
approximation to her South American territory, 
and fearing the example of our ascendency upon 
that country, is grasping forever at more 
territory, by way of security; and hoping to 
derive benefit to her system, from our want of
Philbrick, Rise of the West, p. 164. For the political 
implications of the Jay-Gardoqui affair, see Henderson, Party 
Politics, p. 352.
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system, our discord, and inattention. Hence 
we may expect from Mr. Gardoque, an apparent 
firm demand of the exclusive navigation of 
the Mississippi, with some tempting commercial 
offers to procure our assent to the loss of 
this very valuable navigation. . . .
Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, 1785^
When the American colonies declared themselves independent 
from Great Britain in 1776, great questions arose concerning 
Spanish-American relations in the Old Southwest, and specif­
ically American navigation of the Mississippi River. Great 
Britain's theoretical claim to navigation rights (on the 
basis of the Treaty of Paris, 1763) was never really con­
firmed during the 1760s and '70s, largely because of the non­
expansionist British western policy and the formidable Indian 
barrier in the trans-montane West. With independence and re­
newed American expansion, however, the question of navigation 
of the Mississippi was once again brought into dispute. The 
Spanish were a power to be reckoned with in the Old Southwest. 
Spain controlled the mouth of the Mississippi and claimed much 
of the southwestern trans-Appalachian frontier. The Franco- 
American alliance of 1778 brought Spain into the Revolutionary 
War against Great Britain, embroiled the United States in 
European diplomacy, and made the Mississippi River question 
even more cloudy. Spain was an extremely reluctant ally of 
the United States. As a great colonial power Spain could
^Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, February 14, 1785, 
in Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, VII:332.
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hardly be expected to support enthusiastically an American 
colonial independence movement. Spain was an ally of France, 
not the United States; the Spaniards declared war in order to 
recapture the island of Gibralter from Great Britain. Spain 
looked with distrust upon American independence, and was par­
ticularly concerned about possible American settlements in 
the Mississippi Valley. Spain stood as a formidable barrier 
to American settlement in the southwestern frontier and Ameri­
can navigation of the Mississippi River.^
When Spain first declared war against Great Britain, many 
Americans were willing to recognize its claims to the Old 
Southwest and exclusive navigation of the Mississippi River.
From 1778-1780, commercial and trading interests in the North­
eastern states favored recognizing Spanish claims in return 
for substantial military and economic aid. These New England 
interests were ably represented by American diplomat John Jay, 
who shared their distrust of Westerners, and feared an expand­
ing West would lessen the economic and political weight of 
the Northeast.^ Had the Spanish catered to these Northeasterner
Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United 
States (New York, 1936), p. 34; Philbrick, Rise of the West, 
pp. 64-65; Frank Monaghan, John Jay: Defender of Liberty 
(New York, 1935), p. 255.
^The anti-western sentiment among Northeasterners is dis­
cussed in Paul Chrysler Phillips, "American Opinions Regarding 
the West, 1778-1783," Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley 
Historical Association, VII (1913-14):291. See also,
Staughton Lynd, "The Compromise of 1787," Political Science 
Quarterly 81 (June 1966):233; Abernethy, Western Lands, pp. 
203-204. According to Abernethy, Robert Morris told the
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they might well have enjoyed substantial American support for 
their claims in the Old Southwest. But when John Jay went to 
Spain to seek loans and assurances of military aid, he re­
ceived what Samuel Flagg Bemis has called ’’one of the most 
protracted painful snubbings ever accorded a distinguished 
envoy of the American government."^ This diplomatic affront 
was followed closely by the American victory at Yorktown in 
1781, which greatly decreased the United States dependence 
on the Franco-Spanish alliance. Thus within a year Spain 
lost probable American guarantees to its claims to the 
Southwest and exclusive navigation of the Mississippi River. 
Jay later wrote that in order to obtain Spanish aid, he had 
originally considered surrendering American claims to East 
and West Florida and asking only for a free port on the 
Mississippi :
But when Spain afterwards declared war for 
objects which did not include ours, and in 
a manner not very civil to our independence,
I became persuaded that we ought not to cede 
to her any of our rights, and of course that 
we should retain and insist upon our right 
to the navigation of the Mississippi.'
At the Treaty of Paris negotiations the Spanish further
French envoy Gerard in 1778, ’the strength of the Confederacy 
lay in the North and that the North should be kept in the 
ascendency by curtailing the territory in the Southwest’ 
(Abernethy's paraphrase).
^Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 35.
7Johnston, Correspondence of John Jay, 1:327.
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antagonized the United States by instructing their delegate 
to try to convince the British to negotiate for a buffer 
state between the United States and the Spanish territory.
This effort came too late, however, as the American diplomats 
at Paris were tired of the complications inherent in the 
Franco-Spanish alliance. The Americans ignored their allies 
and independently negotiated the Treaty of Paris of 1783.
In this agreement, the United States received a highly favor­
able, but questionable western settlement. The boundaries 
granted the new American republic were huge. The Americans 
received a southern boundary of 31°, the Mississippi as a 
western boundary, and the right to navigate the entire length 
of that river. Spain was appalled. The 31° southern boundary 
and the Mississippi River western boundary included much of 
the Spanish Yazoo strip in West Florida, land which the 
Spanish traditionally held and had recaptured from the British 
during the Revolutionary War. The British granted navigation 
of the entire length of the Mississippi on the basis of a 
privilege awarded Britain by Spain following the Seven Years 
War (1763), but Spain’s declaration of war against Britain had 
nullified that act. Thus Great Britain gave the United States 
treaty concessions which it had no right to give and, to make 
matters worse, a separate treaty between Spain and Great Brit­
ain (1783) made no mention of these contradictions. The 
stage was set for the inevitable Spanish-American conflict 
over the Old Southwest and navigation of the Mississippi during
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the Confederation era.
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Billington, Westward Expansion, p. 223.
Over 50,000 pioneers crossed the Appalachian Mountains 
during the first few years following the Treaty of Paris. As
Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 10, 63; J e n ­
sen, New Nation, p 170; Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy 
(New York, 1959), p. 58; Philbrick, Rise of the West, pp. 74- 
79, 171
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they settled and began to farm the Ohio Valley, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee, their immediate concern was transporting agricul­
tural surplus to eastern markets. Because of the difficulty 
of transporting freight over the mountains, the most practical 
route was down the Ohio and Mississippi to New Orleans, and 
then onward via ocean transport. It took less time to ship 
goods from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia in this way than to go 
overland! Most of the produce was shipped on flatboats, sim­
ple craft which could hold nearly fifty tons. Farmers banded 
together to build and stock these boats, organized a crew, 
and began a long, arduous journey down the river. After sev­
eral months (forty or fifty days in the Spring) the flatboats 
reached New Orleans where the goods were sold and the boats
9broken up and sold for lumber.
The Spanish watched these developments with ever-growing 
alarm. They believed American settlement south of the Ohio 
and navigation of the Mississippi were a direct challenge to
Q Horsman, Formative Years, pp. 156, 158-59; Philbrick, 
Rise of the West, p. 336 ; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, p. 59; 
Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 95. According to 
Whittaker, the volume of American commerce traveling down 
the Mississippi prior to 1784 was small. He states that no 
flatboats entered New Orleans from 1785-1787 when the Missis­
sippi was closed, and that volume picked up steadily there­
after. The main problem with Whittaker's figures is that 
they are taken from Spanish records and do not include 
smuggled goods, which made up the bulk of the commerce. James 
Wilkinson and John Sevier, for example, are known to have 
made several unofficial visits to New Orleans with boatloads 
of goods. More important, the Spanish were concerned with 
potential use of the river should a precedent be established. 
Mississippi River commerce of the Early National Period would 
certainly demonstrate that their concern was well founded.
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Spanish claims in the Old Southwest. Bernardo de Campo, a
Spanish charge de affaires, wrote from London in 1783 that
swarms of Americans were crossing the mountains into the
Mississippi Valley and would soon threaten Spain's southwestern
possessions. The Spanish governor of Louisiana warned:
If . . . this vast and restless population
come to occupy the banks of the Mississippi 
and Missouri, or secure their navigation, 
doubtless nothing will prevent them from 
crossing and penetrating into our provinces 
on the other side. . . .
The Spanish felt they had to take a stand--or else accept the 
likely possibility of an American takeover of the Southwest.
But the Spanish were fortunate enough to have retained some 
American allies on the Southwestern question. Many of those 
who supported the Spanish in 1778 remained convinced that 
American expansion westward should proceed slowly, if at all. 
Gouverneur Morris believed "emigrations from the middle states 
to the Western country are already so great as to be injurious." 
"Policy would warrant delay," Rufus King wrote Jonathan Jackson, 
"but these western adventurers will not suffer it. They at 
this time hold a bold language, and are yearly making incred­
ible accessions." Encouraged by these sentiments, the Spanish 
government formulated a policy to strangle American settlements 
in the trans-Appalachian West. On July 22, 1784 they issued a 
proclamation closing the Mississippi River south of the 32°
Spanish alarm over American expansion is discussed 
fully in Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 63-67. The 
quoted passage is from Turner, Frontier in American History, 
p. 183.
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parallel to all American citizens. The conflict between the 
United States and Spain had come to the fore. The ambiguous 
provisions of the Treaty of Paris would now have to be re­
negotiated by the two conflicting powers.
I have long entertained doubts concerning 
the line of conduct which Congress ought to 
pursue relative to the Territory of the U. S. 
Northwest of the Ohio, and am every day more 
confirmed in the opinion that no paper en­
gagements, or stipulations, can be formed 
which will insure a desirable connection 
between the Atlantic States and those which 
will be erected to the Northwestward of the 
Appalachian or Allegheny Mountains, provided 
the Mississippi is immediately opened. . . . 
Should there be an uninterrupted use of the 
Mississippi at this time by the citizens of 
the U. S., I should consider every emigrant 
to that country from the Atlantic States as 
forever lost to the Confederacy. . . .
Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, 1786
I look upon this as a contest for empire.
Our country [Virginia] is equally affected 
with Kentucky. The Southern States are 
deeply interested in this subject. If the 
Mississippi be shut up, emigration will be 
stopped entirely. There will be no new 
states formed on the western waters. . . .
This contest of the Mississippi involves 
this great national contest; that is, whether 
one part of the continent shall govern the 
other. The Northern States have the majority, 
and will endeavour to keep it.
William Grayson to the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention, 1788^
lljensen. New Nation, p. 114; Rufus King to Jonathan Jack­
son, September 3, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental 
Congress, VIII: 458; Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 
13, 68.
l^Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, June 4, 1786, in King,
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Spain sent Don Diego de Gardoqui to America as its 
"Encargado de Négociés" to resolve the seemingly irreconcil­
able claims of Spain and the United States. Gardoqui was a 
clever and able diplomat who had worked closely with the 
Americans during the Revolutionary War.^^ The American 
negotiator was Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay. Jay 
had served in Paris in 1783, and was a major Confederation 
diplomat until appointed Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court in 1788. Although Jay demanded American navi­
gation of the Mississippi in Paris in 1783, he and many of 
his fellow Eastern Nationalists still entertained doubts 
about the prudence of an expansionist western policy. As a 
result. Jay was more sympathetic to the Spanish position than 
other American diplomats might have been. The Northeasterners' 
attitudes towards expansion would soon clash with the views of 
the South and the West on that subject, making for a warm 
sectional debate in the Confederation Congress over the Jay- 
Gardoqui negotiations.
The Jay-Gardoqui negotiations span the mid-1780s. Like 
many diplomatic affairs, they were long, tedious, and very 
confusing. John Jay termed the negotiations "dilatory, un­
pleasant, and unpromising." Much of the problem was the 
seemingly irreconcilable nature of the Spanish and American
Correspondence of Rufus King, 1:175; William Grayson in 
Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 75.
^^Gardoqui's duties included coordinating secret ship­
ments of war materiel from Spain to the American rebels.
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positions at the outset of negotiations. The Confederation 
Congress demanded the Spanish accept the Treaty of Paris of 
1783. They instructed Jay to insist unequivocally on "the 
right of the United States to their territorial bounds [31°] 
and the free Navigation of the Mississippi, from the Source 
to the Ocean. . . To back up their demands, the Ameri­
cans pointed to the Treaty of Paris, the sea to sea charters 
of the thirteen colonies, and the "natural right" of a nation 
owning land on a river to navigate the entire length of that 
river. The Spanish countered with a claim to all land south­
west of the Tennessee, Ohio, and Flint Rivers, and exclusive 
navigation of the Mississippi River. They supported their 
claims by pointing to their separate treaty with Great Britain 
in 1783, the right of military conquest of territory belonging 
to a common enemy, their ownership of the entire west bank of 
the Mississippi, and the fact that all British privileges to 
the Mississippi, having been canceled by Spain's declaration 
of war, could not therefore legally be transferred to the 
Americans by treaty. If the United States would accept the
Spanish position, the Spaniards offered a military alliance
15and a commercial treaty.
14john Jay, in Johnston, Correspondence of John Jay, 
111:243. For Jay's instructions, see Journals of the Con­
tinental Congress, XXIX:658.
l^whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 68, 73; 
Ferrell, American Diplomacy, p. 56; Philbrick, Rise of the 
West, pp. 171-72; Monaghan, John Jay, p. 256; Bemis, Diplo­
matic History of the United States, pp. 74-75, 78. For 
Gardoqui's instructions, see Whittaker, Spanish-American 
Frontier. pp. 70-71.
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When negotiations commenced in 1785, the United States 
were at a distinct disadvantage. International law was on 
the side of the Spaniards, and the Americans had no military 
muscle to back up their claims. On the other hand, thousands 
of restless western settlers were daily crossing the moun­
tains, pressuring the Spanish, and in the late eighteenth 
century Spain’s position as a world power was undoubtedly 
on the decline. The Spanish needed American friendship in 
their disputes with Great Britain. Thus both sides had 
assets and liabilities in these intricate diplomatic maneu- 
verings. The winning side would be that most adept at the 
art of diplomatic persuasion. Initially, both men clung to 
their government's positions, and the talks dragged on.
Richard Henry Lee wrote George Washington in October of 
1785, "The négociation with Mr. Gardoqui proceeds so slowly 
and as yet so ineffectually that I may fancy the free naviga­
tion of the Mississippi is a point . . . that will not be 
hastily concluded upon." Gardoqui used flattery, gifts, and 
cajolery to win Jay over. He was particularly charming to 
Mrs. Jay, in hopes she would influence her husband’s decisions. 
But Jay was bound by the Congressional instructions which for­
bade him to surrender the American right to navigate the Mis­
sissippi. He finally weakened, however, when he was made a 
most tempting offer. Gardoqui proposed a defensive alliance 
and a "most favored nation" status for the United States in 
trade (including trading privileges with Africa and the
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Phillipines) in return for a postponement of the southern 
boundary dispute and American relinquishment of the use of 
the Mississippi for a minimum of twenty-five years. The 
prospect of a lucrative trade deal for the commercial North­
east was too much for John Jay to resist. The Mississippi 
River provision was not all that bad, he reasoned, for it 
would "save the right and only suspend the use during the 
term of the treaty." Moreover, Jay honestly believed this 
was the best settlement the United States were going to get.
In May of 1786, he informed Congress the negotiations had 
reached an impasse, and requested that a committee be ap­
pointed "with power to instruct and direct me on every point 
and subject relative to the proposed treaty with Spain.
Edmund Cody Burnett has compared the effect of Jay's 
announcement to that which might have occurred had a bomb 
been tossed into the halls of the Confederation Congress.
That body immediately polarized as Southern Congressmen 
squared off against Northeasterners. Once again, the western 
question served to accent the sectional dichotomy in Congress, 
and split the Nationalist faction into Northern and Southern
Philbrick, Rise of the West, p. 171; Lee to Washing­
ton, October 11, 1785, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental 
Congress. VIII:233; Lee and Washington both favored surrender 
of the navigation of the Mississippi for a number of years. 
Jensen, New Nation, p. 172; Billington, Westward Expansion, 
p. 225; John Jay in Johnston, Correspondence of John Jay, 
111:241; Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII: 
xxviii.
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17camps. "It was immediately perceived," Monroe wrote Madi­
son, "that the object was to relieve [Jay] from his instruc­
tions respecting the Mississippi and get a committee to cover 
the measure." Monroe believed "Jay has manag’d this negotia­
tion dishonestly," and had been "negotiating expressly for 
the purpose of defeating the object of his instructions and
by a long train of intrigue and management seducing the rep-
1 8resentatives of the States to concur in it." While the 
Southerners unanimously opposed Jay's proposal, the Easterners, 
especially Nationalists, voiced their approval. Most Eastern 
Nationalists were not averse to temporarily surrendering the 
navigation of the Mississippi, especially if it would increase 
the wealth of their section. Battle lines were drawn for the 
Mississippi River Debate, which raged in the Confederation 
Congress during the summer of 1786.
John Jay outlined his position in an address to Congress 
on August 3, 1786. The negotiations with Gardoqui, he said, 
were deadlocked, with no agreement possible. Spain would 
never consent to American navigation of the Mississippi River. 
The Spanish were, however, willing to offer a defensive alliance
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 389, 394, 398.
18Burnett, Continental Congress, pp. 654-55; Burnett, 
Letters of the Continental Congress. YIII:xxviii; Monaghan, 
John Jay, p. 258; Monroe to Henry, August 12, 1786, in 
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:424. 
Monroe was so incensed that he disavowed his efforts to 
reach some sort of accommodation with the Easterners over 
territorial government and called for a return to the 
Ordinance of 1784. See chapter 7 below.
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and a "most favored nation" trade status in return for United
States surrender of navigation of the Mississippi for twenty-
five years. "Why, therefore," Jay asked, "should we not
(and for a valuable consideration too) consent to forbear
to use what we know is not in our power to use?":
[I] oppose every idea of our relinquishing 
our right to navigate . . . Mr. Gardoqui 
strongly insists on our relinquishing it. .
. . the King will never yield on that point, 
nor consent to any compromise about it. . . .
It is much to be wished that these matters 
had lain dormant for years yet to come; but 
such wishes are in vain; these disputes are 
agitating; they press themselves upon us and 
must terminate in accomodation or War, or 
disgrace. The last is the worst that can 
happen; the second we are unprepared for; 
and therefore our attentions and endeavors 
should be bent to the first.19
Timothy Bloodworth of North Carolina reported that by
mid-August "the subject was . . . agitated with that warmth
which might have reasonably been expected on a matter of such
importance." The sectional cleavage was so great that many
2 0honestly feared a possible dissolution of the Confederacy.
As the debate progressed, the arguments of the South became 
more clearly defined. The Southerners believed the "use of 
the Mississippi is given by nature to our western country, 
and no power on earth can take it away from them." James Madison 
called Jay’s diplomacy "short-sighted" and "dishonorable;"
ISjournals of the Continental Congress, XXXI:479-80; 
Monaghan, John Jay, ~p~! 259.
Z^Henderson, Party Politics, p. 294: Monroe wrote (August 
12), "the Eastern people talk of dismemberment. . . ," and
Theodore Sedgwick urged Northeasterners to "contemplate a sub­
stitute for union."
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"a voluntary barter in time of profound peace of the rights
of one part of the empire to the interests of another part."
The Southerners opposed any measure that would discourage
immediate settlement of the West. They looked forward to
new western states, and foresaw political allies in the
trans-Appalachian region. They feared that in the proposed
treaty, "The Eastern States are to receive the benefits . . .
and the Southern States are to pay the purchase by giving up
21the Missecippey."
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina keynoted the Southern
2 2argument in a speech probably delivered August 16, 1786.
He called the Jay Treaty unnecessary: "Spain in her treaty
proposes no advantages which we do not now enjoy, and can 
never be in her interest to curtail . . . she proposes nothing 
more than she will always be willing to grant you without a 
treaty." Pinckney argued further that closure of the Missis­
sippi would greatly lower the value of western lands--lands 
from which Congress needed revenue to finance the government: 
"The sale and disposal of lands ceded in the Western terri­
tory has ever been considered by Congress as a sufficient
Z^Timothy Bloodworth to the North Carolina Assembly, 
December, 1786, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Con­
gress . VIII:521; Jensen, New Nation, p. 172. The best ac­
counts of the debates are found in Secretary Johnson's notes, 
and James Monroe's letters in Burnett, Letters of the Conti­
nental Congress. VII. See also the recorded speeches of 
Charles Pinckney and William Samuel Johnson cited in foot­
notes #22, 23, 24.
22"Charles Pinckney's Reply to Jay, August 16, 1786, Re­
garding A Treaty with Spain," American Historical Review 10 
(1905): 820-27.
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fund . . . for discharge of the domestic debt . . .  it is 
known that the value of the lands must altogether depend upon 
the right to navigate the Mississippi." More important, the 
surrender of the Mississippi would drive the Westerners from 
the Confederacy: "By using the first opportunity . . .  to
sacrifice their interests to those of the Atlantic States, 
can they be blamed for immediately throwing themselves into 
[Spain's] arms for that protection and support you have 
denied them?" Pinckney alluded to the need to strengthen the 
Confederation when he implied this treaty might prevent es­
tablishment of a badly needed central government. He argued 
that the South and the West would oppose "vesting that body 
with farther powers, which has so recently abused those they 
already possess." In conclusion, Pinckney stated.
Upon the whole, as the present treaty proposes 
no real advantage that we do not at present 
enjoy, and it will always be in the interest 
and policy of Spain to allow . . . and as the 
suspension demanded may involve us in uneasi­
ness with each other at a time when harmony 
is so essential to our true interests . . . 
let me hope that upon this occasion the gen­
eral welfare of the United States will be 
suffered to prevail, and that the house will 
on no account consent to alter Mr. Jay's in­
structions, or permit him to treat upon any 
terms other than those he has already pro­posed.23
Pinckney had spoken for the South and the West. Now attention 
shifted to the Northeastern rebuttal.
Two Eastern Nationalists, William Samuel Johnson of
Z^ibid.
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Connecticut and Rufus King of New York, delivered the chief 
rebuttals to Pinckney. Johnson contended that both sections 
would gain from the proposed treaty, because "Trade beneficial 
to one part of the Union is beneficial to all, for we are one 
Body." As for the Mississippi, he questioned the American 
"right" of navigation: "That is mine which I have a right
to Use and can Use. Can you say this of the Mississippi? . . . 
It is not yours to give. When you agree not to use it you 
have sacrificed nothing . . . you give up only a Right to go 
to War for 20 years. This is a benefit, not a loss." Rufus 
King concurred, adding the United States could secure naviga­
tion of the Mississippi later on, when they were stronger and 
in a more advantageous bargaining position. He noted that 
Britain and France were on Spain's side, and the Americans 
could not possibly go to war now. Moreover, the livelihood 
of the Northeast depended on commerce, and King insisted that 
without the proposed treaty the Eastern merchants would suffer. 
Nationalists Theodore Sedgwick and Arthur St. Clair concluded 
the Northeastern argument, with St. Clair observing, "This 
will check settlement of the Western country . . . .  Our coun­
try is too thin of inhabitants . . . emigration therefore in
our present situation is hurtful.
St. Clair's sentiments were typical of many Easterners
^^For the Eastern rebuttal, see Burnett, Letters of the 
Continental Congress, VIII:429, 438-40, 447-49.
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who supported at least a temporary forbearance of the naviga­
tion of the Mississippi River. The attitudes of these 
Easterners formed a consistent philosophy regarding the western 
territories. This philosophy was not always espoused openly, 
for to make it known, "would be impolitic for many reasons . . ." 
Many of their views could not "with safety be now admitted.
Yet by examining the political and economic motives of the 
Easterners one can better understand their stance in the 
Mississippi River Debate.
Political considerations figured importantly in the Eastern 
appraisal of the West. Most Easterners, especially the Nation­
alists, doubted the "loyalty" of the squatters and banditti 
of the West. Rufus King believed their "pursuits and inter­
ests . . . will be so different and probably so opposite [ours],
2 ̂that an entire separation must eventually ensue." And even if 
the Westerners joined the Confederacy, Eastern Nationalists 
entertained many apprehensions about their potential political 
and sectional loyalties. Most of these Northeasterners agreed
with the South that new western states would support the South
2 7in Confederation politics. By closing the Mississippi, the 
Northeast hoped to slow western settlement and admission of
? c:Rufus King to Jonathan Jackson, September 3, 1786, in 
Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:458.
^^Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, June 4, 1786, in King, 
Correspondence of Rufus King, 1:175
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 408-409; Staughton Lynd, 
"Compromise of 1787," pp. 22 5-4 7.
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new western states, thus prolonging the Eastern dominance in 
national politics. As Grayson of Virginia observed, "The 
Northern States have a majority and will endeavor to keep 
it."28
At the same time, the Mississippi question was of great 
economic importance to the East. The benefits which would 
result from the proposed Spanish trade deal were especially 
attractive during the post-war depression of the early 1780s. 
But what of other economic motivations? Many conservatives 
believed that westward migration "must in its consequences 
depopulate and ruin the Old States." Northeasterners be­
lieved immediate settlement of the West would drain the 
Eastern labor supply, thereby raising wages and diminishing 
consumers. By slowing settlement they hoped to insure eco­
nomic stability: "If from our relinquishment at present
[Spain] can retain for a number of years the exclusive naviga­
tion of the river, it is well--", Edward Rutledge assured Jay. 
"It will stop migration, it will concenter force, because the 
settlers can have no vent for the products of that country 
but down the Mississippi, and therefore I think they will not 
fond themselves of inhabiting her banks." King agreed. If 
the Westerners were "cut off for a time from any connections 
except with the Old States, across the mountains, I should not 
despair that a Government might be instituted so connecting
2 8Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 75.
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them with the Atlantic States, as would be highly beneficial
to them both, and bring considerable trade." Northeastern
land speculators were in an untenable position. Most of
them had invested in state lands or "mid" western lands. Thus
they favored gradual settlement onto speculator-owned lands.
They opposed opening the Mississippi because it would lower
the value of their lands. Like most Northeasterners, they
feared the economic consequences of immediate unrestricted
2 9American nagivation of the Mississippi River.
These political and economic attitudes combined with 
other factors, most importantly the desire to avoid an Indian 
war, to instill in most Eastern Nationalists an intense fear 
of westward migration. These attitudes were well ingrained
7 QIbid., pp. 74-75; Jensen, New Nation, pp. 9, 171; 
Richard Henry Lee to George Washington, in Ballagh, Letters 
of Richard Henrv Lee. 11:426-27. Lee, a Virginia Antifeder­
alist who became a staunch Federalist in the 1790s, supported 
the Eastern Nationalist western policy of the Confederation. 
Edward Rutledge to John Jay, in Johnston, Correspondence of 
Johy Jay. 111:217; Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, June, 1786, 
in King, Rufus King. 1:178. A Virginia nationalist like 
Washington opposed navigation with a different twist. He 
envisioned a network of canals connecting Virginia with the 
trans-Appalachian West. See Sparks, Writings of Washington, 
IX:115; Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, 
p. 79; Bancroft, Formation of the Constitution, p. 125. For 
land speculation see Chapter 5, above. Also, Madison to 
Jefferson, March 19, 1787, in Hunt, Writings of James Madison. 
11:328: "It will be difficult, however, to get proper steps
taken by Congress so many States having land of their own at 
market. It is supposed that this consideration had some 
share in the zeal for shutting the Mississippi . . . ." The 
irony of Eastern fears of economic repercussions from expan­
sion is, of course, that in the 19th century New England's 
prosperity was based upon western raw materials, foodstuffs, 
and consumers.
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in the American Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay. Jay 
had never ventured south or west of Philadelphia, and feared 
the "western country will one day give us trouble." He 
doubted "whether after two or three generations [the Western­
ers] will be fit to govern themselves. . . . "  His feelings 
about westward expansion are summarized in a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson :
Would it not be wiser gradually to extend our 
settlements as want of room should make it 
necessary, than to pitch our tents through 
the wilderness in a great variety of places, 
far distant from each other, and from those 
advantages of education, civilization, law 
and government which compact settlements and 
neighborhoods afford? Shall we not fill the
wilderness with white savages? and will they
not become more formidable to us than the 
tawny ones which now inhabit it?^"
Many historians contend that John Jay acquiesced to
Gardoqui because it was the wisest and most rational policy
31to follow at that time. Jay believed the Americans could 
not afford a confrontation with the Spanish so soon after the 
Revolution. Gardoqui's offer seemed reasonable, especially 
since it included a favorable trade agreement and only a tem­
porary surrender of navigation of the Mississippi. Yet it 
appears as though Jay could have secured more favorable terms 
in 1786. History contradicts Jay's assertion that, without
^^John Jay, in Johnston, Correspondence of John Jay,
111:245; Jensen, New Nation, p. 170; Monaghan, John Jay, p. 259,
*7 1 See Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, 
p. 79; Monaghan, John Jay, p~̂ 259.
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his proposed treaty, "the Mississippi would continue shut. . . .
The Spanish posts would be strengthened, and that Nation would
32there bid us defiance." The relaxation of Spanish policy and 
the ultimate success of diplomat Thomas Pinckney at San Lorenzo 
in 1795 indicate the United States had more bargaining power in 
1786 than John Jay seemed to realize. To be sure. Jay could 
not predict the future, but did he negotiate as aggressively 
as possible? Or did he betray the same weaknesses criticized 
so severely during the Jay Treaty controversy of 1794? It can 
certainly be argued that Jay's timid diplomacy combined with 
his doubts concerning westward expansion to play a large role 
in his decision to forbear the American right to navigate the 
Mississippi River for twenty-five years.
Thus a number of reasons motivated John Jay and many
Eastern Nationalists to argue in favor of surrendering the 
Mississippi to Spain in August of 1786. After William Samuel 
Johnson and Rufus King finished their speeches, it was again 
the Southerners' turn to speak. A resolution introduced by 
the Virginia delegation (probably written by Monroe and Car­
rington) on August 18, summed up the Southern argument: "This
treaty will not open to us a single port nor admit us into
those now open upon better terms than we now enjoy." If Spain
"fails in her present object . . . she will either come for­
ward and grant the terms we require, or at least seek an
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXI:483-84
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accomodation. . . . "  The surrender of the Mississippi was 
"inadmissable" and Jay should be recalled, "as his sentiments 
are now known in Congress and differ so widely from the 
opinions of the several states, especially on the points 
relative to the Mississippi and the boundaries." Finally, 
the Virginians proposed the negotiations be transferred to 
Thomas Jefferson in Madrid, and the United States continue to 
demand the right to navigate the entire length of the Missis­
sippi River.
A month of heated debate had not changed anyone’s mind. 
The same sectional split which initiated the struggle was 
manifested in the final vote. The Virginia resolution was 
defeated 7-5, and on August 29, 1786, Massachusetts moved to 
repeal Jay's original instructions demanding American naviga­
tion of the Mississippi River. This motion passed, 7-5, with 
all the states from New Hampshire to Pennsylvania in favor, 
and those from Maryland to Georgia opposed. Thus, John Jay
Ibid., XXXI:574-95. For the move to transfer negotia­
tions to Jefferson, see Henderson, Party Politics. p. 398. 
Southerners hoped to have Jefferson use his French connec­
tions as a liaison to the Spanish court. Jefferson was in 
favor of American expansion and endorsed navigation of the 
Mississippi. See Jefferson to Monroe, August 11, 1786, in 
Ford, Writings of Jefferson. IV:262-63: He opposed surrender­
ing navigation because, "Such a supposition would argue not 
only an ignorance of the people to whom this is most interest­
ing, but an ignorance of the nature of man, or an inattention 
to it . . . our best interests will be promoted by making all 
the just claims of our fellow citizens, wherever situated, 
our own . . .  6 making common cause even where our separate 
interests would seem opposed to theirs. No other conduct can 
attach us together; and on this attachment depends our happi­
ness." See also Jefferson to Madison, June 20, 1787, ibid., 
11:481.
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and the Northeasterners seemingly won the hard-fought battle 
over the Mississippi River question.
It is my voice that we instruct our dele­
gates, that with firmness they expostulate 
with Spain on this point and obtain an in­
stant opening of this river to our trade.
It is my voice, and there are two hundred 
thousand people west of the mountains (more 
inhabitants than there are in some of our 
states) who, were they present, would shout 
the same language.
Hugh Henry Brackenridge (representative of 
western Pennsylvania in the Pennsylvania 
state legislature) September 22, 1787^^
Although the Northeastern states won the major skirmish 
of the Mississippi River Debate, they lost the battle as a 
whole. One of their main problems was the provision of the 
Articles of Confederation pertaining to treaties: No diplo­
matic agreement could be made without the approval of nine 
states of the Confederation. To be sure, the East could muster 
seven votes to change Jay’s instructions, but they could not 
possibly secure the nine votes necessary to ratify a treaty 
negotiated under those instructions. This hard political fact
Journals of the Continental Congress, XXXI:592; Burnett, 
Continental Congress, p. 658. After changing Jay’s instruc­
tions, the East further antagonized the South by "locking up" 
the decision through a procedural ruling. See Henderson,
Party Politics, p. 393.
35James H. Mast, "Hugh Henry Brackenridge and the Missis­
sippi Question, 1786-1787," Western Pennsylvania Magazine of 
History LIV (October 1971): 380-81.
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combined with other important developments during late 1786 
and 1787 to dampen Eastern enthusiasm for closing off the 
Mississippi.
One important factor was the considerable public outcry, 
especially in the West, over Congress's August 29 reversal 
of Jay's instructions. Denunciations of Jay poured in from 
all over the country. "To sell us and make us vassals to 
the merciless Spaniards is a grievance not to be borne!", 
protested one Westerner, and the vast majority concurred. 
Several state legislatures received petitions protesting the 
"ruthless and disconsolate policy" of the Spanish and demand­
ing Congress resist the Spanish closure. Thousands of western 
Pennsylvanians petitioned their state legislature, demanding 
it "give such instructions to the . . . Delegates in Congress, 
as may be favorable to the interests of this country." Hugh 
Henry Brackenridge, the delegate from western Pennsylvania, 
delivered an impassioned speech to the Pennsylvania state 
legislature demanding American navigation of the entire length 
of the Mississippi:
We will now use this language and say to 
Spain, you are unjust, and may as well de­
prive us of the great elements of light and 
air, as of this river. Shall I not taste 
because another has drunk? Shall I not 
breathe because another has breathed before 
me? Shall I not see because a ray of light 
has touched your eye?37
^^Henderson, Party Politics, p. 396.
37por western protest to the reversal of Jay's instructions,
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This western discontent is just one aspect of the chaos 
the Mississippi River Debate brought to Confederation politics. 
Indeed, the Jay-Gardoqui affair created a Northeast-South 
deadlock in the Confederation Congress that finally had to be 
settled in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. One his­
torian maintains the Mississippi question was a major catalyst
38for that Convention. The Jay affair convinced Virginia Na­
tionalists like Madison, Carrington, and Arthur Lee that their 
plans for westward expansion had met an impasse in the Confed­
eration Congress. They immediately moved to turn the Annapolis 
trade convention (September of 1786) into a forum for Consti­
tutional reform. At the same time, Shay's rebellion motivated 
Eastern Nationalists to support the Federal Convention. Both 
Northeastern and Southern Nationalists feared the disunion and 
chaos symbolized by the Mississippi and Shay affairs. Yet 
their fundamental disagreement over westward expansion, new 
western states, and navigation of the Mississippi precluded 
any compromise, even in the Federal Convention. Not until 
Northeastern and Southern Nationalists reconciled their differ­
ences over western policy could there be a solution to the
see Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 76-77; Horsman, 
Formative Years, p. 15; and Abernethy, Western Lands. The 
quoted passages are from Jensen, New Nation, p. 173; and Mast, 
"Hugh Henry Brackenridge and the Mississippi Question," 
pp. 378, 380-81. The petitioners in Pennsylvania were par­
ticularly incensed over Arthur St. Clair's stand on the ques­
tion.
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 398-99.
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T OConfederation's political dilemma.
The solution came in the summer of 1787, when the Con­
federation Congress and the Constitutional Convention debated 
simultaneously the Northwest Ordinance, slavery in the terri­
tories, and admission of new western states. Their solution, 
the "Compromise of 1787,"^*^ is discussed at length in chap­
ter seven, below. The importance of the Mississippi River 
Debate in the Compromise of 1787 is that it brought the funda­
mental disagreement over the West to the fore, and served as 
a catalyst for compromise.
That a compromise was in the making can be seen in the 
status of the Mississippi River question during late 1786 
and 1787. The Northeasterners, anticipating the Constitu­
tional Convention, decided not to antagonize the South by 
pressing for their original demands. Although Jay's instruc­
tions remained those of August 29, and Jay continued to 
negotiate with Don Diego de Gardoqui, by the Spring of 1787 
it was obvious the talks had broken down. "The Spanish 
project sleeps," James Madison wrote Thomas Jefferson. "A 
late accidental conversation with Gardoqui proved to me that 
the négociation is arrested . . .  it appears that the intended 
sacrifice of the Mississippi will not be made. . . . "  In the 
Federal Convention, the Eastern Nationalists acquiesced to a
39%bid., pp. 352, 378, 389, 398-99.
^^Staughton Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225-50. See 
section 3 of Chapter 7 below.
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stipulation requiring all treaties be approved by two-thirds 
of the Senate. The Southerners inserted this provision, 
according to Hugh Williamson of North Carolina, "for the ex­
press purpose of preventing a majority of the Senate . . . 
from giving up the Mississippi." Jay himself finally capitu­
lated in September of 1788, when he recommended that "negotia­
tions pass over in their present state to the new government." 
One of the final acts of the Confederation Congress was to 
repeal Jay’s August 29 instructions with a resolve that "the 
free navigation of the River Mississippi is a clear and essen­
tial right of the United States, and ought to be considered 
and supported as such."^^
The Spaniards were angered and frustrated by their narrow 
defeat, and grew even more determined to prevent American 
growth in the Old Southwest. They definitely changed their 
policy, however: "They begin to be convinced," wrote James
White of North Carolina, "the western country, are rather to 
be restrained by benevolence than violence." Faced with dead­
locked negotiations and continuous pressure from the western 
settlers, the Spaniards in 1788 reopened the Mississippi to
Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 404-407; Lynd, "Com­
promise of 1787," p. 235; Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, 
p. 77; Jensen, New Nation, p. 73; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 
p. 60; Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:417; 
Madison to Jefferson, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental 
Congress. VIII:560, 799; Philbrick, Rise of the West, p. 173; 
Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 680; Williamson to Madison, 
June 2, 1788, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress. 
VIII:746; Mast, "Hugh Henry Brackenridge and the Mississippi 
Question," p. 383.
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Americans, stopped encouraging Indian raids, and offered to let 
Americans settle in Spanish territory with freedom of religion 
and no taxation or military service. In return, the Spaniards 
asked the immigrants to pledge allegiance to, and become citi­
zens of, Spain. Through a liberal immigration policy and an 
open Mississippi, the Spaniards hoped to win the western Ameri­
cans* loyalty, create an anti-American buffer state in the Old 
Southwest, and thus halt further encroachments from the United 
States of America. Several western Americans encouraged the 
Spanish in their new policy. Congressmen John Brown and James 
White of Kentucky and Tennessee, as well as John Sevier, James 
Robertson, and General James Wilkinson all listened attentively 
to Spanish overtures, and probably offered support. But their 
actions seem to have been motivated more by desire for trading 
privileges (in New Orleans) than loyalty to the Spanish govern­
ment. Most Westerners were surely unwilling to exchange Ameri­
can rule for that of an autocratic Spanish regime. The so- 
called "Spanish conspiracy" of the late 1780s and 1790s died 
for lack of popular support.
European diplomacy ultimately combined with American 
expansion and Spanish setbacks in the Old Southwest to bring
For the "Spanish conspiracy" of the late 1780s and 
1790s, see Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, pp. 78-122; 
Thomas Perkins Abernethy treats this subject in From Frontier 
to Plantation in Tennessee. See also Philbrick, Rise of the 
West, pp. 175-76, 180; James White to Samuel Johnston, April, 
1788, in Burnett, Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII: 
724; Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier, p. 80; Horsman, 
Formative Years, pp. 15-16; Bemis, Diplomatic History of the 
United States, pp. 81, 106.
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about a victory for the United States in the Mississippi 
affair. Historians Samuel Flagg Bemis and Arthur P. Whit­
taker are at odds over just what caused the Spanish about- 
face.^^ While Bemis points to Spain's European entanglements 
and problems with Great Britain, Whittaker insists that the 
pressure of American western settlement forced the Spanish 
to make concessions. There is evidence to support either 
hypothesis. As always, Spain and Great Britain were at odds 
in Europe. When, in 1790, Spain and Britain clashed in the 
Nootka Sound incident, war between the two seemed imminent. 
Strangely, the Spanish were very concerned lest the Americans 
ally with Great Britain to defeat them. Evidently the Span­
ish were not fully aware of the deteriorating relations 
between the United States and Great Britain which resulted 
from Jay's disastrous treaty in 1794. When the United States 
sent Thomas Pinckney to negotiate with Spain in 1795, he 
arrived at exactly the right psychological moment. The 
Spanish minister Godoy was so afraid of Great Britain he was 
willing to pay any price for American friendship. At the same 
time, the Spanish in the Old Southwest were daily feeling the 
pressure from advancing American settlement. They must have 
realized that the westward movement of the United States 
could not be contained much longer without war. The result 
of these two simultaneous developments was a treaty beyond
For the Bemis-Whittaker debate, see their respective 
works cited above. The debate is treated in Ferrell, Amer­
ican Diplomacy, pp. 73-77.
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the Americans' greatest expectations. The Treaty of San 
Lorenzo (also known as Pinckney's Treaty of 1795) recognized 
the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1783. The United 
States received a southern boundary of 31®, a western bound­
ary on the Mississippi River, and the right to navigate the 
entire length of that river with a port of deposit at New 
Orleans. The Old Southwest remained uneasy for several 
years, but the die was cast. In 1803, twenty years after 
the Treaty of Paris had started the conflict, the United States 
purchased the Louisiana Territory and gained sole possession 
of the Mississippi R i v e r . D e s p i t e  the ill-advised diplomatic 
efforts of John Jay and the reluctant expansionists from the 
Northeastern United States, one more obstacle had been con­
quered in the American trek westward.
The Mississippi River Debate is thus an important subject 
in the study of Confederation politics and the creation of the 
first American western policy. In viewing the Jay controversy, 
one can see the sectional basis of Congressional politics, and 
the importance of the West in the opposing viewpoints of the 
Southern and Eastern parties in the Confederation Congress.
As differences over western policy split the South and the 
Northeast, so too did they divide the Nationalist party of 
those two regions. Not until Southern and Eastern Nationalists
^^Biilington, Westward Expansion, pp. 223, 230, 235; 
Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, pp. 104-105, 
107; Philbrick, Rise of the West, pp. 193-94; Ferrell, Ameri­
can Diplomacy, p. 73; Whittaker, Spanish-American Frontier.
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reached an agreement over a western policy--over questions 
such as American navigation of the Mississippi River--would 
the Nationalist front ever unite to form a strong centralized 
national g o v e r n m e n t . A n d  this would not happen until July 
of 1787, when the Confederation Congress drafted a territorial 
government law for the western territories--the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787.
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 352, 378, 389, 398-99.
CHAPTER VII
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN COLONIAL SYSTEM: 
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787
Some of our fellow-citizens may think we 
are not yet able to conduct our affairs and 
consult our interests, but if our society 
is rude, much wisdom is not necessary to 
supply our wants, and a fool can sometimes 
put on his clothes better than a wise man 
can do it for him. . . .
Western Virginia statehood advocates' 
petition, December 9, 1783
In Congress, since my coming, we have 
passed an Ordinance for establishing a 
temporary government beyond the Ohio for 
the more perfect security of peace and 
property among the rude people who will 
probably be the first settlers there--The 
form of government, as you will see by the 
enclosed paper, is much more tonic than our 
democratic forms on the Atlantic are.
Richard Henry Lee to Colonel Henry Lee, ,
July 30, 1787^
George Bancroft once described the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 as an American state paper second in importance only
2to the Federal Constitution. The Northwest Ordinance formed 
the heart of the United States colonial system throughout the
Frontpiece vignettes are from Turner, "Western State- 
Making," 1:252-53; Richard Henry Lee to Colonel Henry Lee (?), 
July 30, 1787 in Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 11:430,
2Bancroft, Formation of the Constitution.
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late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and served as the 
governmental basis for the American continental empire. For 
nearly a century and a half after its passage, the Ordinance 
of 1787 received unanimous praise from American leaders and 
historians. It was hailed as a magnificent creation, respon­
sible for spreading democratic institutions over the North 
American continent. Within the past fifty years, however, an 
historiographical debate has arisen over the Northwest Ordi­
nance which is as stimulating as it is diverse.
The assault on the Northwest Ordinance came from what 
can be described as a 'second generation' of Progressive his­
torians. In the late 1930s Theodore Pease argued in the 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review that the Ordinance of 
1787 was not a democratic document at all, but rather auto­
cratic and authoritarian. Merrill Jensen documented this 
thesis in his writings about the Confederation period, as 
have John D. Barnhart, Francis Philbrick, and Julian P. Boyd. 
These men point to Thomas Jefferson and David Howell's gov­
ernmental Ordinance of 1784 as the truly democratic document 
of territorial government. The 1784 Ordinance, they say, was 
repudiated in 1787 and replaced by the Northwest Ordinance, 
which "furnished immediately a government that was altogether
3unrepresentative and undemocratic."
Pease, "Ordinance of 1787," pp. 167-180; Jensen, New 
Nation ; Barnhart, Valley of Democracy; Francis S. Philbrick, 
The Laws of Illinois Territory. 1808-1818 (Springfield, 1950), 
introduction to Volume XXV; Philbrick, Rise of the West;
Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, p. 7.
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More recently the detractors of the Ordinance of 1787 
have been put on the defensive by two historians from the 
University of Wisconsin who have written about the Ordinance 
in a more favorable light. Robert Berkhofer, Jr. and Jack 
Eblen contend the change from Jefferson’s 1784 plan to that 
of 1787 was a natural evolution brought about by the exi­
gencies of the frontier situation. They argue that if the 
new system was colonial, it was only temporarily so; the 
territories all gained sovereignty in the course of time.
Eblen insists, "politically controversial or deceitful mo­
tives" cannot be attributed to the framers of the Northwest 
Ordinance :
Their contribution to the Ordinance of 1787 
did not emanate foremost from a desire 
either to further or frustrate whatever demo­
cratic tendencies there were on the frontier,
but from their perception of what would con­
stitute the most viable system of colonial 
government for the Empire in the West.4
Both sides in this historiographical debate agree that a 
change occurred from 1784 to 1787, but here the agreement ends
and the conflicting value judgments begin. Jensen and company
say the change was abrupt, undemocratic, and therefore bad. 
Eblen and Berkhofer say it was a natural evolution, practical.
Jack E. Eblen, The First and Second United States Empires. 
Governors, and Territorial Government. 1784-1912 (Pittsburgh, 
1968), chapter 1; Eblen, "Origins of the United States Colonial 
System: The Ordinance of 1787," Wisconsin Magazine of History 
LX (Summer 1968); Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial 
System," pp. 231-62; Berkhofer, "Northwest Ordinance," pp. 45- 
55. I, for one, would like to have been a 'mouse in the cor­
ner' when these theses were presented at a Merrill Jensen 
seminar at the University of Wisconsin.
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and therefore good. There is evidence to support either posi­
tion. While the change in Ordinances led to an undemocratic 
and arbitrary territorial government, it certainly was the 
product of a natural evolution in that direction. The revi­
sionists are probably correct in their assertion that the 
change was 'best' for all concerned, but that is beside the 
point (as Eblen has shown, most Westerners ignored the Ordi­
nance of 1787 anyivay, thus nullifying whatever impact it might 
have had). The purpose here is not to impose value judgments, 
but rather provide some notion of the political environment 
that produced the Northwest Ordinance of 1787--to view the 
Northwest Ordinance in the political context of the 1780s.
The basic division over the Ordinance of 1787, as in all 
Congressional debates over western policy, was between the 
Northeast (or the "East" as it was called in the 1780s) and 
the South. The Southerners were optimistic about expansion, 
and favored a democratic territorial government that would 
lead to new western states. The Easterners, especially the 
Nationalists, were not so optimistic. They believed in a 
strong, nationally-controlled territorial government. They 
wanted to limit the number of western states, and establish 
a strong federal presence in the trans-Appalachian frontier. 
Sometimes the Eastern Nationalists had to compromise with the 
Southerners, but as the South came to adopt a more 'national' 
political perspective in the middle and late 1780s, the 
Northeasterners encountered less opposition to their plans 
for the West. Prior to 1787, the Eastern Nationalists created
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an Indian and land policy, and conducted diplomacy aimed at 
an orderly, federally-supervised westward advance. The North­
west Ordinance of 1787, with several compromises, was the 
culmination of the Eastern Nationalist western policy.
The Northwest Ordinance was a direct manifestation of 
the political environment of the day. Indeed, attitudes towards 
the West mirror the political ideology of Americans during the 
waning days of the Confederation. A plan for an autocratic 
colonial government in the West was the natural product of a 
nation that yearned for a more powerful and centralized na­
tional government.^ As national political attitudes grew more 
conservative, so too did attitudes towards the West. Yet there 
are seeming contradictions in the history of the Ordinance of 
1787. Why, for instance, did a Southern-controlled Congress 
unanimously pass what was essentially an Eastern Nationalist 
governmental Ordinance for the western territories? During 
the 1780s it was always the Southern block that opposed the 
Eastern plans for the frontier, and the Jay-Gardoqui contro­
versy of 1786 had split the Congress so thoroughly that com­
promise seemed impossible. Why then did a Southern Congress 
pass the Northwest Ordinance of 1787--a document which, among 
other things, permanently outlawed the institution of slavery 
in the territory north of the Ohio River? The answer to this
Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial System," 
p. 260; Arbitrary government during the initial stages of 
settlement, according to Berkhofer, "reflected the political 
currents of the day favoring centralization of government."
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puzzle lies in the political context of the time--in the 
Southern drift towards Nationalism and in the intricate and 
confusing relationship between the Confederation Congress and 
the Constitutional Convention meeting concurrently during the 
Spring and Summer of 1787. By viewing the political events 
that led to the "Compromise of 1787,"^ one can see that the 
debate over the West not only reflected the Nationalist 
ascendency in Confederation politics, but was a catalyst for 
the triumph of Nationalism in the Federal Constitution of 1787,
Shall [the territorial governments] be upon 
colonial principles, under a governor, 
council, and judges of the United States re­
movable at a certain period of time and they 
admitted to a vote in Congress with the 
rights of other states, or shall they be 
left to themselves until that event? 7James Monroe, 1786
Following the American Revolution most agreed that some 
sort of government was necessary to establish order in the 
West and administer the affairs of that country. The focus 
of this essay will be the evolution of a governmental ordi­
nance for the West in the Confederation Congress. However,
Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225-250; Henderson, Party 
Politics, pp. 408-20. Lynd’s thesis that the Northwest Ordi­
nance was the result of a compromise between North and South 
in the Confederation Congress and the Constitutional Convention 
figures importantly in Henderson's interpretation, and will 
be treated at length in section 3 of this essay.
7Jensen, New Nation, p. 35 8.
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Congress was not the only body attempting to provide govern­
ment for the trans-Appalachian frontier. The history of the 
1780s is full of instances of Westerners forming states, 
writing constitutions, and creating their own governments. 
Congress notwithstanding. Many western settlers took Thomas 
Jefferson literally when he wrote that Americans everywhere 
possessed "a right which nature has given all men, of . . . 
going in quest of new habitations and there establishing new 
societies under such laws and regulations as to them shall 
seem most likely to promote public happniess." Of the numerous 
proposed western states, Vandalia, Transylvania, Westylvania, 
and Franklin are best known. The Ohio country actually had a 
"squatter governor" in 1787, and as early as 1785 Kentuckians 
wefe clamouring for independence, statehood, and their own 
government. Yet none of these statehood movements could suc­
ceed without approval of the Confederation Congress. With the 
creation of the National Domain in 1784, most Americans turned 
to Congress to see what provisions would be made for govern-
Oment in the West.
OTurner, "Western State-Making," provides a good survey 
of the various western statehood movements. Ibid., p. 267. 
For the state of Franklin, see Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From 
Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee (Birmingham, Alabama, 
1932); Randolph C. Downes, "Ohio’s Squatter Governor: William 
Hogland of Hoglandstown," Ohio Archeological and Historical 
Quarterly XLII (April 1934): 273-82. See Caleb Wallace (Ken­
tucky) to James Madison, July 12, 1785, in Hunt, Writings of 
James Madison, 11:149, "We conceive the people of this Dis­
trict do not at present enjoy a greater portion of Liberty 
than an American colony might have done a few years ago had 
she been allowed a Representative in the British parliament."
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Philbrick, Rise of the West, p. 88.
Many men have been credited with the creation of the 
American system of territorial government--Thomas Jefferson, 
David Howell, Timothy Pickering, Rufus King, James Monroe, 
Edward Carrington, Manasseh Cutler, and Nathan Dane, to name 
the most prominent. Yet no one man was responsible for the 
process that culminated in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 
That document was a product of evolution-- an evolution that 
began with the British imperial government in colonial America 
During the Revolutionary era Americans became quite aware of 
the dangers of colonial administration, and after declaring
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independence, many agreed that the territories in the trans- 
Appalachian West should eventually be granted statehood and 
sovereignty. The Dickinson draft of the Articles of Confed­
eration and Jefferson’s draft of the Virginia state constitu­
tion both called for "free and independent states" in the 
West, and the Virginia cession of the Ohio country to Congress 
stipulated that the region be divided into numerous small 
states to join the Union eventually with equal rights. Al­
though Congress squabbled for seven years over the Virginia 
cession, it did agree on a resolution stating.
That the unappropriated lands that may be 
ceded or relinquished to the United States 
by any particular State . . . shall be dis­
posed of for the common benefit of the 
United States and be settled and formed in­
to distinct republican States which shall 
become members of the federal union, and 
have the same rights of sovereignty, free­
dom, and independence as other states.^
Yet not all Americans agreed that new states should be 
created in the West. The above resolution barely received a 
majority of votes. And even those who favored new western 
states disagreed as to how they should be governed and incor­
porated into the Confederation. How many states should Con­
gress create in the West? What sort of territorial government 
should they have? Were the settlers to run their own affairs, 
or would Congress exercise temporary jurisdiction? How long 
would they have to wait for admission into the Confederacy?
^Bestor, "Settlement of the West," pp. 13-44; Berkhofer, 
"Northwest Ordinance, pp. 45-55.
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Congress debated all of these questions in the early 1780s, 
and various governmental proposals emerged. Thomas Paine, 
Peletiah Webster, Theodoric Bland, Alexander Hamilton, and 
Timothy Pickering devised some of the more notable plans.
With temporary approval of the Virginia cession in the Spring 
of 1784, the Confederation Congress gained jurisdiction over 
a huge public domain in the trans-montane West. Now Congress 
had to act. In a letter to an Indian affairs committee,
George Washington warned that the West was being overrun by 
"lawless Banditti" who would soon cause an Indian war. Order 
must be established immediately in that region, warned Wash­
ington. Thus, on March 1, 1784 (the same day the Virginia 
cession was accepted), Congress appointed Thomas Jefferson to 
head a committee to draw an Ordinance of government for the 
western territories.^^
The Ordinance of 1784,^^ drafted by Thomas Jefferson and 
David Howell and approved by Congress on April 23, 1784, was 
a radical document. It proposed to divide the trans-Appalachian 
West into fourteen new states, all eligible for eventual admis­
sion into the Confederation. The period of federal supervision 
would last only until the Westerners formed their own territorial
For early territorial government proposals, see section 1 
of Chapter 5, above. Also, Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. 
Territorial System." Most of the early governmental plans are 
in Hulbert, Ohio in the Confederation. George Washington to 
James Duane (Indian Affairs chairman)', September 7, 1783, in 
Sparks, Writings of George Washington, VIII:477-484.
l^For the Ordinance of 1784, see section 2 of Chapter 3
above.
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government, and there was no minimum population requirement 
for organization of those governments. The Ordinance called 
for local control during the entire territorial process and 
allowed admission into the Union when the respective states' 
populations reached that of the smallest of the original 
thirteen states (Delaware--60,000 in 1790). Congress defeated 
Jefferson's provision abolishing slavery in the territories 
(by one vote), yet the Ordinance of 1784 provided for white 
male suffrage long before any of the seaboard states legislated 
such a reform. A study of the Ordinance of 1784 leaves the 
impression that Jefferson and Howell were not so worried about 
the "lawless Banditti" of the frontier as some of their contem­
poraries .
Although the Ordinance of 1784 passed on April 23, it re­
mained a dead letter until replaced by the Northwest Ordinance 
three years later. Why was not the Ordinance of 1784 put into 
effect? The most obvious reason is that Congress did not 
exercise firm control over the West from 1783-1787. Indian 
hostilities, the tardiness of land surveys and sales, and Con­
gressional financial straits all prevented implementation of 
Jefferson and Howell's Ordinance. More important, there was 
still serious disagreement over just how great a role the 
national government should play in the western territories.
Ibid. The best discussions of the Ordinance of 1784 
are the "Editorial Note," in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, VII; 
Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial System;" and 
Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, chapter 1.
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Many Eastern congressmen voted for the *84 plan mainly because
it met the requirements of the Virginia cession. These men
wanted to decrease the number of new states and put some muscle
into the law by adding federal controls. In April, Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts had succeeded in amending the Ordinance
of 1784, to wit:
Measures not inconsistent with the principles 
of the Confederation, and necessary for the 
preservation of peace and good order among 
the settlers in any of the said new states, 
until they shall assume a temporary govern­
ment as aforesaid, may from time to time be 
taken by the United States in Congress as­
sembled.
This amendment did not greatly affect the democratic tone of 
the Ordinance, however. Since there was no minimum requirement 
for the formation of "temporary government," the period of na­
tional control would not be very long. But a movement to in­
crease the amount of federal control over the West had definitely 
begun.  ̂̂
Ironically, many Americans in 1785 felt a curious sense of 
identification with Great Britain's colonial problems. Congress 
faced a double-edged sword: If, on the one hand, federal super­
vision of the West was too weak, lawlessness and anarchy would 
prevail; or worse, the Westerners might start a war with Britain 
or Spain. Yet if Congressional rule was too strict, the West­
erners might revolt and declare themselves independent, just as
*J *7Peterson, Jefferson and the New Nation, p. 278; Eblen, 
First and Second Û1 Si Empires, p. 26; Boyd, Papers of Je^ffer- 
son, VI; Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial System," 
p. 253.
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the seaboard states had done nine years earlier. Most Ameri­
cans in the 1780s agreed that transplanting republican insti­
tutions in the West was going to be a tricky business. But 
they differed greatly over how the transplantation was to take 
place.
The basic division over the West fit into the sectional 
context of Confederation politics. The Southern delegates 
were much more optimistic about the prospects of westward ex­
pansion than their Northeastern colleagues. Most Southerners 
supported the Ordinance of 1784 and Jefferson’s Land Ordinance 
of 1784. They opposed the first draft of the Land Ordinance 
of 17 85 and John Jay’s attempt to surrender American use of 
the Mississippi River for twenty-five years. The Southern 
faction wanted to admit numerous new western states into the 
Confederacy as soon as possible, but their motives were based 
more on political considerations than noble agrarian premises. 
During the 1780s the West was being populated mostly by South­
ern pioneers in Tennessee, Kentucky, and southern Ohio. Thus 
Southern leaders fully expected the new western states to sup­
port the South in the sectional politics of the Confederation
_ 15Congress.
Easterners, almost to the man, agreed with this view of
^^Eblen, First and Second U, S. Empires, pp. 28, 47; 
Theodore Pease, "The Ordinance of 1787," p. 176.
1 ̂ Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 408-20; Lynd, "Compro­
mise of 1787," pp. 229-30.
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the potential political loyalties of the new western states,
Rufus King of Massachusetts believed that, in the Ordinance
of 1784, "Congress had impoliticly laid [the West] out into
ten States. . . .  It is possible then that if this plan be
persisted in by Cong^, 10 new votes may be added. . ."to
the Southern faction in Congress. Although some Northeasterners
entertained hopes that at least one of the western states would
adopt "Eastern politics," most were pessimistic. They wanted
to reduce potential states and postpone their admission into
the Confederation as long as possible. Politics was not their
only rationale. Many Easterners saw the West as a potential
economic threat--an escape for those who would otherwise man
the factories and shops of the East. Westward expansion, they
reasoned, would lead to higher wages, lower land prices, and
competition in the form of a viable Mississippi River commerce.
Mr. George Clymer, a Nationalist from Pennsylvania,
thought the encouragement of the Western 
Country was suicide on the old States. If 
the States have such different interests 
that they cannot be left to regulate their 
manufactures without encountering the inter­
ests of other States, it is a proof that they 
are not fit to compose one nation.16
Many Easterners could not understand why anyone would want 
to leave the seaboard states to settle in the wild frontier.
Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 408-409; Rufus King in 
Adrienne Koch, ed., Notes on the Debates in the Federal Conven­
tion of 1787 Reported by James Madison (Athens, Ohio, 1966), 
p. 457; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, pp. 26.28; 
Peterson, Jefferson and the New Nation, p. 284; George Clymer 
in Madison, Notes on the Debates, p. 545.
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They were puzzled by the "half-savage" pioneers, and deeply 
disturbed about their propensity for starting Indian wars.
Constrictionists like Samuel Meredith of Pennsylvania be­
lieved, "it would prove a happiness to all settled parts of 
the Country if the Ohio were the boundary for a Number of 
years." Most Northeasterners, however, took a more pragmatic 
view. If westward expansion was indeed inevitable, then it 
would have to be closely supervised and regulated by the na­
tional government. Those who advocated an increased role for 
the central government, the Nationalists, pointed to the West 
as a prime example of the need for an expanded federal role. 
Consequently, the Eastern Nationalists in Congress began a 
movement to tighten national controls over the West. Their 
first priority was to reduce the number of projected western 
states, and make their admission into the Union more difficult. 
As Congress began to revise Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784, the 
Easterners found they had an effective, if unwitting, ally in 
young James Monroe of Virginia. It was in August of 1785 that
Monroe set out on horseback for a five month fact-finding tour
17of the Northwest territory.
It is in effect to be a Colonial Govt, 
similar to that w^ prevail'd in these States 
previous to the Revolution with this remark­
able and important difference, that when
l^Samuel Meredith to Thomas Fitzsimmons, 1787 in Burnett, 
Letters of the Continental Congress, VIII:513; Jay A. Barrett, 
Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 33.
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such district shall contain the number of the 
least numerous of the "13 original States for 
the time being" they shall be admitted into 
the Confederacy.
James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson
May 11, 1786
I have the honor to inclose to you an 
Ordinance that we have just passed in Con­
gress for establishing a temporary Govern­
ment beyond the Ohio, as a measure prepatory 
to the sale of Lands. It seemed necessary 
for the security of property among the uni­
formed and perhaps licentious people as the 
greater part of those who go there are, that 
a strong-toned government should exist, and 
the rights of property be clearly defined.
Richard Henry Lee to George Washington
July 15, 178718
James Monroe was twenty-eight years old when he went West 
in the summer of 1785. During his tour, Monroe saw much of 
the Ohio country, interviewed settlers and military commandants, 
and he even sat in on some Indian treaty negotiations. While 
out West, Monroe formed some opinions about that region, some 
of them astute and some rather strange. He returned in Decem­
ber and wrote Thomas Jefferson, "My several routes westw^, with 
the knowledge of the Country I have there obtain'd, have im­
pressed me fully with a conviction of the impolicy of our mea-
19sures respecting it."
18James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, May 11, 1786, in 
Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, 1:126-27; Richard Henry 
Lee to George Washington, July 15, 1787, in Burnett, Letters 
of the Continental Congress, VIII:620.
^^Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787. p. 33; 
Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 651; Monroe to Jefferson, 
January, 1786 in Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, 1:117-18.
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Monroe's observations were twofold. First of all, he 
felt the federal presence in the West should be increased 
during the initial stages of territorial government. He was 
"clearly of the opinion that to many of the most important 
objects of a federal government their interests, if not 
oppos’d, will be but little connected with ours." He there­
fore advocated a strong national presence, making the West 
"subservient to our purposes." Secondly, Monroe thought the 
number of states should be decreased;
A great part of the territory is miserably 
poor, especially near the lakes Michigan §
Erie § that upon the Mississippi § the Illi­
nois consists of extensive plains w" have 
not had from appearances § will not have a 
single bush on them for ages. The districts
therefore within wh these fall will perhaps
never contain.a sufficient number of Inhabi­
tants to entitle them to membership in the 
Confederacy, and in the mean time, the peo­
ple who may settle within them will be gov'd 
by the resolutions of Congress in w they 
will not be represented. . . .
Why Monroe thought a "great part" of the Ohio and Mississippi
valley was a 'barren plain' unable to support a substantial
agricultural population is puzzling. Yet his call for fewer
states had some credence. As a Southerner, Monroe wanted
western states incorporated into the Union as soon as possible.
Jefferson's proposed states were so small that it would take a
long time for them to equal the population of the smallest of
the thirteen original states (Delaware in 1786). To be sure,
the Jefferson-Howell grid would provide many more western
votes, but not for a long time, and "perhaps never. . . . "
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Monroe was evidently willing to sacrifice long-term advantage 
for more immediate benefits. Thus he recommended Virginia 
change its cession and Congress redivide the Northwest terri­
tory, provided "that the s^ territory be divided into not
2 0less than two nor more than five States."
By 1786 most Congressmen believed that the Confederation 
government should play a more powerful role in the western 
territorial governments. This development paralleled growing 
Nationalist attempts to increase the overall powers of the 
central government. At the same time most Congressmen, North­
eastern and Southern, believed that the number of projected 
states in the West should be reduced. Their motivations, how­
ever, were diametrically opposed. The South wanted to reduce 
the number of new states in order to expedite their admission. 
The Northeast wanted to decrease the number in order to lessen 
their future political muscle. Since the question of just how 
and when new western states would be admitted into the
7 0Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 33; 
Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 651; Peterson, Jefferson and 
the New Nation, p. 284; Monroe to Jefferson, January 19, 1786, 
in Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe. 1:117-18. This letter 
is of vital importance in understanding the evolution of the 
Northwest Ordinance. See also Monroe to Jefferson, May 11, 
1786, in Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe. 1:126-27. The 
state land cessions, particularly Virginia's, figured impor­
tantly in all discussions of future states in the West. The 
Virginians stipulated that numerous states (ISO miles square) 
be erected in the West. Otherwise their deed of cession was 
null and void. That is why Monroe tried to persuade Virginia 
to change the cession--for unless they did there could be no 
public domain, much less a governmental ordinance. Although 
Congress accepted the Virginia cession in March of 1784, it was 
not until 1786 that Virginia changed the cession to conform to 
the new Congressional standards. Thus the cession controversy 
actually dragged on for 10 years.
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Confederacy had not yet arisen, a rather artificial unity 
existed on the issue of territorial government. Nearly all 
the members of Congress agreed that changes were necessary, 
and this unity led to the passage of an April resolution, by
Nathan Dane of Massachusetts, calling for appointment of a
21new committee to rewrite the Ordinance of 1784.
The new committee on territorial government, consisting 
of James Monroe (chairman), William Samuel Johnson, John Kean,
Charles Pinckney, and Rufus King, issued its report on May 9,
2 21786. Much of this May 9 report survived one and a half 
years of debate to constitute the governmental articles and 
part of the articles of compact of the Northwest Ordinance of
1787. The Monroe report provided a constitution for western
territorial government. The governmental structure was quite
similar to the British colonial governments of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. The May 9 report applied only to
the ceded lands of the Old Northwest, and made them into one
2 3governmental unit until three to five states were formed.
To summarize, the road to statehood passed through two stages 
of governmental evolution. The first stage was unrepresentative.
^^Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 37.
7 7 Monroe's May 9 report is in Journals of the Continental 
Congress. XXX:251-55. Two Eastern Nationalists, Johnson and 
King, served on the Monroe committee.
^^Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 39: "It was
partially to gain the initiative and forestall attempts to 
reduce the number of states to two that Monroe had introduced 
his proposal in 1786 for a three to five way division of the 
territory."
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The territory was to be governed by a congressionally appointed 
governor, assisted by a secretary, council, and court of three 
judges. In this first stage, the territorial governor had 
absolute executive and legislative authority. The second, 
"representative" stage began when the population of the terri­
tory reached 500. In this stage the residents could elect an 
assembly (with one representative for every fifty people) 
and send one non-voting representative to Congress. Voters 
and officials had to own property to vote and serve. This 
stage was similar to the British system in that the territorial 
governor had an unqualified veto on all legislation and convene, 
prorogue, and dissolve the assembly at will. The new state
could not be admitted into the Confederacy until its population
2 Sreached that of the smallest of the original thirteen states.
Congress did not act on the Monroe report during the Spring 
of 1786, During this interlude some interesting correspondence 
occurred between Monroe and Thomas Jefferson, who was serving as 
American minister to France. Monroe sent Jefferson a copy of 
the proposed Ordinance, assuring him "The most important princi­
ples of the Act of Annapolis [the Ordinance of 1784] are you 
observe preserv’d in this report." In an emotional reply of 
July 9, Jefferson disagreed with his friend and defended the
Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 652. The 500 popula­
tion minimum for the second stage and the representative ratio 
(1:50) were not in the May 9 report but were added as amend­
ments that summer.
^^Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, pp. 29-32; Berk­
hofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial System," p. 256;
Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," p. 234.
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1784 plan. His objections to the May 9 report centered around 
the proposed decrease in the number of western states, Jeffer­
son and others adhered to Montesquieu’s basic tenet that re­
publican institutions could flourish only in areas small enough 
to preserve the homogeneity of interests and lifestyles of the 
inhabitants. Jefferson feared that powerful, centralized, i.e.. 
non-republican governments would be necessary to administrate 
the affairs of large territories. Thus, to Jefferson's rea­
soning, the Westerners "will not only be happier in states of
moderate size, but it is the only way in which they can exist
as a regular society." If Congress encouraged, temporarily or 
permanently, authoritarian regimes in the West, "They will end 
by separating from our Confederacy and becoming its enemies."
In conclusion, he stated,
Upon the [1784] plan we treat them as fellow
citizens. They will have a just share in
their own government, they will love us, and 
pride themselves in an union with us. Upon 
the latter [the May 9 report] we treat them 
as subjects, we govern them, and not they 
themselves; they will abhor us as masters 
and break off from us in defiance.26
Monroe to Jefferson, May 11, 1786, in Hamilton, Writings 
of James Monroe, 1:126-27; Jefferson to Monroe, July 9, 1786, 
in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson. IX:112-13; Berkhofer, "Origins of 
the U. S. Territorial System," pp. 244, 257-60. Berkhofer con­
tends that too much emphasis has been placed on this letter. 
Furthermore, "all the letters usually cited to prove Jefferson’s 
opposition to extension of Congressional authority during the 
early stages of government, when read in the context of his 
ideological geography, refer more to the proposed alteration in 
the size of the new states than to the nature of their govern­
ment." I believe the size of states directly affects their 
government, temporarily or permanently, "in the context of his 
[Jefferson’s] ideological geography." Boyd, Papers of Jeffer­
son. XVII:163.
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Jefferson’s letter had not yet arrived when James Monroe 
himself began to have some reservations about the progress of 
the territorial question. Indeed, by July of 1786 Monroe was 
convinced that his May 9 report had, if anything, opened Pan­
dora’s Box. Monroe’s apprehensions were kindled by the Jay- 
Gardoqui negotiations over the Mississippi River in the Spring
and Summer of 1786 which precipitated a Northeast-South split
2 7in Congress over western policy. Whereas both sections had 
earlier agreed that the number of potential western states 
should be reduced, it was now apparent that their motivations 
had been quite different. William Grayson of Virginia attempted, 
in July of 1786, to amend the May 9 report so as to allow for a 
minimum of five states in the Old Northwest, but the weight in 
Congress had shifted to the Northeast. New committee appointments 
gave the Easterners a majority on the territorial government com­
mittee, and rumor had it the new members planned to make the 
statehood provision even more prohibitive. Monroe felt he had 
been betrayed, and wrote Jefferson that the Easterners,
manifested a desire to rescind every thing 
they have heretofore done in it, particularly 
to increase the number of Inhabitants which 
shod entitle such States to admission into 
the Confederacy § to make it depend on their 
having one 13tn. part of the free inhabitants 
of the U.S. This with some other instruc­
tions they wish to impose on them evinces 
plainly the policy of these men to keep them 
out of the Confederacy a l t o g e t h e r . 28
^^Lynd, ’’Compromise of 1787,” p. 235.
7 RBarrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 39;
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Monroe even went so far as to suggest that the May 9 re­
port be discarded and the territorial question be left "upon 
the ground of April 23^ 1784" [the Ordinance of 1784]. By 
mid-summer of 1786 the Northeast-South breach seemed irrepa­
rable. The animosity between Virginia and Massachusetts was 
particularly intense. Monroe advised Jefferson,
The Massach. delegates . . . are without ex­
ception the most illiberal I have ever seen 
from that State. Two of these men whose 
names are Dane and King are elected for the 
next year. . . . The former is I believe 
honest but the principles of the latter I 
doubt.
This conflict directly affected the territorial government
Ordinance, which "hath not been decided on 8 hath only been
postpon'd in consequence of the inordinate schemes of some
men alluded to as to the whole policy of the aff^s of that
country." Thus, when Monroe left Congress in late summer of
1786 he had good reason to regret having ever been involved
29in the territorial question.
The new Northeastern committee on territorial government,
consisting of William Samuel Johnson (chairman), Melancton
Smith, Charles Pinckney, John Henry, and Nathan Dane issued a
30new report on September 19, 1786. Using Monroe's May 9
Bancroft, Formation of the Constitution, pp. 280-81; Monroe 
to Jefferson, July 16, 1786 in Hamilton, Writings of James 
Monroe. 1:140-42.
29Monroe to Jefferson, July 16, 1786 in Hamilton, Writ­
ings of James Monroe, 1:141-42.
3f)Journals o f  the C ont inen ta l  Congress, XXXI :699-703;
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report as a basis, the new committee made some innovations 
that greatly broadened the nature of the Ordinance. Eastern 
Nationalist Nathan Dane’s legal skills are evident in the 
verbiage of the document. He wrote provisions for equal 
conveyance of estates (land inheritance), obligation of con­
tracts, property rights, and what amounted to a territorial 
bill of rights guaranteeing religious freedom, jury trial, 
and habeas corpus. But the committee also moved to slow down 
the statehood evolution. It raised Monroe’s 500 minimum popu­
lation requirement for the second stage to 5,000, and changed 
the representative ratio from 1:50 to 1:5000. Most important, 
the Northeasterners increased the population requirement for 
statehood to one-thirteenth of the population of the original 
states, provided ’’the consent of so many states in Congress is 
first obtained as may at that time be competent to such admis­
sion.” The first part of the new statehood provision would 
have kept Michigan out of the Union until after 18 80, and 
Wisconsin until 1900. And the second part of the new provision 
was so ambiguous that it would have enabled Congress to keep 
new western states out of the Union altogether.
The innovations of the Northeastern committee were so 
repugnant to the South that compromise was impossible during
Johnson, Henry, Smith, and Dane were from the Northeast. 
Johnson and Dane were Nationalists.
^^Ibid. Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787. 
pp. 42, 57; Lynd, ’’Compromise of 1787,” p. 234; Henderson, 
Party Politics, p. 409; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, 
p p . 34-35.
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the Fall of 1786. Southerners were concerned about the
western question, and Jefferson wrote Madison,
This measure, with the disposition to shut up 
the Mississippi give me serious apprehensions 
of the severance of the Eastern and the Western 
parts of our confederacy. It might have been 
made the interests of the Western states to 
remain united with us, by managing their inter­
ests honestly and for their own good. But the 
moment we sacrifice their interests to our own, 
they will see it better to govern themselves.
Seven months passed before Congress again resumed debate over 
the territorial Ordinance--but an eventful seven months at 
that. During the Winter of 1786-1787 the Jay-Gardoqui negotia­
tions over closure of the Mississippi River continued with no 
settlement and the Massachusetts state militia suppressed 
Shay’s Rebellion. Most important, the Nationalists succeeded 
in their campaign to replace the Articles of Confederation, 
and scheduled the Constitutional Convention to meet in May of
1787. Yet there was still no government for the western terri­
tories. In early Spring several memorials from the inhabitants 
of the Illinois country combined with renewed Southern interest
T Oto prod Congress into action once again.
On April 26, 1787 Congress re-read the September 19 report 
and reassigned it to a new committee also dominated by the
T  TNortheast. It submitted a new report on May 9, 1787, exactly 
one year after Monroe's original report. The governmental
32Jefferson to Madison, December 16, 1786, in Boyd, Papers 
of Jefferson. X:603; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, 
p. 36; Henderson, Party Politics, p. 410.
33Journals o f  the C ont inenta l  Congress, X X X I I : 281.
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provisions remained intact (indeed, they had not changed
noticeably since Monroe's first draft), but the Easterners
filled some loopholes and assigned specific terms of office
to territorial officials. Now the governor and judges were
to share the legislative function during the first stage,
and adopt the laws of one of the thirteen original states.
The report made the territories responsible for a share of
the federal debt and forbade higher taxes on nonresident
landowners. But in debate which probably took place May 10,
the Southerners succeeded in deleting the "one-thirteenth"
population requirement from the statehood clause.
Congress scheduled the Ordinance for a third reading and
a vote on May 11, but did not act on it again until July. One
reason for the inaction was that Congress had no quorum from
May 11 to July 4. The Constitutional Convention was meeting
35in Philadelphia and many Congressmen served in both bodies. 
Still, the basic reason for the failure to pass the territorial 
Ordinance was deadlock. Since the South defeated the "one- 
thirteenth" clause on May 10, the Ordinance had no statehood 
provision. Easterners and Southerners still could not agree 
on a method for admitting new states into the Union. Not 
until Congress reconvened in July was the Northwest Ordinance 
again taken up, and then it passed in just three days. But
Ibid.; Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787. 
43; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, pp. 36-37.
35B u rn e t t ,  C ont inenta l  Congress, p. 681.
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what happened between May and July? Why were the Congressmen 
able finally to complete the Ordinance over which they had 
haggled for three years?
Until recently, most historians have linked the passage 
of the Northwest Ordinance with the appearance in Congress of 
Rev. Manasseh Cutler, an agent for the Ohio Company of New 
England. The Ohio Company was comprised of a group of Eastern 
Revolutionary War officers who pooled thousands of military 
land bounties and petitioned Congress for 1 and 1/2 million 
acres in the Ohio Valley. They hoped to colonize the Ohio 
country and sell their lands for a substantial profit. The 
fact that nearly all Ohio Company members were Eastern Na­
tionalists who favored a 'corporate,' federally supervised 
mode of expansion (in the colonial New England tradition) has 
led many historians to hypothesize that the Ohio Company was 
responsible for the arbitrary nature of the governmental pro­
visions of the Northwest O r d i n a n c e . R e c e n t  scholarship, 
however, has taken much of the wind out of this "Ohio Company 
thesis." It appears the governmental provisions of the North­
west Ordinance were not altered substantially after Monroe's 
May 9, 1786 report. To be sure, the Ohio Company members 
found an autocratic territorial government much to their liking, 
But they cannot be credited with the drafting of such a govern­
ment, because much of the legislation was on record prior to
^^For this view, see Pease, "Ordinance of 1787," p. 167; 
and Jensen, New Nation, p. 358.
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Cutler’s arrival in New York in 1787.^^
While Manasseh Cutler was not solely responsible for the 
Northwest Ordinance, he did have a role in its passage. There 
is substantial evidence that Cutler met with Nathan Dane and 
others in July of 1787 to discuss government in the terri­
tories. The Ohio Company speculators were naturally interested 
in the territorial question, and Cutler wrote on July 10 that 
he had received a copy of the proposed Ordinance "with leave 
to make remarks and propose amendments." This amended copy of 
the Ordinance is in the Cutler family records, and it appears 
that Rev. Cutler was responsible for provisions of the articles 
of compact of the Northwest Ordinance relating to Indians, 
religion, and education. Thus Cutler played a minor role in 
the drafting of the Ordinance of 1787. However, the real im­
portance of Manasseh Cutler and the Ohio Company was in the 
passage of the Ordinance. Cutler’s offer, in behalf of the 
Ohio Associates, of hundreds of thousands of dollars was 
quite tempting to the bankrupt Confederation Congress, yet 
the Ohio Company made a territorial government a condition 
of purchase. Without a governmental Ordinance there could be 
no money. So the Ohio Company’s offer served as a spur to 
the reluctant Congress, pressuring them to reach a compromise. 
There were other more important motivations, however, and just 
how Congress reached a compromise will be discussed at length
37Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 37.
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7 Oin the final section of this essay.
For whatever reason, the Confederation Congress burst
into activity in early July. A score of Southerners left
the Constitutional Convention for New York on July 2 and,
on July 4, established the first congressional quorum in
over two months. They wasted no time. A reconstituted.
Southern-controlled committee composed of Edward Carrington
(Chairman), Richard Henry Lee, Melancton Smith, John Kean,
and Nathan Dane finished drafting the Ordinance of 1787.
Dane wrote.
We tried one day to patch up M[onroe]*s p. 
system of W. Government.--started new ideas 
and committed the whole to Carrington,
Dane, R. H. Lee, Smith, and Kean. We met 
several times and at last agreed on some 
principles--at least Lee, Smith and myself.
We found ourselves rather pressed. The 
Ohio Company appeared to purchase a tract 
of federal lands--about six or seven mil­
lions of acres--and we wanted to abolish 
the old system and get a better one for 
the government of the country, and we 
finally found it necessary to adopt the 
best system we could g e t . 39
7  0 Ibid.; Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, 
pp. 69-70, 72; Henderson, Party Politics, p. 411; Burnett, 
Continental Congress, p. 682. Cutler also amended the Ordi­
nance by including an anti-slavery proviso in the articles 
of compact. This idea, however, was not original with him 
and I believe that by July 10 numerous Congressmen were talk­
ing about abolishing slavery in the Northwest. The signifi­
cance is that Cutler knew about the slavery proviso before 
he left for Philadelphia the evening of July 10. As will be 
discussed in the third section. Cutler's greatest role in the 
passage of the Northwest Ordinance was his service as a mes­
senger to the Constitutional Convention that led to the Com­
promise of 1787.
39Dane to King, July 16, 1787, in King, Correspondence 
of Rufus King, 1:289-90. The reconstituted committee con­
sisted of two Nationalists (Carrington and Dane), two
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On July 13 the Confederation Congress passed the North­
west Ordinance of 1787.^^ The governmental provisions, bill 
of rights, and legal verbiage were essentially unchanged, 
although Nathan Dane added property qualifications for all 
elected officials. The most important additions lay in the 
articles of compact. The Northeast and South had finally 
agreed on a statehood provision. The Old Northwest^^ was to 
be divided into no less than three and no more than five 
states, to be admitted into the Union "whenever any of the 
said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants." 
Moreover, "such admission shall be allowed at an earlier 
period, and when there may be a less number of free inhabitants 
in the State than sixty thousand," if Congress approved. This 
sudden agreement on a statehood plank, after three years of 
haggling, is quite surprising, but not so surprising as the
Antifederalists (Lee and Smith), and Kean, an Independent.
Lee, who later joined the Federalists, was a strong supporter 
of the Eastern Nationalist western policy.
^^Journals of the Continental Congress. XXXII : 333-343,
The only negative vote was cast by Abraham Yates, a parochial 
Antifederalist from New York. Yates’ rationale is unknown, 
although Dane wrote that "In this case, as in so many others, 
he appeared not to understand the subject at all." Yates was 
so adamantly opposed that I have tried to learn his reasoning, 
but could not find anything.
^^Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 38. Although 
Monroe’s original report applied only to the Northwest, the 
idea was dropped and does not appear in either the September 
19 or May 9, 1787 revisions. The concept of a Northwest 
Ordinance was not again incorporated until July of 1787. This 
has led Lynd to believe that the boundary was drawn because of 
the slavery proviso in the document. See section 3, below.
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sixth article of compact, which stated.
There shall be neither involuntary servitude 
in the said territory, otherwise than in the 
punishment of crimes whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted: Provided always.
That any persons escaping into the same, 
from whom labor or service is lawfully 
claimed in any one of the original States, 
such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed 
and conveyed to the person claiming his 
or her labor or service as aforesaid.
Fugitive slave law notwithstanding, this slavery provision
was quite radical and unexpected. Congress had not discussed
slavery in the territories since the 1784-1785 session, and
even committee chairman Nathan Dane confessed,
I had no idea the States would agree to the 
sixth article, prohibiting slavery, as only 
Massachusetts of the Eastern States was 
present, and therefore omitted it in the 
draft, but finding the House favorably dis­
posed on this subject, after we had com­
pleted the other parts, I moved the article, 
which was agreed to without o p p o s i t i o n . 42
In only one week in July of 1787 the Confederation Con­
gress was able to complete a task that had dragged on since 
1784. To be sure, most of the Northwest Ordinance was already 
written. Monroe had provided the governmental provisions and
Journals of the Continental Congress. XXXII:343; Eblen, 
First and Second U. S. Empires, pp. 32, 36-37, 38, 40; Barrett, 
Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787. pp. 47, 60, 77; Pease, 
"Ordinance of 1787," p. 179; Dane to King, July 16, 1787 in 
King, Correspondence of Rufus King. 1:290. Actually, there 
was considerable anti-slavery sentiment among the Eastern 
Nationalists throughout the 1784-1787 period. The Easterner 
needed a vehicle to express that sentiment, however, and the 
Northwest Ordinance provided that vehicle. See Pickering to 
King, March 8, 1785, in King, Correspondence of Rufus King. 
1:284, and Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787, p. 29.
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Nathan Dane the bill of rights and several of the articles 
of compact. Yet the Northeast-South split over the number 
of states and the statehood provision had seemed irreparable. 
What caused the sudden burst of energy and spirit of compro­
mise in July of 1787? Most historians have either glossed 
over the subject, or relied heavily on the "Ohio Company 
thesis." They credit Congressional lust for money as the 
main stimulus. But the "Ohio Company thesis" leaves many 
questions unanswered. For instance, how was the severe 
Northeast-South breach over western policy, accentuated by 
the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations, ever resolved? How did the 
Easterners and Southerners ever reach an agreement on the 
number of possible western states and admission procedure? 
Moreover, why did a score of Southern politicians leave the 
Constitutional Convention and travel 90 miles to New York 
City for the purpose of passing a colonial governmental 
Ordinance drawn in its final stage by a New Englander under 
the stimulus of an Eastern land company? And most important, 
why did an overwhelmingly Southern Congress unanimously pass 
an Ordinance which, in its final form, prohibited slavery 
north of the Ohio River?! To answer these difficult ques­
tions one must, again, turn to the political developments 
of the time. By viewing the Northwest Ordinance in the con­
text of the debates of the Constitutional Convention one can 
conceive the relationship between the Ordinance of 1787 and 
the Federal Constitution. And by studying the debates of
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the Confederation Congress and the Constitutional Conven­
tion one can understand the crucial role that the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787 played in what Staughton Lynd has termed 
the "Compromise of 1787."^^
This brings to my recollection what I was 
told by Mr. Madison and what I do not remem­
ber ever to have seen in print. Many indi­
viduals were members of both bodies [the 
Constitutional Convention and the Confedera­
tion Congress], and thus were enabled to 
know what was passing in each--both sitting 
with closed doors and in secret sessions.
The distracting question of slavery was agi­
tating and retarding the labor of both, and 
led to conferences and inter-communications 
of the members, which resulted in a compro­
mise by which the northern or anti-slavery 
portion of the country agreed to incorporate, 
into the Ordinance and Constitution, the 
provisions to restore fugitive slaves; and 
this mutual and concurrent action was the 
cause of the similarity of the provision 
contained in both, and had its influence, 
in creating the great unanimity by which the 
Ordinance passed, and also in making the 
Constitution the more acceptable to the 
slaveholders.
Edward Coles (former secretary to..
James Madison), 18 56
When Edward Coles wrote the above passage he emphasized 
the fugitive slave question, probably because the Fugitive
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 408-20; Lynd, "Com­
promise of 1787," pp. 225-250.
^^Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," p. 228. This quotation 
was originally in Edward Coles, History of the Ordinance of 
1787 (Philadelphia, 1856), pp. 28-29. A similar theory is 
in Peter Force, Life, Journals, and Correspondence of Rev. 
Manasseh Cutler, L.L.D. (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1888), II, Appen­
dix D, p. 419.
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Slave Act was one of the burning issues of the 1850s. The 
fundamental importance of Coles' statement, however, is his 
assertion, by way of James Madison, that "conferences and 
intercommunications" took place between the Confederation 
Congress and the Constitutional Convention over the nature 
of the Northwest Ordinance and the Federal Constitution. 
This idea has been fully researched by Professor Staughton 
Lynd, who hypothesizes that there was a connection in the 
drafting of the Ordinance and the Constitution.^^ In order 
to ease the sectional tensions which had stymied both docu­
ments, a compromise was reached whereby the South received 
the "three-fifths" rule in the Constitution and liberal 
statehood provisions in the Northwest Ordinance, as well 
as tacit recognition of slavery below the Ohio River in the 
latter. The Northeast received a guarantee of a minimum of 
three states in the Ohio territory, and prohibition of
Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225, 245: "This essay
takes issue with Professor Max Farrand's belief that the 
three-fifths compromise was of secondary importance in the 
proceedings of the Convention, and that the question of the 
West was separate from the sectional conflict between North 
and South. . . . One is therefore led to inquire whether 
consultation between Congress and Convention preceded the 
drafting of the Northwest Ordinance on July 9-11; whether 
the nature of the Ordinance was such as to ease the sectional 
tensions then troubling the convention; and whether the essen­
tial features of the Ordinance were reported to members of 
the Convention in time to influence its voting on July 12-14. 
Since the answer to all of these questions is probably yes,
I think one can justifiably present the hypothesis that there 
occurred in 1787 a sectional compromise involving Congress 
and Convention, Ordinance and Constitution, essentially simi­
lar to those of 1820 and 1850." See also Henderson, Party 
Politics, pp. 408-420.
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slavery (and therefore the ’’three-fifths” clause) north of 
the Ohio River. Lynd observes that on July 10 the Constitu­
tional Convention was in a severe sectional deadlock over 
the issues of slavery and proportional representation, just 
as the Confederation Congress was in a deadlock over the 
statehood provisions of the Northwest Ordinance. But on 
July 12 the Constitutional Convention passed the ’’three- 
fifths compromise,” and the following day the Confederation 
Congress unanimously passed the Northwest Ordinance, outlaw­
ing slavery in the Ohio country. Is this a coincidence? 
William Grayson wrote James Monroe that the slavery article 
in the Northwest Ordinance was agreed to by the South for 
the purpose of preventing tobacco and indigo production in 
Ohio, ”as well as for sev'l other political reasons.” What 
were the ’’political reasons” to which Grayson alludes? To 
find out, we must turn to the proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention and the Confederation Congress and explore the 
intricate relationship between these two bodies in the Summer 
of 1787.46
The Northeast-South factionalism over the West in the 
Confederation Congress was also present in the Constitutional
46bynd, ’’Compromise of 1787,” pp. 225-238, 249. Grayson 
to Monroe, August 8, 1787, in Burnett, Letters of the Conti­
nental Congress, VIII:651-32. Henderson. Party Politics, 
pi 413 : ’’Only by perceiving the Northwest Ordinance in the
context of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention 
can one properly understand its passage, and only by viewing 
the debates of the Convention as an extension of Congressional 
factionalism can one understand why the convention had such a 
vital influence on the Ordinance.”
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Convention. Recent scholarship indicates that the Virginians 
and the Southerners wielded much more power at the Convention 
than previously believed. It was Virginian Nationalists like 
James Madison, Edward Carrington, and Arthur Lee who took 
the initiative in 1787, and most effectively advocated the 
Nationalist program in Philadelphia. But unlike Eastern Na­
tionalism Virginia's Nationalism had a sectional bias that 
was inextricably linked to slavery and the West. Virginia's 
Nationalism took the form of the "Virginia Plan" of May 29, 
which called for proportional representation in both houses 
of Congress and a slave census for purposes of taxation and 
representation. The Virginians advocated proportional repre­
sentation, the heart of the Nationalist program, not only 
because of their republican political tenets, but because 
of their vast Kentucky holdings and visions of a number of 
Southern-dominated states in the western frontier. The 
Southerners foresaw a day when they would dominate the poli­
tics of the new nation. But Southern ascendency depended 
upon proportional representation (with a slave census), and 
speedy incorporation of Western states into the Union. Thus 
the issue of proportional representation was closely bound 
to the issue of the West. Without new Western states, this 
Southern "geo-political" strategy was nullified. And the 
Constitutional Convention, like the Congress, was split over 
the West.^^
^^Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 414-418
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In June and July of 1787 the Constitutional Convention 
hotly debated the questions of slavery census, proportional 
representation, and the West. Although historians have 
traditionally viewed the Convention division as one of "small 
states" vs. "large states," the events of June and July evi­
dence another pattern: Northeast vs. South. As James
Madison wrote,
the States were divided into different in­
terests not by their difference in size, but 
by other circumstances; the most material of 
which resulted partly from climate, but 
principally from the effects of their having 
or not having s l a v e s . 48
Gouverneur Morris, Elbridge Gerry and Rufus King led the
Eastern faction in the fight. Nationalist Morris opposed
proportional representation, especially in the West, because
he felt it would insure eventual Southern and Western domi­
nance:
He thought the rule of representation ought 
to be so fixed as to secure to the Atlantic 
States a prevalence in National Councils.
The new States will know less of the public 
interest than these. . . . Provision ought 
therefore to be made to prevent the maritime 
States from being hereafter outvoted by them. 
He thought this might be easily done by 
irrevocably fixing the number of representa­
tives the Atlantic States should respectively 
have, and the numbers which each new State 
will have . . . [the West] would not be able 
to furnish men equally enlightened to share 
in the administration of our common interests. 
The busy haunts of men, not the remote wil­
derness, was the proper school of political 
talents. If the Western people get power
48Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 239, 242.
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into their hands, they will ruin the 
Atlantic interests. . . .49
The Southerners disagreed. After hearing Morris' July 5
speech, James Madison retorted, "To reconcile the gentl^ with
himself, it must be imagined he determined human character by
the points of the compass." In a reply to Morris, George
Mason of Virginia admitted.
According to the present population of 
America, the Northern part of it has a 
right to preponderate; and I cannot deny 
it. But unless there shall be inserted 
in the Constitution some principle which 
will do justice to the Southern States 
hereafter, when they shall have three- 
fourths of the people in America within
their limits, I can neither vote for the
system here nor support it in my state.
_ The Western States as they arise must be 
treated as equals, or they will speedily 
revolt.50
Several days later Elbridge Gerry again took up the Eastern 
attack regarding new western states. He was for "admitting 
them on liberal terms, but not for putting ourselves into 
their hands." Gerry feared the Westerners would "oppress 
commerce and drain our wealth into the Western country. To 
guard agSt these consequences," he thought it necessary, "to 
limit the number of new States to be admitted into the Union, 
in such a manner, that they should never be able to outnumber
the Atlantic states." Gerry's motion to this effect, seconded
40 Ibid., p. 242; Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 416-17; 
Koch, ed., Madison, Notes on the Debates, p. 271.
^^Koch, ed., Madison, Notes on the Debates, p. 271; 
Bancroft, Formation of the Constitution, pp. 262-63.
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by Rufus King of Massachusetts, was defeated. Yet there 
were still no grounds for compromise.
The Constitutional Convention debated over the West 
in late June and early July of 1787. On July 2 the Conven­
tion held a short recess to search for a compromise. At 
this same time the North Carolineans and Georgians left the 
Convention and traveled to New York City to join the Virgin­
ians in Congress. It seems likely they did so in order to 
finish the Northwest Ordinance--the Southerners wanted some 
assurance that new western states would be equitably incor­
porated into the Union. Early July is also the time when 
the "conferences and intercommunications" to which Edward 
Coles alludes probably took place. Besides Coles' statement, 
there is circumstantial evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Many of the representatives serving in the Confederation 
Congress in 1787 were also members of the Constitutional 
Convention. The Convention adjourned for three days on 
July 2 because of the deadlock. When the Confederation Con­
gress reached a quorum on July 4, Gorham, King, Johnson, 
Blount, Few, Pierce, Hawkins, and Madison were among those 
seated, and all of them had just arrived from Philadelphia 
with news of the Convention. In addition, Hamilton, Cutler, 
Richard Henry Lee, and Gouveneur Morris arrived from
Koch, ed., Madison, Notes on the Debates, pp. 288-89; 
see also ibid., pp. 245, 266-67 , 552; Bancroft, Formation of 
the Constitution, p. 263; Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 416- 
17.
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Philadelphia between July 3 and 5. If Congress thus knew 
the affairs of the Convention, the opposite was also true.
On July 10, after perusing the Northwest Ordinance and mak­
ing several amendments. Rev. Manasseh Cutler "thought this 
the most favorable opportunity to go on to Philadelphia." 
Cutler arrived there in the midst of the slave census de­
bate, one day before the crucial vote of July 12. Gouverneur 
Morris had adjourned the Constitutional Convention July 11 
on a note of despair; the division over slave representation 
seemed irresolvable. That night Cutler consulted with the 
Virginia and Massachusetts delegates at the Indian Queen 
Tavern and probably told them about the slavery provision 
in the Northwest Ordinance. The next morning, July 12, 
Gouverneur Morris announced a new plan to "bridge" the sec­
tional conflict. The "three-fifths" compromise passed on 
July 12, and the Northwest Ordinance, with its slavery 
article, passed in Congress the following day, July 13, 
1787.52
If one accepts Lynd’s hypothesis, what then were the 
motives which led Southerners and Easterners to support the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787? The Southerners, who controlled
Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 416-17; Lynd, "Com­
promise of 1787," pp. 227-28; Barrett, Evolution of the 
Ordinance of 1787. p. 70. Another person who may have helped 
implement the Compromise of 178 7 was Alexander Hamilton of 
New York. On July 12 Hamilton arrived in Philadelphia from 
New York for a short, unofficial visit with his friend. 
Gouverneur Morris.
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C 7Congress in July of 1787, thought the Northwest Ordinance
would provide a guarantee of future Southern political power
through rapid admission of new western states and application
of the "three-fifths" rule to the region southwest of the
Ohio. To be sure, there would be only three to five new
states in the Northwest, but the prospect of immediate allies
(via the new lower population requirements for statehood)
was very tempting to Southern Congressmen. The Virginia
delegates wrote Governor Randolph,
Indeed, if it is thought Material to the in­
terest of the Southern States that their 
Scale be Strengthened by an accession from 
this quarter, that object will be better 
secured by the New, than the old plan 
[Ordinance of 1784], because upon the 
former there may be an early admission of a 
state, but upon the latter such an event 
must be long, or forever p o s t p o n e d . 54
In addition to allies in the Northwest, Southerners looked
forward to a block of slaveholding states in the Southwest
territory. The July 13 version of the Ordinance applied
SSonly to the Ohio country. Since it outlawed slavery in
S3Four of the eight states present were Southern, the 
temporary president was William Grayson of Virginia, and 
three of the five committee members who drafted the Northwest 
Ordinance in its final stages were Southerners (Lee, Carring­
ton, and Kean). See Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225-26.
^^Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 225-26, 229-30, 237; 
Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 39; Virginia Dele­
gates to Governor Randolph, November 3, 1787, in Burnett, 
Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:672-73. See also, 
Carrington to Jefferson, October 23, 1787, in ibid., p. 660.
^^See footnote #41. The Southwest Ordinance of 1789 was 
identical to its predecessor except the slavery provision was 
deleted.
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just the Northwest, the Ordinance of 1787 was interpreted 
by nearly everyone as a tacit endorsement of slavery in the 
Southwest territory. Insomuch as the new Constitution stated 
that the "three-fifths" rule would apply to "the several 
states which may be included within this union," Southerners 
were naturally quite pleased. Reading this clause in con­
junction with the liberalized statehood admission procedures 
of the Northwest Ordinance, the South thought, with good 
reason, that it was the victor in both questions of slave 
representation and in equal representation for western 
states. Indeed, Grayson later commented that the Northwest 
Ordinance "passed in a lucky moment," leaving Massachusetts 
"extremely uneasy about it." And Nathan Dane wrote King in 
mid-August that "the Eastern states . . . gave up as much 
as could reasonably be expected.
But both sides gain something in a compromise, and the 
Compromise of 1787 was no exception. The Northeast may have 
made concessions regarding statehood requirements, the fugitive 
slave clause, "three-fifths" rule, and slavery in the South­
west, but it had good reasons for supporting the Northwest 
Ordinance. Most important, the Easterners succeeded in bar­
ring the institution of slavery (and the three-fifths rule)
Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 231-32, 244, 246-47; 
Dane to King, August 12, 1787, in Burnett, Letters of the 
Continental Congress, VIII:636.
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from the Ohio country. Moreover, there was a possibility 
of only three new states emerging from the Northwest, and 
the territory now had an autocratic territorial government 
to delay the statehood process as long as possible. Some 
Easterners were not entirely pessimistic about their politi­
cal prospects in the West. Dane considered the 60,000 popu­
lation requirement "too small, but, having divided the whole 
Territory into three States, this number appears to me to be 
less important." Thus Dane assumed that only three new 
states would evolve. Even if they all supported the South, 
Northeasterners would retain control of the Senate. And 
some Northeasterners entertained notions of political allies 
in the West. Dane reasoned.
The Eastern State of the three will probably 
be the first and more important of the rest, 
and will no doubt be settled chiefly by 
Eastern people; and there is, I think, full 
an equal chance of its adopting Eastern 
politics.^7
The announced intention of the Ohio Company of New England 
to colonize the Old Northwest lent credence to Dane's suppo­
sition. Many conservatives believed the Ohio Company would 
introduce into the Old Northwest "a description of men who 
will fix the character and politics throughout the territory, 
and which will probably endure to the latest period of time." 
The Ohio Company's presence, in combination with a strong
Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 246-47; Dane to King, 
August 12, 1787, in King, Correspondence of Rufus King, 1:289 
90. The emphasis is my own.
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handed territorial government, could restrain if not nullify 
any Southern political muscle in the Northwest territory. 
Indeed, the first five territorial officials in the Ohio 
country were all Eastern Nationalists, and three were members 
of the Ohio Company. Could the appointment of territorial 
officials have also been part of the Compromise of 1787?
No evidence exists to confirm such an idea. But it is 
clear that Northeast as well as South had justification for 
supporting the Northwest Ordinance and the Compromise of 
1787.58
The ambiguities of the Compromise of 1787 are apparent. 
The South thought five states would be created in the North­
west, the Northeast predicted three. Southerners thought 
the region would solidly support the South, but the Easterners 
hoped at least one state would adopt "Eastern politics."
The South hoped for immediate admission of new states, while 
the Northeast intended to delay the process as long as pos­
sible. The Northeast and South each had their own differ­
ent and contradictory rationales for supporting the Ordi­
nance of 1787, but since only time would tell what political 
course the Old Northwest would follow, both sections could 
support an Ordinance that would lead to settlement and 
eventual statehood. In place of a West vaguely attractive 
or dangerous, the Northwest Ordinance made available a West
COEblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 46; Carring­
ton to Jefferson, in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, VIII:164.
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described by Staughton Lynd as "just sufficiently specific 
that each section could read in it the fulfillment of its 
political dreams.
The great irony of the whole affair is that the Confed­
eration notions of the future American political balance 
were exactly backwards. The South thought its power would 
lay in all of the West and in the House of Representatives.
In fact, its strength lay in just the Southwest and in the 
Senate. By struggling for proportional representation and 
admission of western states, the South not only created its 
future political o p p o n e n t s , b u t  at the same time approved 
one of the landmark documents of American Negro freedom!
It is unfair, though, to expect the men of the 1780s to have 
been prophets. If the Southerners were mistaken, so too were 
their colleagues from the Northeast. No one knew what would 
happen in the West, so they compromised and hoped for the 
best.
The Compromise of 1787 led to the drafting of the Fed­
eral Constitution and passage of the Ordinance of 1787, two 
of the most important of all American state papers. Both
^^Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," pp. 230, 247-50; Eblen, 
First and Second U. S. Empires, p. 39.
^^To be sure, all of the early national West backed 
the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians and was therefore allied 
with the South. But during the sectional crises of the 
1840-60 period, the Northwest allied with the Northern Whigs 
and eventually the GOP. Who was that man from the Illinois 
territory, anyway?
^^Lynd, "Compromise of 1787," p. 249.
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these documents are truly products of their time, and by 
viewing them one can view the political dialog of the late 
1780s. The intricate relationship between the Ordinance 
and the Constitution added to the "covenanted" quality the 
Virginia cession had given the former. There was no provi­
sion whatsoever for admission of new states in the Federal 
Constitution aside from the statement, "New states may be 
admitted into the Union." Without the Northwest Ordinance 
there was no basis for expansion and creation of the American 
Western Empire. This is why Bancroft said the Ordinance of 
1787 stood second in importance only to the Constitution 
itself. The relationship between the Northwest Ordinance 
and the Constitution, and the circumstances under which the 
Northwest Ordinance passed, gave that document a quasi­
constitutional quality and the character of truly fundamental 
legislation.
To summarize, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was not 
written by any one person. It had distinct British colonial 
origins, and evolved in a series of stages in the Confedera­
tion Congress during the 1780s. In its final form, the 
Ordinance of 1787 bore the stamp of many men, but three stand 
out: Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe of Virginia and 
Nathan Dane of Massachusetts. The drafting of the document
^^Henderson, Party Politics, p. 418
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was begun in the Southern faction and ended up among the 
Eastern Nationalists. At the same time, the colonial system 
of the British was transformed into a highly democratic form 
by Jefferson, but then came back to an unrepresentative form 
of government controlled by an autocratic territorial gover­
nor. The western territories were to pass through three 
stages of development that distinctly paralleled the evolu­
tion in the British colonial system, but as Monroe observed, 
there was one ’’remarkable and important difference.” After 
the territories reached a specified population, ’’they shall 
be admitted into the Confederacy.”^^
The debate over whether the Northwest Ordinance was 
democratic, or ’should’ have been democratic rages on. The 
neo-Progressives point to the imposition of a governor and 
judges, absence of elections, absolute veto of the governor.
Burnett, Continental Congress, p. 685; Eblen, First 
and Second U. S. Empires, p. 18; Berkhofer, "Origins of the 
U. S. Territorial System,” p. 261; Pease, "Ordinance of 
1787,” p. 168; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires: 42, 
44-45: "The American colonies passed through three stages 
that roughly but distinctly parallel the three stages of 
the Ordinance of 1787. During the seventeenth century 
the colonies passed through a stage of strong executive con­
trol that can be equated with the first stage of the Ordi­
nance. The first two-thirds of the eighteenth century was 
a period of executive eclipse and the real emergence of a 
strong representative government authorized in the Ordi­
nance’s second stage . . . after 1763 the colonies moved 
into a period of rebellion that led to independence. The 
Ordinance sought to avoid rebellion by providing for quasi­
independence through statehood as the third stage.” Eblen 
notes that one reason for the arbitrary nature of the Ordi­
nance was the considerable French and alien population resid­
ing in the territories. Monroe to Jefferson, May 11, 1786, 
in Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, 1:126-27.
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and high property qualifications for suffrage and officehold- 
ing. They conclude that "Jefferson's Ordinance . . . was
abolished in 1787 by the land speculators and their supportes 
who wanted Congressional control of the West so that their 
interests could be protected from the actions of the inhabi­
tants." The revisionists counter that, in a nation's history, 
brief periods of colonialism are inconsequential. The impor­
tance of the Northwest Ordinance, they say, is that it even­
tually led to statehood and full rights of citizenship. In 
the interim it administered the affairs of the frontier in 
an organized and efficient manner. "Thus the 1787 document 
should be considered more an extension and replacement than 
a repudiation of the Ordinance of 1784,"^'^
The revisionists Eblen and Berkhofer are probably cor­
rect in their assertion that the Northwest Ordinance was a 
"viable system of colonial government." It was very orderly 
and efficient, if only on paper. The Eastern Nationalists 
were very good at this sort of thing. The creation of the 
national bureaucracy and administrative systems under Hamil­
ton and the Federalists during the 17 90s is the classic
Jensen, New Nation, p. 354; Pease, "Ordinance of 
1787," p. 169; Barnhart. Valiev of Democracy, pp. 133-34:
"If the Ordinance of 1787 is compared with the Virginia 
Bill of Rights of 1776, it is obvious that protection to 
only a limited number of rights were assured to the settlers 
of the Northwest Territory." Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, 
pp. 17, 164; Berkhofer, "Origins of the U. S. Territorial 
System," p. 261; Eblen, First and Second U. S. Empires, 
pp. 44, 47.
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example of their organizational abilities--and the Northwest 
Ordinance fits well into this Nationalist bureaucratic tradi­
tion. Yet Jensen, Philbrick, Boyd, and Barnhart are correct 
in saying that the Northwest Ordinance provided for an un­
democratic, authoritarian regime in the West. Was this 
"good" or "bad"? Some would say it does not really matter, 
since most Westerners negated the arbitrary nature of the 
Ordinance of 1787 by simply ignoring it.^^ The purpose 
here has been to place the Northwest Ordinance in the po­
litical context of the 1780s. And the fact that Congress, 
in 1787, reinstituted in the W-est a colonial system similar 
to that against which the thirteen original states had them­
selves revolted in 1776 seems a good indication of just how 
the political ideology of the American Revolution had evolved
Initially, Westerners protested loudly over the auto­
cratic nature of their territorial government. Governor 
Arthur St. Clair, for example, was constantly at odds with 
the settlers of the Northwest territory, who claimed he 
was "cloathed with all the powers of a British nabob." St. 
Clair opposed statehood for Ohio until 1802 when he was 
dismissed from office by President Thomas Jefferson. But 
this sort of violent opposition diminished as Westerners 
learned that the territorial governments were strong only 
on paper. Jack Eblen states that the final result "was a 
quick repetition of the slow loss of the pre-Revolutionary 
royal governor's powers, even though the territorial gov­
ernor's office was stronger in law." The West was too 
big to rule with an iron hand, and Westerners were not 
ideally obedient subjects. Most Westerners just ignored 
the territorial governments. Moreover, the genius of the 
Northwest Ordinance was that its undemocratic features were 
only temporary. Federal supervision lasted just long enough 
to help the territorial settlers through the difficult early 
years. Then their territories were able to take an equal 
place among the United States of America. See Eblen, First 
and Second U. S. Empires, pp. 47-50.
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in thirteen years.
Political ideas and attitudes changed greatly during
the 1780s. Edward Carrington talked of this evolution in
June of 1787 when he wrote Jefferson about the proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention:
The ideas here suggested are far removed 
from those which prevailed when you [were] 
amongst us, and as they have arisen with 
the most able, from an actual view of events, 
it is probable you may not be prepared to 
expect them. They are however the most 
moderate of any which obtain in any general 
form amongst reflective and intelligent 
Men.
Times had changed. Radical notions of decentralized author­
ity and local control were no longer in vogue. The new 
ideology "amongst reflective and intelligent Men" called for 
a strong national authority and a centralized federal govern­
ment. Nationalism had prevailed, and a study of Confedera­
tion western policy provides an excellent means for viewing 
the rise of the centralist impulse. The change in attitudes 
towards the West reflects an overall change in the political 
ideology of many Revolutionaries.
But the West was far more than just a mirror of the 
rise of Nationalism. Indeed, the West and the western ques­
tion was a direct catalyst for adoption of the Nationalist
program in 1787-88. Without the western question, the South
7may never have supported the Federal Constitution. It was
GGcarrington to Jefferson, June 9, 1787, in Boyd, Papers 
of Jefferson, pp. 11, 410.
The thesis that the West was a catalyst for Southern
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largely because of their political aspirations in the West 
that Virginia and the South endorsed the heart of the Na­
tionalist program--proportional representation. And it was 
to insure admission of new western states into the Union 
that the South compromised and accepted Eastern Nationalist 
proposals for three to five states in the Old Northwest. 
Southern advocacy of a colonial territorial governmental 
Ordinance was quite natural for a section that had adopted 
Nationalist notions of centralized authority. Times had 
changed. If Carrington could seriously say to Jefferson, 
’’the negative which the King of England had upon our Laws 
was never found to be materially inconvenient," then he 
could certainly endorse the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
And it was the Northwest Ordinance that led to adoption of 
the Nationalist program in the Federal Constitution of that 
year.
Nationalism is part of the "geo-political" interpretation of 
Virginia politics by Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 415-18:
The "Southern delegates in the Convention overwhelmingly took 
a "large-state" position on the issue of proportional repre­
sentation in both houses. . . . That Virginia led the "nation­
alist" force in the Convention--a force composed of four South­
ern States out of five and just two Northern states out of six 
present (8 in all) was due not only to her supremacy in popula­
tion among the thirteen states, but also to her vast Kentucky 
holdings and her involvement in the settlement of the Northwest. 
That "small" states such as Georgia and North Carolina should 
have joined Virginia on the very foundation of the nationalist 
plan, proportional representation, also testifies to the ubiq­
uitous influence of Southern geo-political strategy for the 
West in Convention proceedings. . . . The Virginia-Pennsylvania 
bloc epitomized in the two persons of Madison and James Wilson 
(who disagreed with Morris regarding the West) can be understood 
as a triumphant core region manifestation of the Virginia Congres 
sional policy of the past year. Indeed the Pennsylvania alli­
ance was crucial to disarm to destructive sectional dichotomy 
which had obtained during the Jay-Gardoqui affair."
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION: THE RELUCTANT EXPANSIONISTS
The state of society has an influence 
not less than climate. Our back country 
people are as much savage as the Chero­
kee. I believe . . . that were it not 
for the commercial cities on the sea 
coast even the use of a plough would far 
to the westward be forgotten.
David Ramsay, 178 5
It was always my fear that our Western 
Territory, instead of proving a fund for 
paying our national debt, would be a 
source of mischief and increasing expense, 
but the expense is not the worst part of 
it. It has given such a spring to the 
spirit of emigration, too high before, 
that though it is pregnant with the most 
serious consequences to the Atlantic 
States, it can not now be held back.
Arthur St. Clair to,
John Jay, 17 88
The great accomplishment of the Confederation Congress 
was the creation of the first American western policy. From 
1783 to 1787 Congress mapped an overall strategy for westward 
development. Congress first established federal control of 
the National Domain in 1784, and drafted the revenue-oriented 
Land Act of 1785 to provide money for the national government
David Ramsay to Thomas Jefferson, 1787, in Boyd, Papers 
of Jefferson. IX:441; St. Clair to Jay, December 13, 1788, 
in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 11:101-105.
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Indian affairs culminated in the Ordinance of 1786, and the 
Dane committee reports of 1787, and during that same time 
John Jay negotiated with Don Diego de Gardoqui to try and 
settle the diplomatic problems in the Southwest. Finally, 
in July of 1787 the Confederation Congress instituted a 
strong territorial government in the West under the North­
west Ordinance of 1787. All of the various aspects of the 
western policy fit together in a consistent and coordinated 
plan, because most of the men who drafted the legislation 
subscribed to similar notions about the West, and agreed as 
to what would be the wisest policy for that region. The 
creation of the first American western policy was largely 
the work of the Eastern Nationalist faction in the Confedera­
tion Congress. Although Southerners had some input, it was 
mainly the Eastern Nationalists who legislated for a slow, 
orderly westward advance, closely supervised by the federal 
government. By examining the political, economic, and social 
bases of Eastern attitudes towards the West, one can better 
understand why they acted as they did.
Political motivations have been discussed at length in 
these essays and need only to be reviewed at this time. If 
power is the ultimate goal of any political movement, then 
political motivations played a major role in Eastern Nation­
alist western policy. Conservatives had always seen the 
frontier element as a threat to their political fortunes. 
Colonial legislatures often gerrymandered districts so as to
266
insure coastal dominance, and after the Revolution Easterners 
fought efforts to move state capitols to the West. In the 
Confederation Congress the Eastern Nationalists pursued a 
similar strategy because they feared that voters in the 
West would not be receptive to their brand of political con­
servatism. They were right, of course. Westerners were 
opposed to the centralist tenets of the Eastern Nationalist 
political doctrine. This became obvious during the struggle 
over ratification of the Constitution. In most of the state 
conventions, the "up-country agricultural regions" and 
Westerners voted almost solidly against ratification. The 
Westerners were not sympathetic to the Constitution or Na­
tionalism, and were particularly repelled by the Northeast's 
conservative brand of Nationalism. After the Constitution 
passed, Westerners quickly moved into the Jeffersonian camp.
Thus Northeasterners had sound political reasons for acting
2as they did during the Confederation period.
Economic rationales for Northeastern attitudes towards
2Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History," in Ray Billington, ed., The 
Frontier Thesis: Valid Interpretation of American History 
(New York, 1966), p. 17; Jensen, New Nation, p. 327. See 
also, John C. Miller, The Federalist Era. 1789-1801 (New 
York, 1960), p. 125. For western opposition to the Consti­
tution, see Main, The Anti-Federalists, p. 280; Turner, 
"Frontier in American History," p. 209; Homer Hockett, 
"Federalism and the West," in Essays in American History 
Dedicated to Frederick Jackson Turner (New York, 1910), 
pp. 116. For the Northern-Western alliance of the 1830- 
1860 period, see the Epilogue, below.
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the West have also been treated in the preceding essays.
The Eastern Nationalists were greatly concerned lest west­
ward expansion result in a reversal of their economic 
supremacy. Most predicted expansion would cause a drain 
of labor supply and consumers, with a resulting drop in 
prices and increase in wages. The East was still almost 
entirely devoted to commerce; manufactures had not yet be­
come the overriding economic factor. Not until the large- 
scale development of factories and manufacturing in the 
nineteenth century did Northeasterners come to see the West 
as a valuable source of raw materials and a ready market 
for Eastern products. In the 1780s the West, and the Mis­
sissippi River commerce in particular, seemed threatening 
and potentially dangerous. At the same time Eastern land 
speculators were in a delicate position. Some had invested 
in lands in the original thirteen states (such as in Western 
Pennsylvania and up-state New York) and opposed all expansion 
for fear it would lower their land prices. Yet others like 
Pickering, and the Ohio associates had invested in the lands 
bordering the Ohio River. They wanted expansion, but very 
carefully controlled expansion onto speculator-owned lands.
If the floodgates were opened, their lands would greatly 
depreciate (and this is eventually what happened--none made 
the fortunes they had anticipated). Thus the West seemed 
an economic threat to the Northeast. The trans-Appalachian 
frontier, populated by fugitive debtors and paper money
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advocates, posed a threat to fiscally conservative New Eng­
land, and to the commercial interests and speculators who 
formed its economic base.
Social attitudes and class conflict are important 
ingredients in the conservative view of the West. As Francis 
Philbrick and others have shown, there existed from colonial 
times "misapprehensions concerning border communities, which 
were the basis of strong social prejudices against them.
One constant source of irritation was religion. The Eastern 
Nationalists had a strong puritan strain, and in the eigh­
teenth and early nineteenth centuries were nearly all Congre- 
gationalists, Episcopalians, and Presbyterians. It is no 
marvel that these pious New Englanders frowned on a segment 
of the population attracted to the Methodists and Baptists, 
or to no religion at all. At the same time, the Northeast 
was solidly opposed to slavery, and embraced humanitarian 
notions regarding the American Indian. The implication of 
a South-West alliance as it affected the 'peculiar institu­
tion' was certainly a bone in the Northeasterners* throats. 
Moreover, the Westerners' propensity for trespassing on 
Indian lands, and the resulting violence and warfare were
Philbrick, Laws of the Illinois Territory. XXXVrcccxxiii 
Many historians have written of anti-western sentiments among 
the upper classes. Perhaps the best known are Turner,
Merrill Jensen, John D. Barnhart, Henry Tatter, Payson J. 
Treat, Julian P. Boyd, and Merrill D. Peterson.
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denounced constantly as barbarous and cruel by outraged 
Northeasterners. All of these factors combined with long­
standing class prejudices to instill a great contempt among 
Easterners for those "lawless Banditti", "squatters, insol­
vent emigrants, and demagogues," and "white savages" who
4populated the trans-Appalachian West.
Class prejudices against Westerners are evident in the 
correspondence and public papers of the period. The upper 
classes in both sections were offended by the rude settlers 
of the frontier. These attitudes are particularly evident 
among New Englanders, largely because of their isolation from 
the trans-Appalachian West. The Northeasterners were appalled 
at the manners and conduct of the border settlers. People 
who "looked rude in their manners and dress" gave most East­
erners "an unfavorable opinion of the country." They assumed 
that anyone anxious to leave the security and comforts of the 
seaboard must be the scum of society, "Under the pressure of 
poverty, the [jail], and the consciousness of public con­
tempt, [they] leave their native places, and betake them­
selves to the wilderness," observed Timothy Dwight. Benjamin 
Rush agreed:
The first settler in the woods is gen­
erally a man who has outlived his credit 
or fortune in the cultivated parts of the 
state . . .  as he lives in the neighborhood
For religious factors, see Philbrick, Rise of the West, 
p. 319; Marshall Smelser, The Democratic Republic. 1801-1815 
(New York, 1968), p. 76; and Manning J. Dauer, The Adams 
Federalists (Baltimore, 1953), pp. 26-27. Anti-slavery is 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 7. For Eastern attitudes towards 
the Indian, see Chapter 4, above.
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of Indians, he soon acquires a strong tinc­
ture of their manners. His exertions, while 
they continue, are violent, but they are 
succeeded by long intervals of rest. His 
pleasures consist chiefly in fishing and 
hunting . . . .  Above all he revolts against 
the operation of laws. He cannot bear to 
surrender up a single natural right for all 
the benefits of government.
This comparison of the settlers to Indians, and assertion of
their laziness is found in nearly all Eastern Nationalist and
Federalist comments about the pioneers. Jay called them "white
savages;" David Ramsay said they were "as much savage as the
Cherokees;" Samuel Holden Parsons referred to them as "our
own white Indians;" and Pickering wrote King, "They are little
less savage than the Indians; and when posessed of the most
fertile spots, for want of Industry, live miserably."^
These sorts of attitudes made Easterners very concerned
about Confederation western policy. Nathan Dane wrote Timothy
Dwight, "our frontier inhabitants from New Hampshire to
Georgia . . . will give us much trouble in a few years if we
do not treat and govern them with much prudence and good
policy." But what was that "good policy" to be? What was
the most prudent course? Some Eastern Nationalists were avowed
constrictionists. They were against all expansion. Men like
Rufus King were "opposed to encouragement of western emigrants,"
and Paine Wingate of Massachusetts doubted "whether, in our day,
Philbrick, Laws of the Illinois Territory. XXV:cccxxxiii, 
cccxxxiv; Berkhofer, "American Territorial System;" David 
Ramsay to Jefferson, 1787, in Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, X:441; 
Pickering to King, June 4, 1785, in King, Correspondence of 
Rufus King. 1:106.
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that country will not be a damage to us rather than advan­
tage." Wingate believed it would have "been as well for the 
Indians to have kept their own territory."^ But these men 
were in the minority. Most Northeasterners were expansion­
ists- -but reluctant expansionists, to be sure. Their aim 
was to control westward expansion through a strong national 
government. This is why Nationalism and the centralist im­
pulse are so important to an understanding of Confederation 
western policy. Western policy was one of the major avenues 
for increasing the power of the central government during the 
1780s. Through land policy, Indian affairs, diplomacy and 
territorial governments, the Eastern Nationalists of the Con­
federation era moved towards a centralized state. But they 
could not achieve their goal without the help of the South.
The South, and particularly Virginia, is of key impor­
tance in understanding the adoption of an Eastern Nationalist 
western policy. Why did the South support the Eastern mea­
sures? The answer is twofold, and can be found largely in 
the realm of politics. First, the Southerners (especially 
the Virginians) were vitally interested in western develop­
ment. According to Henderson, their entire "geo-political 
strategy" of the 1780s was aimed at securing the economic
Philbrick, Laws of the Illinois Territory. XXVrcclvi; 
Rufus King to Jonathan Jackson, September 3, 1786, in Burnett, 
Letters of the Continental Congress. VIII:458; Paine Wingate 
to Samuel Lane, June 2, 1788, in Burnett, Letters of the Con­
tinental Congress. VIII:746.
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and political benefits that would come with expansion and
7new western states. Southern desire for new states led 
them to compromise with Northeasterners over the West. They 
accepted many notions about that region that were essentially 
"Eastern Nationalist" because they believed that any expan­
sion was better than none. Since the Northeast had an 8 to 5 
majority in Congress, the Southerners’ hopes all lay in the 
future. The second political consideration can be found in 
a shift in political philosophy. Nationalism and the cen­
tralist impulse were in the ascendency during the middle and 
late 1780s. The Nationalist faction, which had originally 
been a Northeastern phenomenon (Morris, Hamilton, Jay, King, 
Pickering, Livingston, etc.), began to gather a large Southern 
following. Indeed, by 1787 Virginia, not New England, was 
the leader of the centralist movement, with Washington and 
Madison as prominent Nationalist spokesmen. Attitudes towards 
the West changed with the evolution in political philosophy. 
This tempering of the Southern position became evident during 
the land policy debate of 1785, when the South accepted a 
modified "New England" land system. When the Jay-Gardoqui 
controversy threatened an impasse, both sides again searched 
for a compromise. The interrelationship between the North­
west Ordinance and the Federal Constitution, as manifested 
in the Compromise of 1787, was no accident. Western policy
7Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 370-71.
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was inextricably tied to the Nationalist movement. As the 
Southerners, especially Virginians, adopted Nationalism, so 
too did they adopt Eastern Nationalist western policy. The 
rise of centralism was accompanied by adoption of centralist 
notions concerning the West.
If one gives any credence to the frontier hypothesis of 
Frederick Jackson Turner, the split over Western policy can 
be viewed in a much broader context. The American Revolution 
was declared in 1776 and based upon highly radical conceptions 
of the individuals* natural right to freedom and sovereignty. 
Yet even before the Declaration of Independence was signed, 
Americans were arguing among themselves as to just how far 
those ideals of natural rights should be carried. Disagree­
ments emerged as liberals who favored maximum individual 
sovereignty, a weak central government, and local control, were 
pitted against conservatives who valued order and stability 
and a strong national government. The western question was a 
perfect focal point for this struggle, if only in the idealis­
tic sense. As Turner has shown, the frontier came to symbolize 
the forces of individualism, liberty, and sovereignty in the 
minds of many Americans. The radicals' version of the Revolu­
tionary experience coincided with an idealistic view of the 
frontier experience, because Revolutionary ideals of freedom 
and liberty could be sought in an environment that offered 
few governmental restraints on the individual. Yet as Turner 
also noted, and as the conservatives of the 1780s constantly
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pointed out, the frontier encouraged some undesirable aspects 
of complete freedom. A person did not become automatically 
rational the minute he crossed the Ohio, and lawlessness and 
rashness were just as much a part of the frontier experience 
as sovereignty and independence. Indeed, an American's 
attitude toward the West and Westerners was a direct result 
of his conception of the Revolutionary experience and the 
limits to which ideals of freedom and sovereignty should be 
extended. The radicals and libertarians tended to ignore the 
less savory characteristics of Westerners, and idealized the 
importance of their settlement beyond the Appalachians. Con­
servatives were wary of the West, and sought to harness the 
troublesome Westerners through a strong national government. 
The Nationalist impulse, the desire to control and regulate 
the affairs of individuals, found logical expression in the 
western policy of the 1780s. The Nationalist victory in the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787 was complemented by adoption 
of the Northwest Ordinance that same year.
The irrelevancy of Nationalist western policy to the 
realities of the frontier soon became obvious. No proof need 
be submitted other than the fact that, with the exception of 
prior rectangular survey of lands, every aspect of the Eastern 
Nationalist policy was either greatly altered or abandoned 
by the federal government of early national America. Congress 
repudiated the sale of public lands for revenue purposes as 
early as 1804; a humanitarian Indian policy was out of the
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question by the time of Jackson's presidency; Thomas Pinckney 
secured American navigation of the Mississippi in 1795; and, 
as Jack Eblen has shown, the Northwest Ordinance was simply 
ignored by those settlers who were supposedly under its con­
trol. The Nationalist western policy may have been typical 
of the political climate from which it evolved, but as Ameri­
cans moved West during the Great Migration of the early 
1800s, it became increasingly anachronistic. By 1840 the 
opening of the trans-Mississippi frontier made the Eastern 
Nationalist western policy a dead letter.
The uniqueness of Eastern Nationalist plans for western 
development is apparent to anyone who visits Marietta, in 
southeastern Ohio. Marietta was the first legal settlement 
in the Ohio Valley, completely planned and developed by the 
Ohio Company of Massachusetts. Even today. Marietta's citi­
zens boast that they live in the "only planned community in 
America." They exaggerate, of course. Throughout the Ohio 
Valley there are many planned communities like Marietta.
They have spacious, ordered streets, and a town square sur­
rounded by public buildings. The Ohio Company and the North­
easterners built many such towns--replicas of the New England 
and Eastern villages from whence they migrated. But as one 
moves farther west or south, these towns are few and far 
between. Beyond the Mississippi they simply do not exist.
The Eastern Nationalists had a vision for the American advance 
westward. They looked forward to a slow, corporate settlement.
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and a transplanting of New England society in the great Ameri­
can West. They anticipated thousands of communities like 
Marietta dotting the Mississippi Valley. The Eastern Nation­
alists believed that if the central government was strong 
enough, they could mold and shape society as they pleased.
As it turned out, they were mistaken. Eastern domination of 
the West did not come until the economic and cultural pene­
trations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries combined 
with political centralism to cause the fusion of two differ­
ing societies.
EPILOGUE
THE FEDERALIST PARTY AND THE WEST 
1789-1803^
Now by adding an unmeasured world beyond 
that river [the Mississippi] we rush like 
a comet into infinite space. In our wild 
career we may jostle some other world out 
of its orbit, but we shall, in every event, 
quench the light of our own.
Fisher Ames’ opinion of thog 
Louisiana Purchase, 1803
After a new Federal government was instituted under the 
Constitution, most Eastern Nationalists of the Confederation 
era formed the nucleus of the Federalist party of early na­
tional America.^ Thus the Eastern Nationalist attitudes
Most of this essay is drawn from Michael Allen, "The Fed­
eralist Party and the West, 1783-1803," A Senior Honors Thesis 
submitted to the Department of History of Central Washington 
State College, March 8, 1974. The only other treatment of the
subject is Homer C. Hockett, "Federalism and the West," in
Essays in American History Dedicated to Frederick Jackson Tur­
ner (New York, 1910), pp. 113-135. See ibid., p. 115: "To the
extent to which [the Federalist party] was the party of aristo­
cratic tradition and the representative of the commercial 
against the agricultural interest it was a party of inherent 
antagonism to the interests and ideals of the West."
2Seth Ames, ed., The Life and Works of Fisher Ames (Boston,
1854), pp. 323-24. “
^Henderson, Party Politics, p. 420: ", . . party develop­
ment in the 1790s began as a remarkable continuation of the 
factionalism in the Continental Congress. The Southern and 
Eastern nucleii of the Republican and Federalist parties as 
well as the division in the Middle States were replications of 
the structure of Confederation politics."
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towards the West can be seen in the western policy of the 
Federalists of the 1790s and early 1800s. In Indian affairs, 
land policy, territorial government and admission of new 
western states, the Federalists tried in vain to slow down 
the westward advance. Some tried to stop it altogether. A 
study of Federalist attitudes towards the West from 1789-1803 
involves also a study of the decline of the Federal party. 
Nothing so nearly represented the spirit of the new republic 
as its restless westward settlers. And nothing so nearly 
represented the spirit of the Federalist party as its efforts 
to stop those settlers. By studying Federalist attitudes 
toward the West one may gain a better understanding of the 
Federalist-Jeffersonian dichotomy and a clearer perception 
of America in 1800. Only in this way can one understand the 
importance of the revolution that was taking place.
The trans-Appalachian frontier played an important role 
during the Federalist administrations of George Washington 
and John Adams. Events such as the Whiskey Rebellion, the 
struggle with Great Britain over the Northwest posts, 
Pinckney's Treaty (securing navigation of the Mississippi 
River), and the Kentucky Resolutions serve to accent the 
importance of the West during the Federalist era. Since 
nearly four-fifths of Washington's budget was spent on mea­
sures directly or indirectly related to the frontier, Feder­
alist leaders soon formulated a consistent policy for that 
region. Alexander Hamilton saw the West mainly as a source
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of revenue to fund the national debt and support his fiscal 
program, and most Federalists shared similar views. They 
distrusted and feared the migrants to the frontier regions 
and, consequently, Americans west of the Appalachians came 
to resent their government. The frontier settlers demanded 
a more equitable land policy, free navigation of the Missis­
sippi, British evacuation of the Northwest posts, admission 
of western states, and protection from the Indians. The 
Federalist administrations of George Washington and John 
Adams often ignored or only partially answered these de­
mands . ̂
As in the Confederation era, the Federalists of the 
1790s demonstrated an unusual concern and sympathy for the 
plight of the American Indian. Federalists comprised a 
large percentage of the small group of early national poli­
ticians who made genuine efforts to acknowledge the property 
rights and sovereignty of the Indian. Their motivations 
were twofold. First, the educational and social backgrounds 
of most conservatives made them more receptive to the ideas 
of humanitarianism.^ Second, Federalists saw the American 
Indian as an effective barrier to westward migration. Al­
though acting on strong moral belief, they saw a liberal
Leonard White, The Federalists: A Study in Administra­
tive History (New York, 1948), pp. 161-383; Philbrick, Rise 
of the West, p. 354; Treat, National Land System, pp. 70-73; 
Syrett, Works of Alexander Hamilton. VI:421, 502; Miller, 
Federalist Era, p. 161,
^See Chapter 4 above.
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Indian policy as an effective means of keeping settlers out 
of much of the trans-Appalachian frontier. President Wash­
ington and Secretary of War Knox were early proponents of 
an equitable Indian policy. "The Indians," Henry Knox 
stated, "have constantly had their jealousies and hatreds 
excited by attempts to obtain their lands. I hope in God 
that all such designs are suspended for a long period."^
A Congressional committee composed of six Federalists de­
nounced the Frontier Protection Act of 1792, recommending 
that.
Instead of being ambitious to extend our 
boundary, it would be wise to check the 
roving disposition of the frontier set­
tlers and prevent them from too suddenly 
extending themselves to the Western 
waters. If kept closer together . . . 
they would not so frequently involve us in 
Indian wars; but permitted to rove at 
pleasure, they will keep the nation em­
broiled in perpetual warfare. . . .
The Frontier Protection Act passed the Senate with nineteen 
members voting no; thirteen were Federalists.^
Despite the efforts of Hamilton, Knox, Pickering, Wash­
ington, and others to establish good relations, Indian wars 
were the inevitable result of white encroachment on Indian
^Prucha, Indian Policy, p. 41.
7Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United 
States (Annals of Congress), 2nd Congress, January 26, 1792, 
p. 338. Federalist members of the committee were Goodlue, 
Wayne, Boudinot, Livermore, Steele, Parker, and Bourne. In 
the vote over protection from Indians, as in all other Con­
gressional votes, I have determined the Federalists by using 
David Hackett Fischer, Revolution of American Conservatism, 
Appendix II.
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lands. After the Ohio Valley tribes defeated General 
Harmar and territorial governor Arthur St. Clair, the Ameri­
can government was put in the awkward position of having to 
defend trespassers on Indian lands. Colonel Timothy Picker­
ing opposed aiding the frontiersmen and explained in a letter 
to Rufus King how he would control the lawless trespassers 
of the frontier:
If such savage emigrants encroach on the 
Indian Territory or commit any outrages, 
nothing short of a military force will be 
able to bring them to justice . . .  to pre­
vent [Indian wars] resulting from such 
emigrations I could wish the Indians might 
be expressly authorized by treaty, to break 
up every settlement within their territory.&
In Congress, Federalist Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts 
expressed a somewhat more philosophical opinion on the sub­
ject:
Were they (the opponents of Indian land 
rights) to say to the savages in their own 
land, you have no right to any land? . . . 
wherever the natives of a country had pos­
session, there they had a right and not 
because they did not dress like us, were 
not equally religeous, or did not under­
stand the arts of civilized life were they 
to be deprived of their posessions. . . .
Their rights or their posessions were as 
sacred as civilized life.®
Unfortunately for the Indians, the political pressure of the
Westerners proved greater than Federalist sympathy for the
O Pickering to King, in King, Correspondence of Rufus
King, 1:106. 
9Annals of  Congress, 4th Congress, A p r il  1796, p.  900.
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Indians’ plight. Anthony Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers 
preceded the eventual removal of most Indian tribes to the 
region west of the Mississippi, the humanitarian Federalists 
notwithstanding. Andrew Jackson soon demonstrated the Repub­
lican solution to the Indian problem.
Debates over the statehood applications of Kentucky and 
Tennessee would seemingly provide an excellent arena in 
which to view Federalist western policy. The issue of Ken­
tucky, however, is clouded. Most Federalists probably agreed 
with Fisher Ames' view of the Kentuckians as "the infuriate . 
wild men of the mountains." But Kentucky applied for admis­
sion simultaneously with Vermont (1791), and this dual appli­
cation appears to have facilitated a North-South, Federalist- 
Republican compromise. Alexander Hamilton wrote.
One of the first subjects of deliberation 
with the new congress will be the Indepen­
dence of Kentucky, for which the Southern 
states will be anxious. The North will be 
glad to send a counterpoise in Vermont.
These mutual interests and inclinations 
will facilitate a proper result.
The Federalists apparently thought Vermont would balance the
political influence of Kentucky, leaving the Federalist
domination in Congress unchallenged.^®
Statehood for Tennessee was an entirely different matter,
Ames, Life and Works of Fisher Ames. 1:317; Syrett, 
Works of Alexander Hamilton. V:186. Federalist hopes of po­
litical support from Vermont were soon dispelled as a rural- 
urban split occurred in that state.
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Since there were no new Eastern states to balance potentially 
Republican Tennessee, the Federal party opposed admission 
solidly. They knew that a shift in the balance of power 
would occur should this new western state be admitted into 
the Union. Statehood for Tennessee was, Chauncey Goodrich 
wrote Oliver Wolcott, "but one twig of the electioneering 
cabal of Mr. Jefferson." Yet most of the Federalists* argu­
ments against admission did not sound so partisan. They 
attacked both the census and proposed constitution of Ten­
nessee, insisting they did not comply with the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787. Congressman Theodore Sedgwick thought 
Tennessee's new constitution had been drawn up too hastily, 
and Rufus King chaired a senate committee that voted to deny 
admission until a more accurate census could be taken. Eleven 
of the fifteen senators who voted to postpone admission be­
longed to the Federalist party. In the final vote, however, 
the Federalists lost. Northern Republicans (led by William 
Findley and Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania) allied with 
southern Republicans and southern Federalists having large 
frontier constituencies (such as Robert Goodloe Harper and 
William Smith of South Carolina), and the House of Represen­
tatives voted 48 to 30 in favor of admission. All thirty 
negative votes were cast by Federalists. As the Federalists 
had feared, one of Tennessee's first acts as a new state was 
to cast its electoral votes for Thomas Jefferson in 1796.^^
llfor Tennessee statehood, see Abernethy, From Frontier
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The Federalists seemed oblivious to political reality,
however, as they wrote and adopted the constrdctionist Land
Act of 1796. This legislation followed General Anthony
Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers, which opened up a brand
new area north of the Ohio to western settlement. Battle
lines were drawn quickly over the proposed Ordinance. The
Federalists were determined to retain the speculator-oriented
provisions of the Land Ordinance of 1785 in this new bill,
while Republican and frontier elements prepared to fight for
a law favoring the yeoman farmer. Once again the Northeastern
vs. Southern and Western political split was apparent in the
12United States Congress. The frontier faction in the House 
again allied under Gallatin and Findley. Republican strength 
in the House typified the changing political scene and made 
for a more heated debate over the land bill. Gallatin's lib­
eral amendment calling for a residency requirement for pur­
chasers was defeated, but enjoyed considerable support. 
Republican Congressman Baldwin charged that "Speculation and 
making money [are] rarely found in more raging extremes and
to Plantation in Tennessee, p. 138; Annals of Congress. 4th 
Congress, May 1796, pp. 9Y, 1308, 1312, 1322, 1474; Hockett, 
"Federalism and the West," p. 118; Joseph W. Cox, Champion 
of Southern Federalism. Robert Goodloe Harper of South Caro­
lina (Port Washington, N. Y., 1972), p. 55; Dauer, The Adams 
Federalists♦ Congressional voting appendix. See also, 
Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, p. 143. 
Abernethy suggests that Tennessee might have cast its elec­
toral votes for Adams in 1796 had the Federalist party not 
opposed statehood.
^^Treat, National Land System, pp. 78-80, 89.
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persons we have supposed worthy of our confidence [are] 
publicly practising the meanest and most disgraceful arts 
of tricks of swindling." William Findley of western Penn­
sylvania was one of the most persuasive proponents of an 
agrarian land act. He summed up the Republican argument in 
March of 1796:
Some members thought to obtain money was the 
grand object . . .  [I do] not. . . . Had 
gentlemen considered what they were about?
Whether they were merchants only to get 
money? Surely not; they had men and the 
happiness of men in their view. . . . The 
comparison betwixt a merchant selling goods 
and the government selling land would not 
hold. It is a sort of transaction which 
should always be kept in the hands of gov- 
ernment and not in those of speculators. . .
The Federalists completely rejected this view. They be­
lieved in Hamilton's system of using land revenues to fund 
the federal government. Moreover, many of the Federalists 
were speculating heavily in western lands. Congressman 
William Cooper had amassed a fortune from his land investments 
in up-state New York. He maintained "the true cause of land 
selling was the competition of moneyed men," and argued that 
poor men would not buy land even if it was offered to them.
In opposing Republican efforts to reduce the size of minimum 
purchases. Cooper remarked that Congress should not put itself 
into the business of laying out "garden spots" for yeoman
13Annals of Congress. 4th Congress, February-March 1796, 
pp. 330, 404, 414; Treat, National Land System, pp. 82-83. 
Findley and Gallatin emerged as spokesmen for the West during 
the Whiskey Rebellion of the early 1790s.
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farmers! Some of his colleagues were nearly as outspoken.
One Federalist did not believe ’’there were as many families 
ready to go and settle upon these lands as has been assumed,” 
and he opposed "removing the inhabitants of the Atlantic 
states into these back settlements." Federalist Congressman 
Kittera spoke the sentiments of many anti-expansionists in 
March of 1796: "This kind of bounty as to encourage emigra­
tion is not good policy. There is still plenty of good land 
in the east to be disposed of."^^
Southern and Western strength in the House resulted in 
the passage of a fairly liberal land law, but a Senate com­
mittee composed of Federalists Ross, King, Marshall, and 
Strong amended all of the liberal features out of the Land 
Act of 1796. The result was a bill even more unfavorable 
to the West than the Ordinance of 1785. It required a 640- 
acre minimum purchase at $2.00 per acre. Even the credit 
provision, added as a feeble compromise, required a farmer 
to produce $1,280.00 in cash during one year. This bordered 
on the absurd, yet it reflected the wishes of most Federal­
ists .
Annals of Congress. 4th Congress, February-March, 1796, 
pp. 344, 348, 352, 408, 416. Congressman William Cooper was 
the father of novelist James Fenimore Cooper. See Henry Nash 
Smith, Virgin Land. The American West as Symbol and Myth (New 
York, 1950) , p. 67.
^^Annals of Congress. 4th Congress, April, 1796, p. 6 8 ; 
Cox, Robert Goodloe Harper, p. 52; Treat, National Land Sys­
tem . pp. 85, 92, 378.
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The election of John Adams as Washington's successor 
meant a continuation of the Federalist western policies. 
Although Adams came to represent what has been called the 
"agrarian" element of his p a r t y , h e  nevertheless enter­
tained many apprehensions concerning the trans-Appalachian 
West, and believed "The country is explored and thinly 
planted much too fast." Federalists during the Adams admin­
istration acted on several measures which reflected their 
attitudes toward the frontier. On January 25, 1799, the 
House voted to exempt the Mississippi River from restric­
tions on commercial intercourse. Thirty-two of the thirty- 
four congressmen who opposed this pro-western measure were 
Federalists. On April 24, 1800, a bill to grant Ohio terri­
torial governor Arthur St. Clair the right to dissolve the
Ohio territorial legislature was defeated, 49 to 42. Forty
17of those who favored the motion were Federalists. These 
measures not only reflect Federalist animosity towards the 
West, but also show a decline in the power of the Federal 
party's constrictionist element. Tennessee's admission in 
1796 was an early indication of this development. Another 
important step was the Harrison Land Law of 1800, passed by 
a coalition of Republicans and southern Federalists. It 
provided for a 320-acre minimum purchase at $2.00 per acre
^^See Dauer, The Adams Federalists, pp. 7, 18 
17 I b i d .  , Congressional vot ing  appendix.
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with four years credit. Although the Harrison act was not
as radical as Jefferson's Land Act of 1804 (160-acre minimum
at $1.64 per acre, but no credit), it was the most liberal
land law ever passed by Congress. The conservatives still
had bargaining power in 1800, but it was on the decline.
After twenty years, the American yeoman was now able to
purchase good land in the West on credit from the federal
government. Federalist efforts to slow westward migration
through a restrictive land policy had only worked tempo- 
18rarily. They had postponed the inevitable for twenty 
years.
Payson Treat is correct in his observation that expan­
sion from 1789-1800 occurred despite efforts of the federal 
government. The revenue-oriented programs of the Federal 
party showed no consideration for the people of the trans- 
Appalachian frontier. But settlers continued to migrate; 
pioneers squatted on land they could not afford to buy, and 
stole from the Indians the lands which were not for sale.
1 8Smelser, The Democratic Republic, pp. 36, 134; Phil­
brick, Rise of the West, p. 295; Treat, National Land Sys­
tem . pp. 101, 141. Reviewing the four land ordinances dis­
cussed in these essays one can see a definite evolution.
The Land Ordinance of 1785 provided for a 640-acre minimum 
purchase at $l/acre and no credit. The Land Act of 1796 
also specified a 640-acre minimum purchase, but at $2/acre 
and one year ciredit. The Harrison Land Act of 18 00 provided 
for a 320-acre minimum at $2/acre, but with four years credit 
The 1804 law legislated for a 160-acre minimum purchase at 
$1.64/acre (the price was higher if you wanted credit). So 
after twenty years purchasers.could buy land directly from 
the government, saving the expense of dealing through land 
speculators and investors.
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Federalist efforts to slow expansion through a liberal 
Indian policy, slow admission of western states, and a re­
strictive land policy proved ineffective.^^ Eventually, 
the anachronistic nature of Federalist western policy be­
came as apparent as the intent of the frontier settlers to 
ignore that policy. The unpopularity of Federalist western 
policy was one of many factors that led to Jefferson's vic­
tory over Adams in 1800. But Thomas Jefferson's election 
did not mean the Federalist anti-expansionists had sur­
rendered; it simply marked the beginning of the end. The 
phenomenal westward push during the "Great Migration" of 
the 1800s greatly worried conservatives during Jefferson's 
first administration. The aborted Federalist attempts to 
block admission of Ohio (1802) and the purchase of Louisiana 
(1803) demonstrated that the Northeasterners were not willing 
to change their views--even though their inflexibility meant 
political oblivion.
Congress debated the Ohio statehood question during the 
Spring of 1802. By this time, the people of Ohio were 
clamoring for statehood. They had met the requirements of 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and sent petitions to Con­
gress asking for admission into the Union. Federalist terri­
torial governor Arthur St. Clair vigorously opposed this
^^Treat, National Land System, p. 377; White, The Fed- 
eralists, pp. 366-386.
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statehood movement. He and other Ohio Federalists believed 
statehood would produce "nothing but misfortune." The 
Ohioans, according to St. Clair, were too poor and ignorant 
"to employ their thoughts on abtruse questions of Government 
and policy." "Fixed political principles they have none," 
he declared. "Their government would most probably be demo­
cratic in form and oligarchic in execution, and more trouble­
some and more opposed to the measures of the United States 
than even Kentucky." St. Clair and his allies in Congress
2 0used every political device available to prevent statehood,
but the Republican Congress voted to admit Ohio into the
Union in March of 1802. Of the twenty-nine members of the
House who opposed admission, twenty-three were Federalists.
The six senators who opposed admitting Ohio into the Union
21were all members of the Federal party.
The constrictionist Federalists waged their final great
2 0In Congress, the Federalists produced petitions from 
Ohioans who did not want statehood. When this failed. Fed­
eralists Griswold, Henderson, Goddard, and Bayard tried to 
gerrymander the borders of the new state. This would, accord­
ing to St. Clair, divide the inhabitants "in such a manner as 
to make the upper or Eastern division surely Federal, and form 
a counterpoise . . .  to those who are unfriendly to the Gen­
eral Government." For Ohio statehood, see Horsman, Formative 
Years. p. 89; Hockett, "Federalism and the West," pp. 123-24. 
The debates over statehood for Ohio are in Annals of Congress. 
7th Congress, March, 1802* pp. 296, 1104-5, 1120, 1123, 1161. 
Prior to the Congressional vote. President Thomas Jefferson 
dismissed St. Clair from the governorship of the territory.
21Annals of Congress, 7th Congress, March 1802, p. 1161. 
The six Federalist senators were Ogden, Foster, Howard, Morris, 
Tracy, and Olcott.
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battle over the Louisiana Purchase. Jefferson's proposed 
purchase of the Louisiana territory from France was in every 
sense an ideal issue for the Federalists, since it lay at 
the very heart of the expansion question. If the United 
States purchased Louisiana, there could be no turning back; 
the American republic would become an empire, and expansion 
would play an increasingly important role in the American 
experience. Inevitably, the political party which had op­
posed the West would suffer. Fully realizing this, a small 
band of Federalists in Congress prepared to fight the Pur­
chase. The Hartford Courant sounded the Federalist battle 
cry:
Fifteen million dollars for bogs, mountains, 
and Indians! Fifteen million dollars for 
uninhabited wasteland and refuge for crimi­
nals! And for what purposes? To enhance 
the power of Virginia's politicians. To 
pour millions into the coffers of Napoleon 
on the eve of war with E n g l a n d . 22
The constrictionist Federalists used several avenues of
attack. Fisher Ames protested the expense of Louisiana and
deplored wasting the "many millions it costs." Roger Griswold
doubted the validity of the French title to Louisiana, while
Senator Timothy Pickering warned of Spanish objections to the
purchase. Most surprisingly, the Federalists employed a
'strict construction' of the Constitution argument and termed
23the Louisiana Purchase "unconstitutional." But Federalist
22james Eugene Smith, One Hundred Years of Hartford's 
Courant (New York, 1949), pi 82.
23Ames, Life and Works of Fisher Ames, pp. 323-24; King,
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arguments against the expense, constitutionality, and dip­
lomatic consequences of purchasing Louisiana convinced no 
one. The House voted 90 to 25 in favor of the Louisiana 
Purchase. Nineteen of the twenty-five opponents belonged 
to the Federal party. In the Senate, the vote was 24 to 7, 
with all seven nays coming from the Federalists.^^
Thus the United States admitted into its boundaries a 
territory populated by what one conservative termed a 
"Gallo-Hispano-Indian ominum gatherum of savages and adven­
turers." With finalization of the Purchase, Fisher Ames 
wrote gloomily:
Now by adding an unmeasured world beyond that 
river [the Mississippi] we rush like a comet 
into infinite space. In our wild career we 
may jostle some other world out of its orbit, 
but we shall, in every event, quench the 
light of our o w n . 25
Such doom’s day talk was no charade. Most members of the
Federal party honestly believed that westward expansion would
Correspondence of Rufus King. 1:360; Smelser, Democratic Re­
public . p. 98. The only Republican who had scruples over 
the constitutionality of the purchase was Jefferson himself. 
Thus both parties had performed a flip-flop as regards their 
1790s view of the Constitution. For Congressional debates 
over Louisiana, see Annals of Congress. 8th Congress, pp. 34, 
44, 46, 73, 386, 432, 441, 445, 454, 472, 488.
^^Annals of Congress, 8th Congress, October, 1783, p. 
488; Smelser, Democratic Republic, p. 97. Smelser notes 
several prominent Federalists who did support the Louisiana 
Purchase were Rufus King, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, 
and John Marshall.
^^Ames, Life and Works of Fisher Ames, 1:323-24.
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result in. disaster for the American people. The Federalists 
had many tangible economic and political reasons for their 
constrictionist ideas, but at the heart of their view of the 
West was their basic conservatism. Linda Kerber has shown 
that the constrictionist Federalists were suspicious and 
wary on the unknown West. They had no desire whatsoever to 
venture into this "Land of Marvels." Such preposterous no­
tions could only be entertained by Jeffersonians and other
fools!26
The Federalists refused to embrace the West, and they 
paid the political price. After Kentucky and Tennessee 
allied with the South to elect Jefferson in 1800, the Federal 
party died a quick death. Their strength steadily declined, 
while the Republicans gained additional support in Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and western Pennsylvania and up-state New York. 
Admission of Ohio and the Louisiana Purchase promised to 
further lighten New England's political power. At the same 
time, the Federalists suffered an intra-party sectional split. 
According to Manning Dauer, the decline of Federalism was due 
largely to the decline of the agrarian, and Southern elements 
of the party. These "Adams Federalists," or "Half-Federalists" 
left the party after the Hamilton-Adams feud. Thus the Hamil­
ton Federalists changed their party from one with an Eastern
Linda J. Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and 
Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ithaca, 1970). Kerber 
explores the Federalist psyche and makes some interesting 
observations as to their conception of the West as a "Land 
of Marvels."
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seaboard following to one with only a Northeastern seaboard 
following. The South and West turned solidly to the Repub­
licans. Some historians contend that the Federalists could 
have successfully courted the western vote. Robert Goodloe 
Harper and other southern Federalists certainly did. But
the arch-Federalists seemed bent on self-destruction. Their
27withdrawal into New England insured it.
The irony of the whole affair is that the Federalists'
political heirs, the Whigs and Republicans (GOP) of the
1830-1860 period, came to be great political allies of the
28West. The hero of Tippecanoe and "Harry of the West" 
were Whigs, not Jacksonian democrats. Obviously, much hap­
pened during the intervening years. The Northeast was tem­
pered by democracy while the industrial revolution shifted 
that section's livelihood from commerce to manufacturing.
In the meantime the Old Northwest was settled by trans­
planted Northeasterners. These developments combined with
27Smelser, Democratic Republic, p. 76; James M. Banner, 
Jr., To the Hartford Convention; The Federalists and the 
Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts. 1789-1815 (New 
York, 1970), p. 113; Dauer, The Adams Federalists, pp. 7,
18. As Dauer notes, the "Half-Federalists" were hardly 
frontiersmen. They resided in the exporting agricultural 
regions, not on self-sufficient homesteads. Yet on many 
western issues they sided with the W'esterners and Republi­
cans. A good biography of one of the Half-Federalists is 
Cox, Robert Goodloe Harper. Read the chapter entitled 
"Robert Goodloe Harper and the West."
? 8William Henry Harrison of Ohio (Whig candidate for 
president in 1840) and Henry Clay of Kentucky (Whig candi­
date in 1832, 1836, and 1844). And do not forget that trans­
planted Kentuckian in Illinois who ran for president on the 
Republican ticket in 1860.
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completion of the Erie Canal (1825) to create a new partner­
ship between East and West, as the Westerners furnished raw 
materials, foodstuffs, and a consumer market for Eastern 
manufactures. The old South-West alliance was superseded 
by an East-West alliance that lasted through the Civil War 
and much of the nineteenth century. Industrial capitalism 
thus forged a partnership between two sections the arch-
Federalists thought to be inherently at odds with each 
?Qother.
But the Federalists of the 1790s and 1800s were no 
prophets. They feared and distrusted the West, and believed 
westward expansion boded ill for the republic. In Indian 
policy, diplomacy, land legislation, and admission of new 
states and territories they tried to discourage migration 
to the trans-Appalachian West. They tried, in vain, to 
thwart the growth of a segment of the population whom they 
considered to be a "wild, ungovernable race, little less 
savage than their tawn neighbors. Many Americans, of 
course, disagreed. A western legislator had earlier answered 
similar charges in an emotional speech before the Confedera­
tion Congress of 1783:
. . . with the utmost frankness, I admit 
their personal appearance is not the most 
fashionable and elegant kind; they are
^^Hockett, "Federalism and the West," pp. 134-35.
^^Quoted in Tatter, "Land Policy During the Confedera­
tion," p. 182.
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not decorated in all the style, the gaiety, 
and the taste of a dandy of the first 
water. Their means are too limited and 
their discretion too great, I trust, for 
the indulgence of such foppery and ex- 
travagence. , . . Sir, these are the very 
constituents of whom the nation ought to 
be proud. They constitute the bone sinew 
and strength of your government.31
Twenty years later, during the debate over Louisiana, a
young frontier Congressman named Andrew Jackson insisted "the
frontier people will listen to reason and respect the laws
of their country." And in 1809, the pioneers of Shawneetown
(in southern Illinois) alluded to the misapprehensions about
Westerners shared by many Federalists in a letter to Matthew
Lyon:
We must beg leave to make mention with 
diffidence lest a misconception be pre­
possessed from misrepresentations, that 
there are amongst our number both Moral 
and Relidgeous as well as many enterpris­
ing and industrious p e o p l e . 3 2
Despite these defenses, and after more than twenty 
years of debate. Federalist attitudes towards the West re­
mained virtually unchanged. The party which had harnessed 
the energy of the new republic was now unable to control it. 
The conservatism which made the Federal party a sturdy base 
on which to build a new culture, prevented it from changing 
with that culture. Although the West is only one window
31Quoted in Karl F. Geiser, "New England and the Western 
Reserve," Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical 
Association VI (1912-13):62.
3 2Annals of Congress, 8th Congress, September-October 
1803, pi 455; Philbrick, Laws of the Illinois Territory, 
XXV:cccxliv.
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through which one may view the growing obsolescence of the 
Federalist party, it is one of the clearest. The several 
hundred thousand pioneers who had crossed the Appalachians 
symbolized the energy and feeling that pulsed throughout 
America in 1800. Men and women who willingly risked their 
lives in an untamed wilderness demonstrated the spirit of a 
rising people. Like the frontiersmen among them, Americans 
in 1800 were searching for something indefinable, something 
called national greatness. They were in no mood to tolerate 
a political party that frustrated their search. In its 
attitudes toward the West, as in so many other ways, the 
Federal party had become an anachronism. It had no place 
in the America of 1800--no place at all.
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